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1. Introduction and context
1.1 Who the Handbook is for and what it covers
This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support Member States 
in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It 
is designed to be used by prison managers and prison staff, in particular, but will also be 
relevant for other actors involved in the criminal justice system, such as policymakers, legisla-
tors and members of non-governmental organizations. It can be used in a variety of contexts, 
both as a reference document and as the basis for staff training. While some elements of the 
Handbook may not be achievable immediately in some jurisdictions, particularly in post-
conflict situations, the Handbook provides national authorities with guidelines for the devel-
opment of policies and protocols that meet international standards and good practice.
This Handbook constitutes the first technical guidance tool to addresses the manifestation 
of radicalization to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the level of the United 
Nations. It provides practical guidance on:
• The management of violent extremist prisoners (prisoners who have embraced violent 
extremism)
• Preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons (prisoners who may be 
vulnerable to radicalization to violence)
• Interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and at 
facilitating their social reintegration upon release.
Within these parts, the Handbook covers key prison management policies and mechanisms, 
such as the need for: overall prison conditions to be in line with international minimum 
standards; effective assessment and classification systems; physical, procedural and dynamic 
security; professional prison staff training; fair, humane and non-discriminatory treatment; 
preventing corruption; various categories of disengagement interventions involving experts 
from different disciplines; and social reintegration and post-release support.
Overall, the Handbook advocates an approach aimed at strengthening these key components 
of prison management. Not only is such an approach explicitly called for in the international 
good practice documents, it also provides value by creating sustainable benefits for the entire 
prison system. The following considerations summarize the key principles underlying all 
recommendations made in the Handbook:
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• Adherence to fundamental rights, international standards, and good prison practice: It is 
crucial that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to under-
mining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are 
entitled. Under international human rights law, no exceptions or restrictions are per-
missible to the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Equally relevant is the protection of the right to hold an opinion and to have or adopt 
a religion or belief of one’s choice,1 although certain manifestations may be subject 
to limitations, if strictly necessary and provided by law (e.g. for the protection of 
public order or the respect of others’ rights). At the same time, Member States should 
prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or reli-
gious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
• Relevance of overall prison conditions and prison management: Guidance on the manage-
ment of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in 
prisons must ensure that any proposed intervention is closely embedded in broader 
prison reform efforts. Stand-alone disengagement interventions, which are imple-
mented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results, 
in particular if the latter fails to adhere to international standards and norms. Vulner-
ability to radicalization to violence is exacerbated in prisons that are overcrowded, 
understaffed, fail to provide basic services to prisoners, or are otherwise managed in 
a disorderly manner.
The most powerful weapon in the fight against radicalization in prisons is without a doubt a 
humane detention policy that respects the fundamental rights of the detainees and focuses 
indefatigably on rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, a custodial sentence or measure has 
to be executed under psychosocial, physical and material conditions that respect the dignity of 
the human person, has to render the preservation or growth of the self-respect of the detainee 
possible and has to appeal to their individual and social responsibility.
Belgium Federal Public Service–Justice (2014): Action Plan against Radicalization in Prisons, pp. 4 and 6.
• The importance of definitions and differentiation: This Handbook reiterates that prisoner 
radicalization, far from being a new phenomenon, is a very old issue which is not in 
itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all 
radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number 
of radicals actually become violent extremists. Definitions and differentiation are impor-
tant, therefore, when dealing with the sensitive topic of (violent) extremism and radi-
calization (to violence), in particular in order to differentiate between thought and action.
 See the glossary for a definition of key terms used for the purpose of this Handbook.
1 Arts. 7, 18(1), 19(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 2(2) of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment no. 20, para. 3; General Comment no. 22, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, paras. 2-3; and General 
Comment no. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 9.
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• Specific challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners: The above notwithstanding, prison 
managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may 
employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideo-
logical, religious, or political gain, and believe that they are fighting for a cause. This 
can have a significant impact on the way violent extremist prisoners should be man-
aged, as this Handbook will set out.
The focus of this Handbook is on adult male and female violent extremist prisoners. The 
specific issue of children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having committed violent 
extremist offences will be dealt with in a separate UNODC publication, recognizing the dif-
ferent legal regime applicable to children deprived of their liberty. Collective disengagement 
from violent extremism is also not covered in this Handbook, as its focus is on the individual 
prisoner and interventions aimed at individual disengagement from violence. Groups may 
also abandon their use of violent methods, but the reasons for them doing so are not neces-
sarily the same as when an individual disengages from violence.2
1.2 The overall context of violent extremism
Violent extremism is an affront to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It undermines 
peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. No country or region is immune 
from its impacts ... Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is 
neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief ... Definitions of "terrorism" 
and "violent extremism" are the prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their 
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law ... Violent 
extremism undermines our collective efforts towards maintaining peace and security, fostering 
sustainable development, protecting human rights, promoting the rule of law and taking 
humanitarian action.
Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), 
paras. 1, 2, 5 and 12.
While most of the media’s attention has been on acts of systematic terror committed by groups 
such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the name of Islam, it is important to note that the growth 
in extremist violence is not limited to one religion. Even in the Middle East, crimes have been 
committed in defense of Judaism, and Christian militias exist in many parts of the world. In Asia, 
groups have committed violations in the name of Hinduism and Buddhism, and in other parts of 
the world, political ideologies have led groups to take up arms.
Countering Violent Extremism While Respecting The Rights And Autonomy Of Women And Their Communities in: 
Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing The Peace–A Global Study on the Implementation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, (2015), p. 222.
Many countries are currently facing a threat from violent extremism and hardly a week goes 
by without an act of violent extremism taking place somewhere in the world. The threat of 
terrorism is rated “high” in many countries, and most regions of the world have seen the 
2 For a discussion on group disengagement, see: Cronin, A. (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline 
and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009) 
Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: Routledge.
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consequences of different acts and types of violent extremism. Attacks undertaken by violent 
extremist cause more than loss of life and economic damage; they can sow the seeds of 
division between communities, giving rise to increasingly reactionary and extremist views in 
other parts of society. This contributes to a breeding ground for violent extremism, perpetu-
ating a vicious cycle of radicalization to violence, aggression, and violent responses.
The main motivations to resort to violent extremist acts can be grouped under three head-
ings, notwithstanding the fact that people can also be motivated to use violence by more 
than one issue:
• Ideological violence
(a) Political ideologies such as nationalist, neo-Nazi groups, white supremacy or hate 
groups that advocate the use of violence; (b) extreme interpretations of religious ide-
ologies and beliefs that advocate the use of violence; or (c) violent left-wing, anarchist, 
and right-wing ideologies.
• Issue-based violence
(a) Violent animal liberation and animal rights movements; (b) environmental or eco-
related violent extremism; or (c) anti-government, anti-globalizationization or anti-
capitalist movements that advocate the use of violence.
• Ethno-nationalist or separatist violence.
Violent political or independence struggles based on race, culture, geography or 
ethnicity.
Violent extremism has evolved and taken on new forms and capabilities. Extremist groups 
now occupy large amounts of territory, have seized and generate substantial resources (for 
example, oil, kidnappings and illicit trade), and make sophisticated use of social media and 
communication tools to propagate their messages, disseminate their ideology and incite vio-
lence. The trends, means and patterns of radicalization to violence equally continue to broad-
en.3 Violent extremism now finds its inspiration in a larger variety of ideologies, and its 
activities are no longer the exclusive domain of centralized and hierarchical organizations. 
The threat has progressively evolved to include smaller groups, cells and lone actors operat-
ing in a more unconstrained and unpredictable way. They plan attacks with limited or no 
direction from an organization, making prevention even more difficult. Violent extremists are 
capitalizing on advances in technology to find new ways of engaging with disaffected youth, 
taking advantage of social networking sites, online video channels and radical chat rooms. 
They tend to spread their propaganda more widely, more rapidly and more effectively, and 
usually with more alacrity, than governments.
Very little attention has been paid historically to the idea of working with violent extremists 
to disengage them from violence, except perhaps by the traditional means of physical force 
or imprisonment. More recently, countries have realized that they cannot solve violent extrem-
ism with force and imprisonment alone (referred to as the “hard” approach).4 They have also 
realized that relying on repressive means alone may actually cause more problems than it 
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions–Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extrem-
ism: strengthening the EU's response (2014).
4 Cronin, A. (2009): How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns, Princeton 
Press. 
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solves. Consideration is therefore increasingly being given to adopting a more systematic and 
holistic way of understanding and managing the risk of individuals entering and re-entering 
violent extremist groups, and of exploring methods aimed at getting individuals to disengage 
from violent extremism voluntarily, and then reintegrating them back into society (referred 
to as the “soft” approach).5
1.3 Prisons and violent extremist prisoners
It is impossible to give a figure for the number of violent extremist prisoners that are currently 
held around the world. Some countries have only a few violent extremists within their prison 
systems, while other countries have many hundreds or thousands in detention. Given the 
number of violent extremist prisoners currently incarcerated, there is no doubt that prisons 
have a significant role when it comes to tackling violent extremism—a role which has been 
increasingly recognized by the United Nations and the international community at large.
I therefore recommend that Member States: (f) Reform national legal frameworks and penitentiary 
systems to ensure the security of inmates, personnel and facilities and establish procedures to 
prevent and counter radicalization in prisons based on human rights and the rule of law;
Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/67 (2015), para. 50(f).
Law and order cannot be established, and the safety and security of citizens and of the State 
cannot be preserved, without police and other law enforcement agencies operating in 
conjunction with functioning justice and corrections systems. Functional corrections systems are 
also a prerequisite to efforts to tackle "new" global threats, such as violent extremism and 
transnational organized crime, which are affecting an increasing number of conflict and post-
conflict settings.
Prison Support in United Nations Peace Operations (2015), United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
Department of Field Support, Ref. 2015.11.
Obligation to Prevent Terrorism: To ensure that States fulfil their obligation to prevent terrorism, 
States must provide the responsible authorities the necessary specialized training and technical 
and material assistance. States must also adopt, as needed, non-punitive counter-radicalization 
and deradicalization policies and programs that include engaging and working with … prison 
rehabilitation programs … to ensure effective implementation and sustainability of these related 
measures.
Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa (2015), Part 1,B.
An effective system for incarcerating convicted terrorists is a critical part of an effective criminal 
justice response to terrorism. Such a system should … prevent further radicalization of prisoners, 
prevent terrorist activities from being directed or supported from within the prison system, and 
provide for the deradicalization and reintegration of prisoners into society where possible and 
thereby reduce recidivism.
Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (2012): Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism 
Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector, Good Practice 11.
5 Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: 
Routledge, p. 2.
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The primary function of prisons holding alleged, accused or convicted violent extremist 
prisoners remains equal to that of any other prison, namely to contribute to public safety. 
In order to carry out this function, prisons must keep them securely and ensure that they 
do not escape from lawful custody. Prison administrations are also expected to work towards 
their disengagement from future violence and, by doing so, to prepare many for their social 
reintegration into the community.
In light of the risk that prisons constitute potential locations for the radicalization to violence 
of prisoners sentenced for offences unrelated to violent extremism, prisons should further 
strive to prevent other prisoners from being radicalized to violence. At the same time, prison 
administrations should keep in mind that prisons also provide an opportunity for prisoners 
to disengage from violence. Time in prison may bring about a transformation away from 
violent extremism—and could even prove a catalyst for positive change.6
Properly managing violent extremist prisoners reduces the opportunities for escape, miscon-
duct and inappropriate external communications. Improving the prison environment can also 
help ensure that prisons do not become locations in which radicalization to violence takes 
place. Interactions with prison staff who engage in humane and positive behaviour towards 
violent extremist prisoners can create openings for changes in prisoners’ thinking and 
behaviour.
Prison systems in many Member States face up to the challenge of imprisoning violent 
extremist prisoners by seeking to improve all aspects of prison management. The implemen-
tation of such an approach improves the management of the general prison population while 
at the same time enabling the prison administration to identify more clearly those who need 
specific interventions to disengage from ideologically-based violence. In general terms, focus-
ing on and investing in violent extremist prisoners should not divert attention from the 
general prison population, including other individuals or groups who have specific needs or 
may present a different threat to society. It is imperative, therefore, that any additional mate-
rial or financial support for prisons should benefit the whole system if it is to have a sustain-
ably positive impact and avoid discrimination.7
The selection and training of staff working with violent extremist prisoners is one particularly 
important element. Prison staff working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners need 
to be able to resist attempts to condition, manipulate and, in some circumstances, to radical-
ize them to violence. At the same time as working to prevent escapes, prison staff should be 
actively involved in efforts to get prisoners to disengage from violence. Care should also be 
taken to ensure that staff do not adopt an overzealous and discriminatory approach to catego-
ries of prisoners based on their faith or criminal charges, as this can antagonize them, as 
well as their sympathizers.
Finally, it must be noted that empirical studies measuring the extent of prison-based radi-
calization to violence in different regions on the one hand, and the effectiveness of pro-
grammes that promote disengagement from violence in Member States on the other, are still 
limited. On the basis of currently available analysis, research findings and practical examples 
from a variety of Member States, this Handbook seeks to provide knowledge and options 
on how best to manage and intervene with violent extremists in prison settings.
6 Jones, C. (2014): “When foreign fighters return: Managing terrorists behind bars”, The Conversation, 1 September 
2014.
7 See International Committee of the Red Cross (2016): Responding to radicalization in detention: An ICRC 
perspective.
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1.4 Existing guidance
This Handbook does not seek to duplicate existing guidelines on the management of violent 
extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons, or to provide 
another high-level checklist of key themes. Rather, the intention is to reference and build on 
existing guidance and research, and to provide more detailed information and practical exam-
ples of management approaches related to this particular category of prisoners. The following 
international organizations, fora and research institutes have drafted documents to provide 
guidance on various aspects of the approach to the management of violent extremist prison-
ers, which are referenced throughout this Handbook:
• Council of Europe
 − Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism (2016)
• Global Counterterrorism Forum
 − Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012)
 − Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of 
Violent Extremist Detainees (2012)
• International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
 − The Hague Core Principles and Good Practices Paper on the Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012)
• International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law
 − Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicali-
zation (2015)
As the core standard applicable to prisons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela 
Rules) are considered as an overall lens through which all other guidelines and recommenda-
tions should be read and interpreted.8
8 A/RES/70/175 (17 December 2015) entitled “United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)”, hereinafter referred to as the “Nelson Mandela Rules”. In the case of 
women prisoners, also see A/RES/65/229 (16 March 2011) entitled “United Nations Rules for the Treatment of 
Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules)”, hereinafter referred 
to as the “Bangkok Rules”. 
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To a great extent, managing institutions holding violent extremist prisoners requires the same 
“core” prison management approach as managing prisons detaining any other group of pris-
oners. Violent extremist prisoners, like other prisoners, need to be kept securely, provided 
with basic necessities such as food and clothing, looked after with humanity and given 
opportunities to reform and rehabilitate themselves.
Research shows that harsh treatment in detention facilities can play a disconcertingly powerful 
role in the recruitment of a large number of individuals who have joined violent extremist groups 
and terrorist organizations. Several factors have been identified as spurring prisoners to seek 
protection by joining groups, including inhumane prison conditions and inhumane treatment of 
inmates, corrupt staff and security officers, gang activity, drug use, lack of security and proper 
facilities, and overcrowding …
Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), paragraph 31.
Good management and good order in prison shall respect diversity, tolerance and human dignity 
of both prisoners and staff as this helps avoid situations conducive to radicalisation and violent 
extremism.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremis, 
Principle 8.
Respect for the dignity, and protection of the physical and psychological integrity of all persons 
deprived of their freedom is the basis for any successful treatment and programmes in detention.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2016): Responding to radicalization in detention: An ICRC perspective.
On the other hand, managing violent extremist prisoners can also bring additional challenges 
around security, dealing with the risk of radicalization to violence of other prisoners and 
prison staff, and manifestations of anti-authority behaviour.
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2.2 Upholding human rights
It is important that there is a clear legal basis and procedural framework for the detention 
and management of violent extremist prisoners which complies with obligations under inter-
national law, and which clearly delineates the institutions and agencies involved, as well as 
their respective roles, responsibilities and powers in this area.
A fundamental principle set out in international law and all relevant international standards 
and norms related to the treatment of prisoners is that their treatment should be humane 
and respect the inherent dignity of the human person. Torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment is prohibited with respect to all prisoners, including violent extremists, and prison 
administrations may not invoke any circumstances whatsoever as a justification for torture 
or ill-treatment.9
While this absolute prohibition is arguably the most fundamental aspect of the respect for 
the human dignity of prisoners, the principle of humane treatment encompasses many other 
aspects of prison management.10 Respecting prisoners’ dignity as human beings also means 
that prison authorities must ensure that their conditions of detention meet at least their basic 
needs, which include their accommodation, bed, bedding and clothing, drinking water and 
nutrition, access to open air and exercise, natural and artificial light, a temperature appropri-
ate to health as well as personal hygiene, sanitation facilities and access to health-care services. 
All prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled to the general living condi-
tions addressed in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Pris-
oners (the Nelson Mandela Rules):
9 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 7 and 10; Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Arts. 2 and 16; Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 1; 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principles 1 
and 6; European Prison Rules, Rules 1 and 72.1; Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of People Deprived 
of Liberty in the Americas, Principle I; Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, Recommendations 
1-3.
10 See the basic principles of the Nelson Mandela Rules, which are applicable to all prisoners, including Rules 
3 and 5(1).
All prisoners shall be treated with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human 
beings. No prisoners shall be subjected to, and all prisoners shall be protected from, torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, for which no circumstances 
whatsoever may be invoked as justification. The safety and security of prisoners, staff, service 
providers and visitors shall be ensured at all times.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 1.
Preventing and tackling radicalisation and violent extremism shall always be based on the rule of 
law and shall comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights 
and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalisation effort. Failure to 
comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalisation.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principle 1.
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“General living conditions addressed in these rules, including those related to light, 
ventilation, temperature, sanitation, nutrition, drinking water, access to open air and 
physical exercise, personal hygiene, health care and adequate personal space, shall apply 
to all prisoners without exception.”11
States are under a positive obligation to meet these basic standards without discrimination 
of any kind, and cannot claim that a lack of material resources and funding prevents them 
from doing so—a point reiterated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 
to Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):
“Treating all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for their 
dignity is a fundamental and universally applicable rule. Consequently, the application 
of this rule, as a minimum, cannot be dependent on the material resources available in 
the State party.”12
It is important to note in this regard that treating prisoners with humanity does not hinder 
safeguarding security and order in prisons, but on the contrary, is fundamental to ensuring 
that prisons are secure and safe. Good practice in prison management has shown that when 
the human rights and dignity of prisoners are respected and they are treated fairly, they are 
much less likely to cause disruption and disorder, and more likely to accept the authority of 
prison staff. Treating violent extremists prisoners with respect can also undermine “us and 
them” thinking, demonization, dehumanization and attitudes that justify offending. Psycho-
logically, it can directly challenge ways of thinking and perceptions of groups that facilitate 
violent extremism.
In low-resource countries and post-conflict environments, meeting these basic requirements 
may pose significant challenges, especially where prisons are overcrowded, which is often the 
case. In such jurisdictions, there may be significant reliance on support from donor agencies 
to meet basic requirements, and such support is not always available. Prisoners will usually 
be dependent on their families to provide them with adequate food, and will not have access 
to sufficient space or other conditions that promote and protect physical and mental health. 
Such situation not only contravenes international standards, but failure to meet these basic 
needs can further be exploited by violent extremist groups to facilitate recruitment and reten-
tion of existing violent extremists, for example when violent extremist groups provide food, 
safety, or education to prisoners (and their families).
11 Ibid., Rule 42. For further details, see Rules 12 to 17 on accommodation, Rule 18 on personal hygiene, 
Rules 19 to 21 on clothing and bedding, Rule 22 on food, Rule 23 on exercise and sport, and Rules 24 to 35 on 
health care.
12 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 21, para. 4 (1992).
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TUNISIA: The dangers of prison overcrowding
The living conditions in prisons must be safe and humane, where the prison’s administration is 
easily able to determine and diagnose the danger of recruitment and intervene to protect 
individuals and offenders. Overcrowded rooms will create insecurity and reduce control, which will 
provide opportunities for recruitment and converting to extremist thought. Overcrowding also 
represents a real danger inside prisons because it negatively affects basic caring services and 
rehabilitation and corrective programmes. Overcrowding will also cause frustration, violence and 
tension, which will lead to prisoners seeking protection by joining or belonging to violent 
extremist groups, as they will provide the psychological and material care that is absent from the 
prison administration.
Contribution submitted by the Direction générale des prisons et de la rééducation of Tunisia in the course of the two 
UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 
2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
While not in itself sufficient to trigger radicalization to violence, poor living conditions and 
prison overcrowding can generate resentment and provide the ground for antisocial narratives 
to take root.13 Tackling poor conditions in prison should therefore be considered as an integral 
part of the effort to counter violent extremism in prisons.14 In Somalia, for example, tackling 
overcrowding and providing prisoners with running water, beds and televisions has contrib-
uted to the reduction in violence in prison and has enabled staff to engage prisoners more 
effectively in disengagement activity. At the same time, any specific attention paid to violent 
extremist prisoners must not result in other (groups of) prisoners being denied humane 
treatment and the fulfilment of their basic needs.
Focusing on, and investing in one group of detainees should not divert attention from other 
individuals and or groups who have specific needs or may present a different threat to society. Any 
additional material or financial support for detention should benefit the whole system if it is to 
have a sustainably positive impact and avoid negative discrimination. This applies also to external 
interventions, such as bilateral and governmental cooperation initiatives. (…)
The specific attention paid to detainees perceived as “radicalized”, or detained in relation to 
terrorist acts sometimes results in other groups of detainees receiving neither the humane and 
dignified minimum, nor the necessary management and staff attention. This is particularly the 
case in situations where penitentiary systems already face serious problems (for example, where 
there is severe and chronic overcrowding and a high level of violence). This can create new threats 
to safety and security.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2016): Responding to radicalization in detention: An ICRC perspective .
13 Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extrem-
ism, Principle 9.
14 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 2; ICCTR Paper on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent 
Extremist Offenders, Subsection II (Prison Context, International Standards); Global Center on Cooperative Security 
(2015): Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an 
Action Agenda, Action 8.
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Measures that need to be taken to improve conditions in prisons should start with a review 
of criminal justice policies, aiming to reduce the use of pretrial detention and imprisonment 
when not absolutely necessary. Furthermore, steps must be taken to mitigate the impact of 
overcrowding and to maximize the use of existing capacity by careful planning and by using 
available space creatively.
Programmes such as parole, early release based on good behaviour, or sentencing alternatives 
to imprisonment may reduce the time ordinary inmates are in contact with (suspected) violent 
extremist prisoners, and thereby reduce both overcrowding and recruiting opportunities. 
Alternatives to imprisonment can also potentially repair harm suffered by victims, provide 
benefits to the community through community service, better treat dependencies or mental 
illness, and rehabilitate offenders. Alternatives to imprisonment can also allow the prison 
administration to better focus their often limited prison resources on those prisoners assessed 
to be of high risk. If courts have options other than imprisonment, they can better tailor a 
cost-effective sentence that fits the offender and the crime and at the same time protects the 
community.
 For further detail, see the UNODC Handbook on Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding in Prisons (2013)15
From a prison management perspective, it is not just the issue of overcrowding that can be 
a challenge in terms of accommodation. Even where there is sufficient accommodation, that 
accommodation may not be appropriate for the housing of violent extremist prisoners if it 
consists of large rooms or dormitories holding hundreds of prisoners with minimal supervi-
sion by prison staff. Prisons holding violent extremist prisoners require capacity to manage 
those prisoners in smaller groups rather than in large numbers.
Right to family life and contact with the outside world:16 Violent extremist prisoners retain, within 
certain limits, their right to family life and not to be totally isolated from society, even though 
they may be prevented from physical interaction with the outside world. Prisoners’ ability to 
maintain contacts with the outside world, in particular their families, is also fundamental to 
their prospects of successful social reintegration, as emphasized in the United Nations Stand-
ard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules). Therefore, 
enabling such contact is an essential part of strategies that aim to ensure that their human 
rights are respected and that their chances of social reintegration are strengthened. As appro-
priate prison facilities may be located far from prisoners’ families in some countries, prison 
administrations should make special efforts to prevent the breakdown of family ties, with 
visits, letters and phone calls being allowed to the maximum possible extent, while ensuring 
that the requisite security precautions are in place.
While the above is all the more important in the case of violent extremist prisoners, who 
are likely to serve long sentences, the prison administration’s duty to encourage contact with 
the outside world must also be balanced against the risks that may be associated with the 
ability of violent extremist prisoners to communicate with those outside. Communication 
15 Also see the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights 
implications of overincarceration and overcrowding, United Nations Doc. A/HRC/30/19, 10 August 2015, paras. 
66-68.
16 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 58-63, 106; also see the Bangkok Rules, Rules 23 and 26; Body Of Principles 
For The Protection Of All Persons Under Any Form Of Detention Or Imprisonment, Principles 19 and 20; United 
Nations Recommendations On Life Imprisonment, para. 11.
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must be managed to prevent crime, inhibit the trafficking of unauthorized items, ensure the 
protection of the public from unwanted communications, and prevent escapes. When appro-
priate, prison officials may need to monitor and control violent extremists’ communication 
with people outside the prison or visitors coming to the prison, without prejudice to the 
violent extremists’ legal defence rights. This may apply to family visitors, telephone calls, mail 
or e-mail. Prison officials should take steps to detect, deter and disrupt all communications 
that would benefit violent extremists’ objective.17
It is important, however, that restrictions placed by the prison officials on violent extremist 
prisoners’ communications be in accordance with the level of threat, and applicable domestic 
and international law. Both the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT) and the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CPT) have 
on a number of occasions criticized the unjustified restrictions placed on prisoners with long 
prison terms and those held in high-security settings in their contacts with the outside world. 
As a general rule, all prisoners should be allowed, under necessary supervision, to commu-
nicate regularly, by letter, telephone and visits with their families and other persons.
Access to legal representation:18 Violent extremist prisoners, like all prisoners, should have access 
to a legal advisor or a legal aid provider. As a rule, visits with legal representatives may only 
17 Some violent extremist groups have included in their training manuals the need to maintain contact with 
violent extremists outside of prison. See, for example: Al- Qaeda training manual – Lesson 18: Prisons and Deten-
tion centres (available at: www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2002/10/08/manualpart1_4.pdf), which recom-
mends to “[t]ake advantage of visits to communicate with brothers outside prison and exchange information that 
may be helpful to them in their work outside prison … The importance of mastering the art of hiding messages is 
self-evident here”. 
18 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 61, 119-120. 
States could consider, on a case by case basis and taking into account relevant domestic and 
international law, the introduction of specific control mechanisms with regard to the inmates’ 
communication, both within and outside the prison. Prison officials could consider, where 
necessary and appropriate, limiting or restricting contact between the general population and 
specific segments of the prison population, especially dangerous violent extremist prisoners.
Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012), 
Good Practice, Number 6.
Any supervision and restriction of contacts, communications and visits to prisoners, due to 
radicalisation concerns, shall be proportionate to the assessed risk and shall be carried out in full 
respect of international human rights standards and national law related to persons deprived of 
their liberty and shall be in accordance with Rule 24 of the European Prison Rules concerning 
contact by prisoners with the outside world.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principle 3.
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be restricted in exceptional circumstances, i.e. ordered by a judicial authority.19 Meetings 
with lawyers should take place out of hearing of prison staff, though it is normal procedure 
to have them within sight of staff. Legal documents and correspondence should be treated 
as confidential and the searching of lawyers should be undertaken with particular 
sensitivity.
Freedom of religion:20 International standards are very clear that all prisoners have the right 
to practise their religion. The Human Rights Committee, for example, stressed that prisoners 
“continue to enjoy their rights to manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent com-
patible with the specific nature of the constraint”.21 Freedom to have, adopt and manifest a 
religion or belief of one’s choice can also be regarded as a component of a constructive and 
balanced prison regime. In practical terms, religion may help some prisoners come to terms 
with their sentences and restrictive custodial settings, while offering an opportunity, for those 
who are convicted, to reflect on the crimes they have committed. Researchers have found 
that increased levels of religiosity are associated with high levels of in-prison adjustment and 
significantly related to a smaller numbers of violations of prison rules.22
There should be clear policies for dealing with faith issues in prison and for respecting all 
religious beliefs represented in prisons, including those holding violent extremist prisoners. 
Demonstrating such respect can contribute to undermining violent extremist thinking, for 
example, a lack of tolerance for difference. Prison staff should be provided with adequate 
training to raise awareness and enhance their sensitivity about their duty to promote and 
respect the right to freedom of religion or belief.23 Religious officials can be used to provide 
such training and to act as reference points for other staff on faith matters. Likewise, nobody 
should be obliged to subscribe to any religion or join religious services, either by prison staff 
or other prisoners. No prisoner should be disadvantaged because of his or her religious beliefs 
or lack of them, and measures need to be in place to protect prisoners from being coerced 
into converting to a certain religion or into practising a religion.
19 The European Prison Rules, for example, restrict such exceptional circumstances and corresponding restric-
tions on confidentiality to the prevention of serious crime or major breaches of prison safety and security (see Rule 
23.5). 
20 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 65-66.
21 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (1993) on freedom of thought, conscience or religion, 
United Nations Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 8.; also see the Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom 
of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, 30 January 2015, United Nations Doc. A/HRC/28/66/Add.2, para. 59.
22 See, for example: Clear T., Sumter M. (2002): “Prisoners, prison and religion”, Journal of Offender Rehabilita-
tion, 35(3-4), pp. 125-156; O'Connor T. and Perreyclear M. (2002), “Prison religion in action and its influence on 
offender rehabilitation”, Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 35(3-4), pp. 11-34.
23 See the interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, United 
Nations Doc. A/60/399, 30 September 2005, paras. 69-91.
For religiously inspired extremism, it is very important not to confuse people who might have (re)
discovered their faith with people who have developed radical views. Most people who convert or 
revert, e.g. to Islam, during imprisonment are doing so for peaceful individual motives or to bond 
with a group of other prisoners. However, prejudices around the linkage between religion and 
extremism remain very present and may hamper good risk assessment.
Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016): Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN 
Prisons and Probation–practitioners working paper, p. 3.
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The Government judges the greatest threat to the UK at this time to be from Al Qaeda inspired 
extremists. This must not be confused with the Islamic faith. Islam is one of the major world 
religions. It is based on the Unity/Oneness of God and tolerance towards all mankind. It is one of 
the three great Monotheistic Religions. The others are Judaism and Christianity. Islam means 
“Peace”, and complete submission to the will of God. A Muslim is “one who spreads peace”. There is 
no suggestion that legitimate expressions of faith are in any way indicative of radicalisation or 
extremism. We respect all faiths and we will continue to facilitate the variety of faiths practised in 
our prisons. Faith can play a positive role in the lives and rehabilitation of prisoners. Muslim 
chaplains are the source of specific advice on Islam within prisons.
National Offender Management Service (NOMS) – England and Wales, Extremism and Radicalisation–Guidance 
for Staff.
Prisoners should be allowed to pray, to read approved religious books and to meet other 
relevant requirements, e.g. those related to diet and hygiene. Violent extremist prisoners of 
the same religion may be allowed to gather to celebrate special days or collectively worship, 
taking into account individual risk assessments. Appropriate facilities, such as prayer rooms, 
should be provided. Prisoners should also have the opportunity, if they so wish, to be visited 
by qualified representatives of their own religion in private or in group services.
In order to facilitate the above, prison administrations should establish agreements with 
religious denominations, and religious representatives should be properly trained on how to 
exercise their functions in a prison environment.24 The number of religious officials in each 
prison should reflect the numbers of prisoners of each faith in that prison. Religious officials 
may be hired directly by the prison or prison officials when permitted by law. Alternatively, 
respected religious leaders from the local community may be allowed to hold services within 
the prison. In any case, prison authorities have the right to screen religious representatives 
entering prisons in order to prevent violent extremist views from being disseminated among 
prisoners. Some prison administrations have developed competency profiles to use when 
selecting spiritual counsellors.25 All groups and individuals must be subjected to the same 
screening and review process.26
Next to granting religious officials access to prisoners, prisons should have an adequate sup-
ply of approved religious texts written by qualified representatives of the different religions 
that are represented in a prison. The availability of authoritative literature on religious issues 
is one way of ensuring that prisoners who wish to develop their knowledge on such matters 
do not have to rely on texts smuggled into prison, which may advocate for national, racial 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.27
 For faith-based interventions as a means of disengagement from violence, see chapter 5
24 Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extrem-
ism, Principle 24.
25 See, for example: Ajouaou, M. (2008): Religious competency profile for Islamic spiritual counsellors in the 
Justice Department–working document on behalf of the Muslims and the Government Liaison Committee, The 
Netherlands.
26 IIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommenda-
tion  14 (Support the role that religious and other services can provide to prisons as means to countering 
radicalization).
27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 20(2). See also the Rabat Plan of Action on the 
prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility 
or violence, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 11 January 2013, annex, appendix.
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2.3 Ensuring secure custody
The credibility of any prison system rests on its ability to keep prisoners in custody safely 
and securely—in other words, to prevent violence or harm within the prison setting and to 
prevent escapes. Preventing escapes is a fundamental activity of prison management as it 
protects the public from further criminal acts; contributes to giving the public, media and 
politicians confidence in the criminal justice system; and enables prisoners to benefit from 
rehabilitation activities provided within the prison system. The consequences of escapes by 
violent extremist prisoners can be severe. There have been instances where escaped violent 
extremist prisoners have perpetrated acts of terrorism; murdered and/or seriously injured 
members of the public and law enforcement; and committed other serious criminal activity.
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: An escape incident related to violent extremism
As of June 2016, the prison system of the Kyrgyz Republic accommodated 239 violent extremist 
prisoners, including 159 persons in closed-type prisons, 30 in open-type prisons and 50 offenders 
registered in the probation department. The escape of nine prisoners, including violent extremist 
prisoners, from a high-security prison on 12 October 2015 resulted in the death of 13 people, 
including four prison staff, and sparked a massive political and public outcry. As a result, the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic took emergency measures and allocated funds for the 
construction of a specialized high-security prison facility and provision of resources for recruiting 
additional prison staff. In addition, in April 2016, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic approved 
Law No. 44 of the Kyrgyz Republic on amendments to the Penal Code, which envisages the 
separate accommodation of violent extremist prisoners in cell-type facilities.
Contribution submitted in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 an 1-3 June 2016).
Security in prisons is ensured by physical means of security, such as the walls, bars on win-
dows, locks and doors, alarm systems and so on; by procedural means, which are procedures 
that must be followed, such as rules relating to prisoners’ movement around the prison, the 
possessions they may keep, searches of prisoners and their accommodation, among others; 
and dynamic security, which requires an alert staff who interact with prisoners in a positive 
manner and engage them in constructive activities, allowing staff to anticipate and prevent 
problems before they arise. A proper balance should be maintained between the physical, 
procedural and dynamic security in the case of all prisoners, including violent extremist 
prisoners. The right balance to prevent escape and maintain order will depend on a number 
of factors such as the condition of the prison facilities, the level of technology available, the 
number of staff and type of prisoners being held. For example, where physical security is 
weak (as may be the case in low-resource and post-conflict environments), procedural and 
dynamic security becomes all the more important.
Prison administrations should also be aware that escape attempts do not just involve violent 
extremist prisoners trying to break out of the prison from inside. Violent extremist groups, 
particularly those that have large quasi-military organizations with significant command of 
territory and resources, are increasingly staging attacks on prisons and instigating large scale 
prison riots to effect the escape of imprisoned members. In some cases, violent extremist 
groups have attacked prisons to facilitate the escape of prisoners, who are then recruited into 
the violent extremist group as payment for being freed by the group.
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Finally, prison security refers not only to the means by which escapes are prevented but also 
to measures that are necessary to prevent violent extremist prisoners from directing violent 
extremist and other criminal activity taking place outside the prison. Next to directing ter-
rorist activity, such criminal activity may also include seeking to intimidate or corrupt wit-
nesses, judiciary, lawyers or jurors.28
A fundamental principle of good prison management is that prisoners should be subject to 
the least restrictive measures necessary for the protection of the public, other prisoners and 
staff.29 Most violent extremist prisoners tolerate being in prison when conditions are fair and 
appropriate, and the majority accepts the reality of their situation. Provided that they are 
subject to appropriate security measures and fair treatment, most prisoners will not try to 
escape or seriously disrupt the normal routine of the prison.
A small minority of violent extremist prisoners, however, may well do everything in their 
power to try to escape or to initiate activities intended to undermine the good order of the 
prison. Others will seek to corrupt or manipulate staff and attempt to have illicit goods 
smuggled into the prison. Similar to criminal networks, violent extremist groups can continue 
to exist within prisons. They can make contacts while in prison and, in some cases, extend 
their activity beyond the prison system. Violent extremist prisoners might also use their time 
in prison to learn criminal techniques from, or rely on the services of, “regular” criminals 
(for example, concerning the supply of weapons or forged passports) to prepare or coordinate 
terrorism activities outside of prison. This means that the prison authorities should be able 
to assess the risk posed by each individual prisoner in order to make sure that each one is 
subject to the appropriate conditions of security.
  For the risk of corruption, conditioning and manipulation of prison staff, see chapter 3.6; for the security 
categorization of violent extremist prisoners, see chapter 4
Furthermore, security measures applied to violent extremist prisoners should be reviewed 
regularly and modified as necessary. The implementation of this principle contributes to 
ensuring that only a small number of prisoners will need to be held in high security condi-
tions, thereby ensuring their effective supervision and management. It also ensures that human 
and financial resources are not wasted on holding large numbers of prisoners in custodial 
settings that are more restrictive than necessary.
  For more detail on prison security, see the UNODC Handbooks on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence 
(2015) and on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2016)
28 The commentary (in paragraph 21) to the Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States concerning dangerous offenders makes clear that offenders whose dan-
gerousness is determined by their involvement in organized crime and/or terrorism create specific demands, in 
particular as far as questions of security and public order are concerned: the development of phenomena such as 
violence and/or proselytism in prisons needs to be avoided; when necessary, these dangerous offenders should be 
detained in penitentiary establishments located far from places where criminal organizations have a strong presence; 
these dangerous offenders should not be able to carry on with their criminal activities while in detention (for 
example, they should not have the opportunity to transmit orders to their accomplices on the outside).
29 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules, Rule 36; European Prison Rules, Rules 3 and 18.10; Recommendation CM/
Rec (20143 of the Committee of Ministers of member states concerning dangerous offenders (Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 19 February 2014), para. 4.
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2.4 Importance of prison intelligence
In order to ensure that the prison authorities can identify illicit activities, all prisons should 
have in place a structured prison intelligence system to gather security and related informa-
tion in a secure environment, consistent with national legislation and international standards. 
All prison staff should have a responsibility to actively gather security information and pass 
this information to the security department. This is a key aspect of dynamic security and 
requires staff to actively engage, and maintain professional relationships, with prisoners if 
they are to obtain good quality information.
By being more attentive to what is going on throughout their individual correctional facilities, 
correctional personnel, especially “Line Staff”, can be instrumental in identifying those doing the 
radicalizing and those being radicalized. Seasoned correctional personnel can develop a sixth sense 
about the “feel” of certain correctional environments. They know when something is not right or 
normal. Gathering intelligence is just refining those learned traits and reporting and documenting 
observations, conversations, associations, changes in offenders’ actions and behaviors, etc.
Sturgeon, W. (2015) Radicalization and Intelligence Gathering In Correctional Institutions.
The ability to collect, evaluate, collate, analyse and disseminate information related to violent 
extremist prisoners is critical not only to the safe operation of prison facilities but also to 
the prevention of radicalization to violent extremism. Prison intelligence systems aid in secu-
rity, assist in intake, assessment and classification, and inform interventions and rehabilitative 
measures. Accurate intelligence information also assists prison management in making sound 
strategic decisions about prisoner placement and allocation of human resources and funding 
in the prisons to address security issues, including the prevention of radicalization to violence 
of members of the larger prison population.
GERMANY (State of Hesse): A prison intelligence network on violent extremist prisoners
In 2016, a new department in the Prison Service (Ministry of Justice) was set up. The overall 
objective was to establish a central contact point and centre of competence, which would collect 
relevant knowledge generated through the implementation of projects, and make such 
knowledge available to other institutions. In addition, seven “structural observers” 
(Strukturbeobachter) were deployed in various prisons in the state of Hesse, who act as the focal 
points for relevant information on site. Their work involves close cooperation and information-
sharing with prison staff from various department and disciplines, trainers from the Violence 
Prevention Network, prison imams, structural observers in other prisons, as well as with the 
Ministry of Justice, the State Office of Criminal Investigations (Landeskriminalamt), and the Agency 
for Internal Security (Landesamt für Verfassungschutz), as appropriate. Their tasks also involve the 
supervision and monitoring of violent extremist prisoners’ (a) postal correspondence; 
(b) telephone calls; (c) visits, according to circumstances; and (d) money transfers; as well as (e) the 
participation in and/or initiation of case conferences related to violent extremist prisoners.
Identification of violent extremism includes the: (a) diligent evaluation of existing information and 
intelligence (e.g. documentation related to the individual’s imprisonment, etc.); (b) detailed 
observation of the individual in the course of his or her imprisonment; and the (c) continuous 
information-sharing, such as with the Police and the Agency for Internal Security (Landesamt für
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Verfassungschutz). With regards to the latter element, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior 
and Sports and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration of the state of Hesse have developed 
dedicated guidelines on the cooperation of the Police, the Agency for Internal Security and the 
Prison/Probation Services in cases of politically motivated violence and organized crime, as well as 
for countering violent extremism.
Case study submitted by the Prison Service, State of Hesse, Germany, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group 
Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
As with most elements of prison operations, how officials gather and utilize intelligence 
depends on a number of factors including their legal frameworks, cultures and resources. 
Prison systems should have a central information-gathering unit, which provides prison man-
agement with accurate and timely information about radicalization to violence activities and 
improves prison security protocols. This is best accomplished by observing, documenting and 
addressing the behaviour of violent extremist prisoners. Regular written reports on each 
violent extremist prisoner is one approach to support consistent and individualized 
attention.
The effective management of violent extremist prisoners further requires the collaborative 
sharing of intelligence throughout their incarceration (pretrial, post-conviction and pre-
release). All legal sources for gathering information on what is happening within prisons 
should be utilized as a way to identify potential radicalization to violence in prison.30 Prisons 
and prison intelligence units do not exist in isolation, and dealing with violent extremist 
prisoners, and preventing radicalization to violence, requires a comprehensive approach based 
on approved professional standards at all levels—local, national and international. Prison 
services should therefore cooperate with probation services, where they exist, other law 
enforcement and security agencies, public and private bodies and civil society in order to 
achieve successful disengagement and reintegration of prisoners.31
At the point a violent extremist prisoner enters prison, there is a wealth of information 
already held on the individual by the police, the prosecution service, the judiciary, social 
services and other agencies. It is essential that, at this point, the prison intelligence unit 
captures all available intelligence on that violent extremist prisoner and creates a prisoner 
profile for him or her. To do this effectively and in order to avoid working at cross purposes, 
it is essential that there is a good working relationship between the prison intelligence unit 
and their police, security services and other counterparts tasked with tackling violent extrem-
ism. Most police services and some security services will have an intelligence department 
that will gather and process prisoner-related intelligence.
Prisons should be open to receiving and sharing intelligence and prison staff aware of how 
information will be utilized. Officials should consider appropriate protocols and procedures to 
put in place, in order to share information internally and externally. In order to facilitate the 
sharing of information between all public safety sectors, such protocols should be reciprocal. 
If outside agencies are involved in collecting intelligence from within the prison system, such 
30 IIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 
12 (Utilize all legal sources for gathering information on what is happening within prisons as a way to identify 
potential violent extremist radicalization in prison).
31 See Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principles 26-27.
21Chapter 2 MANAGING VIOLENT ExTREMIST PRISONERS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 
efforts should be coordinated with prison officials to avoid disruption to the proper manage-
ment of the prison or ongoing interventions. Prisons are valuable sources of intelligence relevant 
to criminal justice and national security and should therefore be as open to sharing their intel-
ligence information as they are to receiving such information from partner agencies.
ENGLAND AND WALES: The Extremism Unit of the National Offender Management Service
The Extremism Unit (ExU) is part of NOMS [prison administration] Security Group and is 
responsible for developing the strategic, policy and procedural responses appropriate to the risks 
presented by terrorists, extremists and radicalisers. It receives intelligence and information on 
extremism from all prisons in England and Wales and uses this information to produce strategic 
analysis to assist operational colleagues in prisons and to inform future intelligence gathering. The 
ExU works with Regional Counter Terrorism Coordinators (RCTCs) based across the regions in 
England and Wales to develop intelligence and to monitor and manage terrorist or extremist 
prisoners in custody. RCTCs work with key partners such as Probation, Police and Security Services 
to share information and help manage the risk these offenders pose.
National Offender Management Service (2014) : Managing Terrorist and Extremist Offenders in the Community, p. 10.
Inter-agency cooperation, in practice, often needs to be supported by detailed cooperation 
agreements and protocols that articulate clearly the respective responsibilities of all agencies, 
the resources that they will engage and their service commitment. Inter-agency cooperation 
is usually well served by being formalized and accompanied by clear protocols for resource-
sharing, information-sharing and problem-solving. The respective roles and responsibilities of 
each agency must be clearly defined and understood, and personnel from each agency can 
benefit from an understanding of the respective, and often differing, policies and practices 
of other agencies.
CANADA: Information-sharing arrangements between agencies
The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) identifies persons of credible concern to national 
security in three primary ways: individuals convicted of a terrorism offence (Section 83.01 
Criminal Code of Canada); those identified by partners or third party agencies (e.g., the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency); and those identified 
internally by CSC. Early detection and identification is of paramount importance and affords CSC 
the ability to closely monitor these cases through existing security intelligence processes. 
Existing external partner information sharing arrangements (via memorandums of 
understanding) are an integral component in the process of identification, detection, and 
prevention. CSC possesses MOUs with various criminal justice and law enforcement partners 
that allow for sharing of information on national security cases. This includes support of active 
operational and criminal investigations.
Contribution submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings 
on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
It is good practice to have an Information Sharing Agreement in place at local level to 
facilitate this process and, wherever possible, to be transparent about this process. Informa-
tion should only be shared where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and 
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proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing informa-
tion will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public. In many 
jurisdictions, the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a legal 
power to do so. The information collected by organizations must also comply with the relevant 
national guidelines and/or legislation for the management of information.
  For further detail on privacy, personal data protection and informed consent to data sharing, see chapter 6.6
2.5 Safe and orderly institutions
The management of violent extremist prisoners presents a challenge to prison authorities, in 
that they have to achieve a balance between the threat that such prisoners may pose to order 
inside prisons, including the risk that they will seek to radicalize others to violence, and the 
obligation of the State to treat all prisoners in a decent and humane manner.
It is possible to plot a spectrum of the potential activities violent extremist groups and indi-
viduals may undertake in a custodial environment. Some, or even many, of these activities 
may be seen in normal prison behaviour and, taken individually, may not be seen as reliable 
indicators of violent extremist behaviour at the individual or group level. There are four 
categories of potential activity which can have a negative impact on the safety and order in 
prison: (a) forming groups and the emergence of organizations; (b) using passive or non-
violent resistance; (c) using violent means to resist the prison authorities actively; and 
(d)  intimidation through threats of violence to families of prison staff or other prisoners. A 
characteristic displayed by a number of violent extremist groups is their use of paramilitary-
style hierarchical command structures, which are imported from external organizational struc-
tures into the prison. The use of such paramilitary structures and roles (such as “officer 
commanding”) is in keeping with the view of some violent extremist groups that their pris-
oners should be seen as prisoners of war.
Violent extremist prisoners may voluntarily self-segregate themselves from the rest of the prison 
population. For example, prisoners may seek to move into cells or rooms with fellow violent 
extremists as a means of promoting solidarity and avoiding conflict with other prisoners. Such 
segregation may become a problem for prison administrations where organized groups of violent 
extremist prisoners engage in deliberate efforts to take over the exercise of organizational dis-
cipline in the prisons. Self-segregation may also manifest itself in other aspects of prison life, 
such as refusing to share religious facilities or communal religious services. On the other hand, 
a fundamental aspect of any organization’s existence is its ability to recruit and integrate new 
members. Some violent extremist groups may therefore proactively seek to recruit new members 
from the general prison population. In some cases, different groups may compete over these 
new recruits, who are coerced or intimidated into joining them.
 For more detail on radicalization to violence within prisons, see chapter 7
A recurring aspect of collective resistance by violent extremists is refusing to engage in normal 
prison behaviour and activities. This may include the refusal to wear a prison uniform or to 
participate in prison work. Such refusal serves to both distinguish the violent extremist group 
from ordinary criminal prisoners, and to appropriate power from the prison authorities. Mak-
ing consistent allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the authorities can also be used 
as part of a deliberate strategy to disrupt the normal operation of a prison.
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Physical violence may occur in all prison environments. Confrontations between prisoners, 
and between prisoners and staff, occur over a variety of issues, such as control of resources, 
access to privileges or simply as a means of self-preservation. However, violence can also be 
used collectively and to further specific aims in a prison. Violent extremist groups may seek 
to launch violent assaults on prison staff as a direct challenge to the prison authorities and 
as a means of appropriating power. There have also been examples of violent extremist groups 
taking hostages in prison and starting riots.
Violent extremist documentation seized by security services indicates that violent extremist 
groups seek to build up their organizational networks inside prison through carefully devel-
oped practices.32 Some violent extremist groups provide training manuals on how to behave 
and organize within prison, recommending a structure that closely parallels violent extremist 
cell structures.33 There is also some evidence that violent extremist prison groups use ethnic 
languages and script as codes—a practice adopted from existing prison gangs and the use 
of ancient scripts as code by right-wing extremist groups—to communicate secretly and to 
smuggle violent extremist materials undetected.34 Staff should be attentive to such activity. 
Finally, some violent extremist prisoners may remain well-behaved, passive and compliant 
(“model prisoners”) in order to convince prison staff that they are not a risk to the order 
of the prison. However, they may well be undermining staff control by seeking to radicalize 
other prisoners to violence, running prison gangs and manipulating the weaker prisoners into 
breaking the rules. Good training and experience will enable staff to identify the real causes 
of actual or threatened disorder in prison.
Order in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners could be achieved through excessive 
control, but to do so would make the prison punitive, restrictive, oppressive and over-controlled. 
Oppressive confinement and repressive brutality and intimidation have no place in a modern 
prison system, even when managing violent extremist prisoners.
Discipline and order shall be maintained with no more restriction than is necessary to ensure safe 
custody, the secure operation of the prison and a well-ordered community life.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 36.
[R]adicalisation processes can be accentuated and reinforced when disproportionate measures are 
deployed by the prison administration. Therefore punitive measures, use of force and means of 
restraint shall be proportionate to direct and serious threats of disruption of good order, safety 
and security in a given prison in order to preserve to the extent possible relations of trust and 
support in helping the reintegration of the offender.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principle 10.
32 See for example: Central intelligence Agency (2002) Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars, p. 1. 
“Some terrorist groups … not only encourage members to organize in prison but also provide training on how to 
create a network that closely parallels terrorist cell structures … members there are trying to put their training into 
practice by establishing cellblock leaders and dividing responsibility among deputies for greeting new arrivals, assess-
ing interrogations; monitoring the guard force, and providing moral support to fellow detainees, among other tasks.” 
Available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf
33 See for example, “al-Qaeda training manual – Lesson 18: Prisons and Detention centres”, quoted above.
34 Criminal Investigative Division, “Gangs Use Ciphers and Secret Codes to Communicate,” Federal Bureau 
of Investigation Intelligence Bulletin (Unclassified), 20 July 2006.
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Where prison managers cannot provide safe conditions, however, prisoners will turn to other 
prisoners for protection. Feeling unsafe will lead prisoners to: join prisons gangs; pay for 
protection (in goods or services); or undertake illicit activity (such as smuggling goods, par-
ticipating in disturbances or assaulting other prisoners or staff) in return for protection. In 
the case of prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, there is the added risk that if the 
institution is not safe, prisoners may create alliances with violent extremist groups for their 
own survival. An institution can diminish the appeal of these violent extremist groups by 
ensuring that they do not provide protection and other services that the prison itself should 
offer. All prisoner vulnerabilities, including feeling unsafe, provide potential opportunities for 
recruitment and radicalization since violent extremist ideologues will have the time, space 
and opportunity to target individuals who may be susceptible to radicalization.35
Incentives: The challenge in any prison system is to respond to indiscipline in a way that 
ensures the security and safety of prisoners and staff, and encourage prisoners to learn to 
respect existing rules and regulations. The concept of incentives is one which prison admin-
istrations throughout the world have used for many years for all prisoners, including for 
violent extremists. Enabling violent extremist prisoners to earn benefits in exchange for 
responsible behaviour encourages them to participate in disengagement interventions and 
ensures a more disciplined and controlled environment that is safer for staff and prisoners. 
Other potentially positive outcomes include a reduced risk of self-harm and improved staff-
prisoner relationships.
Restrictions and disciplinary sanctions: From time to time, however, it is inevitable that some 
violent extremist prisoners will break the rules and regulations of the prison, threaten the 
good order of the institution or, on occasion, may use the disorder as a distraction to facili-
tate an escape attempt. The disciplinary system is one of the methods of maintaining order 
in prisons, and will encompass informal resolution mechanisms, internal disciplinary measures 
or—in case of serious alleged criminal acts committed in prison—criminal prosecution.
If found guilty of a disciplinary offence, prisoners may be subject to a range of restrictions 
and sanctions. These should always be just and proportionate to the offence in question, and 
should be the consequence and culmination of a disciplinary process imposed after an allega-
tion against a prisoner is established. In no circumstances may restrictions or disciplinary 
sanctions amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
In this regard, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
explicitly prohibit a number of practices altogether, including:
• Solitary confinement, defined as the confinement of prisoners for 22 hours or more 
a day without meaningful human contact, for an indefinite term
• Prolonged solitary confinement, defined as solitary confinement for a time period in 
excess of 15 consecutive days
• Solitary confinement in the case of juveniles; pregnant women; women with infants; 
breastfeeding mothers; and prisoners with mental or physical disabilities (the latter 
category as far as their conditions would be exacerbated by such measures)
• Placement of a prisoner in a dark or constantly lit cell
35 IIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 
2 (Maintain a safe and humane environment where violent extremist radicalization can be identified early-on and 
terrorist recruiters have less opportunity to target vulnerable individuals).
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• Corporal punishment, including the reduction of diet or drinking water
• Collective punishment36
Use of force: The use of force by prison staff should remain a measure of last resort, and be 
strictly governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality. It should be limited to 
cases of attempted escapes, of active or passive physical resistance against a lawful order, or 
when personal security is threatened. There are particular principles that apply in relation to 
firearms, which must be followed. As a general rule, however, and except in special circum-
stances, prison staff performing duties which bring them into direct contact with prisoners 
should not be armed. Finally, it is never permissible in a well-managed prison to employ or 
otherwise rely on prisoners to control other prisoners.37
Request or complaints: All prison systems should have a clearly defined set of procedures that 
allow a violent extremist prisoner, or their legal advisor, to make a request or complaint, or 
to air a grievance, without fear of reprisal.38 The utility of healthy communication in any 
human institution cannot be overemphasized. Prisoners should be encouraged to commu-
nicate with the prison administration about any difficulties they have, and be assured that 
their complaints will be treated seriously. Complaints procedures should contain a description 
of how a prisoner can go about making a request about his or her treatment and should 
also describe the avenues of complaint available to prisoners, beginning at the local level, 
going on to the most senior level in the prison, and, if need be, proceed to external bodies 
and organizations (such as the prison administration headquarters, inspectorate, ombudsman, 
or courts).
  For further detail on operating safe and orderly prisons, see chapter 6 of the UNODC Handbook on the 
Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2016)
36 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules, Rules 43-45; also see the Bangkok Rules, Rules 22-23.
37 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 40(1), 82; Code Of Conduct For Law Enforcement Officials, Article 2; Basic 
Principles On The Use Of Force And Firearms By Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 15-16.
38 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 56 and 57.
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3. Managing prison staff  
and other people who 
work with violent 
extremist prisoners
3.1 Introduction
Staff are the most important element of any prison system. Prison administrations should 
recognize this and devote significant time and resources to the recruitment, selection and 
training of personnel who work in prison. Ensuring that prisons holding violent extremist 
prisoners have a sufficient number of good quality and well-trained staff should be a priority 
for all prison systems.
In jurisdictions where violent extremist prisoners are held in separate facilities, prison staff 
will find themselves only working with violent extremists. In other countries where violent 
extremists are integrated into all prisons, or dispersed among a few high-security prisons, 
prison staff may work with violent extremists on a less frequent basis. In both scenarios, the 
way in which prison officials deal with violent extremist prisoners (who sometimes refuse to 
conform to legitimate expectations) can be one of the greatest challenges to the professional-
ism of prison staff. Prison managers and staff have to balance security and control with 
delivering disengagement and reintegration interventions when working with violent extremist 
prisoners. Whereas general staff-related elements are covered in other UNODC publications, 
the intention here is to highlight issues related specifically to working with violent extremist 
prisoners.
  For further detail, see chapter 3 of the UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2015), 
including guidance on: qualities of prison staff; recruitment and selection of staff; training and development; 
conditions of service; staffing levels; prison management; professional standards and ethics; the importance 
of interpersonal skills; exercise of discretion; and the risk of staff manipulation and conditioning
3.2 Qualities of prison staff
Staff working with violent extremist prisoners require a good combination of personal quali-
ties and technical skills. They need personal qualities that enable them to deal with all pris-
oners, including the difficult, dangerous and manipulative, in an even-handed, humane and 
just manner.
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As society in general has become more diverse, complex and interconnected, prison society has 
come to reflect this. This changes the requirements for staff skills and competences, especially 
with regard to radicalisation and extremism, in which identity often plays a key role. Sensitivity 
and understanding of other cultural and religious norms, values and expressions has become 
increasingly important for the building of good staff-offender relationships. Prejudices and fear of 
staff members, leading to over-reporting and negative interactions with detainees, can undermine 
de-radicalisation/disengagement efforts. Staff dealing directly with convicted terrorists need 
specific skill sets and not all staff members will be suitable. It is a challenge to select and train staff 
to deal with radicalisation and violent extremism.
Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons 
and Probation–practitioners working paper, p3.
It should be remembered that people joining the prison administration do so with a range 
of existing skills, knowledge and abilities. It is important that prison administrations see staff 
as a valuable asset, build on these existing attributes, and make good use of any existing but 
not yet developed talents.
3.3 Recruitment and selection of staff
The importance of careful recruitment and selection of prison staff is highlighted in a number 
of international instruments.39 Most jurisdictions appoint only experienced staff to work with 
violent extremist prisoners, as it requires more specialized skills and a high level of personal 
integrity to work effectively with those prisoners. This means, first of all, that men and women 
who are to work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners need to be carefully selected 
to make sure that they have the necessary additional qualities, knowledge, and experience.
A few jurisdictions have taken the policy decision to also use new staff in prisons holding 
violent extremist prisoners, in order to ensure that new perspectives are available, to break 
down more entrenched views displayed by longer serving staff, and to overcome problems 
of corruption among some current staff. These new staff will require comprehensive and 
in-depth training and support, as they will be new to working in the prison environment.
Safeguards should be put in place to ensure that staff selected to work with violent extremist 
prisoners are not members of violent extremist groups, criminal gangs or associated with 
organized crime, and are not being used to infiltrate the prison. In post-conflict situations, 
in particular, it is important to provide effective vetting of people who will be working with 
violent extremist prisoners—both existing staff and new staff—to ensure that there are no 
pre-existing loyalties or any hostility between staff and violent extremist prisoners.
Gender-sensitive techniques should be adopted in recruitment, retention and promotion of 
women in prison administrations to correct any gender imbalance. Women staff should be 
recruited and trained to work with women violent extremist prisoners and to design and 
deliver gender-appropriate interventions.
 For further detail on the special needs of women violent extremist prisoners, see chapter 4.7
39 See the Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 74-75; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Article 18; 
Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Principle XX; 
Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, 6; European Prison Rules, Rules 77 and 82.
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Every effort should be made to recruit staff from ethnic, religious and racial minorities and 
indigenous peoples represented among the violent extremist prisoner population. This will 
help to ensure a better understanding among staff about different cultures, establish a non-
discriminatory attitude towards prisoners from minority groups and indigenous peoples, and 
help foster trust between prisoners and staff. Recruiting minority staff also assists in address-
ing challenges related to language and interpretation, which often makes it difficult for staff 
to understand conversations or the exact translation of certain words and statements, leading 
to misinterpretations, intelligence errors, and challenges when delivering interventions (where 
effective communications are crucial).40
Prison administrations should be aware, however, that in some cases staff from the same 
ethnic, religious or cultural background as violent extremist prisoners may be seen as traitors 
by those prisoners, which might, in itself, generate conflict. Furthermore, if a member of the 
prison staff shares the views and beliefs of a particular violent extremist group, he or she 
should not be allocated to work with prisoners from that group.
Particular attention needs to be paid to the recruitment of specialist staff. These are likely 
to be individuals who are already trained in a specific profession. They will include faith 
leaders, teachers, instructors and health-care staff. Adequate numbers of specialist staff, such 
as psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, should also be appointed to prisons holding 
violent extremist prisoners, given the requirement to address the complex needs of this group 
of prisoners. It should not be assumed that people who have had professional training will 
automatically be suitable to work in a prison environment. They also need to be selected 
carefully and there needs to be clarity about the role they are expected to carry out in the 
prison administration.
3.4 Training and development of staff
Training, which is crucial to any environment, is especially important for people working 
with violent extremist prisoners. International standards indicate that prison staff should 
receive training before beginning work in prison (pre-service “orientation” training) and 
throughout their career in the prison administration (in-service “refresher” training).41
40 See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 5.
41 See the Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules, Rules 75-76; Bangkok Rules, Rules 29 and 33.
As much as possible, prison and probation services shall select and recruit staff with relevant 
linguistic abilities and cultural sensitivity. Intercultural and multifaith awareness training for staff 
shall form an integral part of education and training in order to promote understanding of and 
tolerance to diversity of beliefs and traditions.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principle 13.
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CANADA: Training for staff working with violent extremist prisoners
The Correctional Service of Canada’s (CSC) facilities are secure environments, where offender 
behaviour is routinely observed, monitored, supervised and reported. Frontline correctional, 
security and parole staff are provided training on Security Threat Group identification and 
management, which includes training on the identifiers and behaviours of individuals and groups 
who pose a security risk to CSC operations.
Radicalized offenders have been identified at some CSC facilities across the country, and security 
staff at these locations receive support and guidance from external criminal justice partners (i.e. 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Counter-Terrorism Information Officer Program). CSC 
recognizes the need to build organizational resilience to radicalization and violent extremism 
through staff awareness and educational training. Intervention is heavily dependent on the 
strength of identification practices, as early detection would allow CSC to intervene in addressing 
the contributing and criminogenic factors that motivate individuals to support and engage in 
violent extremism-related activities.
Contribution submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings 
on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
Good practice is to give additional training to staff before they begin working in prisons 
holding violent extremist prisoners. Introductory-level modules such as on “Managing violent 
extremists in prison” or on “Identifying radicalization to violence within prison” can be 
delivered to new staff as part of their primary orientation training. In addition, it is important 
to offer courses that educate and sensitize staff to linguistic, cultural and religious diversity. 
For example, in 2016, the Nigerian Prisons Service introduced a two-week training course 
on the Management and De-Radicalisation of Violent Extremist Prisoners. The course is part 
of the curriculum for the training of all new recruits.
More advanced training should be provided for staff working with violent extremist prisoners 
on a daily basis and should include topics such as: understanding violent extremism; recogniz-
ing signs of radicalization to violence; assessment of violent extremist prisoners; implementing 
a positive regime for violent extremist prisoners; assessment of intelligence and other informa-
tion about violent extremist prisoners; anti-conditioning and manipulation training; dealing with 
individual or group violence in a way that protects staff while using minimal force; adhering 
to ethical and professional standards; interpersonal skills; intelligence gathering; stress manage-
ment; religious diversity and freedom of religion or belief; and sensitization and awareness 
courses focussing on language, behaviour, cultural and religious issues related to specific groups.
In lower-resource and post-conflict countries, providing formal training courses for staff may 
not always be possible. In such circumstances, regular briefing sessions on relevant topics 
should be provided by more experienced staff before the beginning of shifts.
All first-line prison and probation staff should be trained to recognise signs of radicalisation. It is 
not necessary for all staff members to be experts on specific ideologies or religions. It is however 
necessary that correctional officers have some background knowledge of the religious and 
cultural backgrounds of the people they are working with. This is essential to understanding the 
difference between normal cultural and religious-based expressions, and extremist expressions.
Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons 
and Probation–practitioners working paper, p. 4.
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It is critical that staff working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners are properly 
equipped to recognize signs of radicalization to violence.42 This is especially true for those 
who are in direct contact with individuals at risk of radicalization to violence. Although these 
professionals are not all prison staff, their training and awareness of the needs of individuals 
at risk means that they are often the best placed to recognize those individuals in the process 
of being radicalized to violence. But frontline workers do not always have a good understand-
ing of the process of radicalization to violence or know how to respond to it. Training is 
therefore needed to help them recognize and interpret signs of radicalization to violence, and 
to help them judge whether an intervention is appropriate or not.43 In some jurisdictions, 
experienced members of staff are appointed as “reference points” for less experienced staff 
to whom they can raise concerns and ask for advice on whether a specific behaviour is an 
indication of radicalization to violence.
 For further detail on the prevention radicalization to violence in prisons, see chapter 7
Where prisons are delivering disengagement interventions, as described in chapter 5, every-
body involved in the disengagement process (including scholars, faith leaders, uniformed, 
non-uniformed and frontline staff) require training to sensitize them to the intervention, its 
goals and objectives, the kind of violent extremist prisoners they are dealing with, how to 
manage crises when they arise, and how to distinguish between signs of radicalization to 
violence and legitimate expressions of faith or ideology.44
It is particularly important that frontline prison staff understand and are carefully attuned 
to the disengagement and reintegration process, even if they are not directly responsible for 
its delivery. Staff should avoid actions that undermine the disengagement and reintegration 
42 IIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 
5 (Commit to developing professional staff, with a particular focus on the elements that will help officials identify 
and address violent extremist radicalization in prisons).
43 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent 
extremism: Strengthening the EU's response (2014), para 2.4.
44 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 5; also see the ICCTR Paper on the Rehabilitation and Reintegra-
tion of Violent Extremist Offenders, Subsection II (Staff training).
ITALY: Training course for staff working with violent extremist prisoners
The Office of Training of the Penitentiary Department of the Italian Ministry of Justice identified, in 
2010, the need to introduce a training course for existing staff on how to manage Muslim violent 
extremist prisoners. The course had two objectives: to help staff avoid behaving in a way that 
might offend the religious sensitivity of Muslim prisoners; and give staff sufficient knowledge 
about Islam to ensure that prisoners did not exploit the lack of knowledge. The three-day training 
course consisted of sessions on: cultural and religious aspects of Islam; Islamic religious practice; 
international terrorism, ideological background and its diffusion; proselytization and 
radicalization; penitentiary management of international terrorists; and operational techniques.
A six-month follow-up evaluation found that 80 per cent of staff who completed the course 
noticed a significant improvement in the quality of their daily duties in the prison; felt more aware 
of aspects related to the culture and religious practice of Muslim prisoners; and were therefore 
better able to establish constructive relationships with those prisoners.
Office of Training, Penitentiary Department, Ministry of Justice, Italy.
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process. It would be helpful for prison staff to have a thorough understanding of and appre-
ciate the important role they play to support the process.45
It is further useful to look for ways and opportunities to cross-train with other law enforce-
ment agencies in order to share operational information and good practices. Training involving 
representatives of a variety of government departments and agencies can also serve to increase 
awareness of the challenges and capabilities of partner organizations and strengthen inter-
agency coordination and information exchange.46
BELGIUM: The CoPPRa staff training module
CoPPRa is a training project which was initially designed for police officers in Belgium, but which 
has since been used to train prison staff and other criminal justice professionals. The programme 
aims to improve the capacity of frontline criminal justice staff to prevent radicalization to violence. 
It rests on the assumption that while frontline staff have a key role in prevention, they do not 
always have a good understanding of radicalization to violence, how to recognize the warning 
signs, or understand what to do in response. This project has aimed to help to remedy this 
through the spread of relevant knowledge and training.
In order to achieve this, CoPPRa has developed a pocket guide for first line staff, a CoPPRa Train the 
Trainer manual, CoPPRa e-learning on its website, and a CD-ROM with PowerPoint slides of 
different training modules. This material is free and is available for interested criminal justice 
organizations. The material is also free to be adapted to local needs and situations. The material 
takes approximately eight hours to cover in total.
In 2015, the CoPPRa module was adapted so that it could now be included in the basic training 
received by all prison staff in Belgium, with a particular focus on helping staff to detect signs of 
radicalization to violence among prisoners. The aim of the training is to raise levels of awareness 
among staff, but also reduce false alarms and unnecessary concern.
Available at: http://www.coppra.eu/resources.php.
Although it can be very helpful to discuss good training practice from different regions, it 
is important that courses are tailored to the local environment and that participants are 
challenged to consider how international strategies and practices can function in their country. 
Furthermore, the training should be tailored to the challenges, responsibilities and capabilities 
of the different stakeholders to ensure that they achieve maximum impact.
Prison directors holding violent extremist prisoners in their prisons also require training in 
“political intelligence”. That is, they need to be able to manage prisoners who have a high 
profile with politicians, media and the public. This brings greater scrutiny and sensitivity to 
any operational decision made in relation to those prisoners. It is important, therefore, that 
prison directors understand the broader landscape and are able to navigate through additional 
pressures.
45 Ibid., Good Practice, No. 9.
46 Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community 
Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda, Action 3.
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3.5 Conditions of service
As the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson 
Mandela Rules) make clear, prison staff should be given appropriate status, levels of pay and 
conditions of employment.47 The conditions of service for staff working with violent extremist 
prisoners should reflect the challenges and importance of their role. The issue of pay requires 
careful consideration. If staff do not receive salary levels appropriate to the economic situa-
tion in their country, they may be open to corruption of a direct or indirect nature.
Prison staff, in a number of jurisdictions, have been attacked and killed by violent extremist 
groups as a consequence of working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners. The prison 
administration should therefore take appropriate steps to ensure the personal safety of staff 
working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, both while they are on duty in the 
prison and while outside of the prison. There have been cases where threats have been made 
directly to staff and their family members, and, in some cases, the “target killing” of officials 
and their family members, particularly if they do not collaborate with violent extremist pris-
oners’ demands.
Depending on the level of risk at any particular time, additional measures may involve pro-
viding secure housing for staff and their families, equipment to search their vehicles, and 
personal alarms. There are also examples, such as in Turkey, where staff working with violent 
extremist prisoners are provided with public housing and special vehicles. Prison managers 
who oversee prisons holding violent extremist prisoners sometimes express concern that the 
unique challenges of these facilities can create a great deal of stress for the staff who work 
in those prisons. Prison administrations should attempt to mitigate the impact of this envi-
ronment in a variety of ways.
Finally, prison administrators should ensure that each prison has an appropriate number of 
staff on duty at all times to enable the prison to comply with international standards and 
national laws and regulations.48 The appropriate staffing level for each prison holding violent 
extremist prisoners should depend on the number of staff required to be on duty at any one 
time to ensure security, safety and order. It is also important that sufficient staff are appointed 
to enable violent extremist prisoners to participate in a range of constructive regime activi-
ties, including disengagement interventions, and to do so without having a negative impact 
on the security, safety and stability of the prison.
  For further detail on staffing levels, see chapter 2.3 of the UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk 
Prisoners (2016)
3.6 Professional standards and ethics
Violent extremist prisoners may attempt to undermine the professionalism of staff and seek 
to exploit staff to obtain illicit goods, to assist with an escape attempt or to act as a conduit 
to criminal groups outside of the prison. Prison staff need, therefore, to meet high standards 
of professional and personal conduct at all times.49
47 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 74.
48 See, for example, Principles and Best Practices on The Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the 
Americas, Principle XX.
49 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 77; United Nations Code Of Conduct For Law Enforcement Officials, Article 7.
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Behaviour that amounts to unprofessional conduct includes: discrimination; harassment; vic-
timization or bullying; dealings with prisoners, former prisoners and their friends and rela-
tions; provoking, using unnecessary or unlawful force or assaulting a prisoner; using offensive 
language to a prisoner; having any sexual involvement with a prisoner; or giving prisoners 
or ex-prisoners personal or other information about staff, prisoners or their friends and rela-
tives which is held in confidence.
Not only is the apparent further radicalisation of terrorist convicts in prison an issue, but the 
potential radicalisation of the inmate population and the prison officers is a problem as well. In 
2005, … a warden at the Keborokan Prison in Bali helped smuggle a laptop into prison for the Bali 
bomber, Imam Samudra, who was then on death row. It was subsequently revealed that the laptop 
was used by Samudra to chat with other militants and help plan the second Bali bombing.
Ungerer C.: “Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian prison experience”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
2011/ 40, p. 12.
Prison officials should be accountable for ensuring that their prisons have internal standards 
and methods in place and implemented to affectively prevent and counter corruption.50 Some 
examples of methods include vetting staff at the point of recruitment and selection for work-
ing with violent extremist prisoners, conducting unannounced staff searches, changing shifts 
regularly, developing an internal affairs or professional standards unit to investigate reports 
of corruption, and prosecuting and publicizing examples of corrupt staff. Ways in which 
violent extremist prisoners may attempt to undermine the professionalism of staff and seek 
to exploit staff include the following:
• Manipulation: A feature of prison life is that prisoners may endeavour to manipulate 
staff. This can be even more prevalent in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, 
as some violent extremist prisoners can be very adept at communication and manipu-
lation. They may do this for malicious reasons or as a strategy to obtain psychological 
prominence. Whatever the motivation, the consequences are always serious. In manipu-
lating staff, prisoners seek to take control from them and this threatens safe custody, 
leaving staff anxious and uncertain. In order to prevent manipulation, staff should 
demonstrate professionalism, be transparent, impartial and consistent. Managers should 
ensure that staff receive training on manipulation and are constantly vigilant to attempts 
to manipulate them.
• Conditioning: Some violent extremist prisoners are particularly good at conditioning 
prison staff. Conditioning can be defined as the manipulation of the balance of power 
towards the advantage of the manipulator. Within the prison context, it is how prison-
ers impose their will upon staff and how some staff impose their will on other members 
of staff. Violent extremist prisoners can adopt a number of methods to identify poten-
tial staff targets for conditioning and exploitation.
Violent extremist groups and individuals have been most successful in their prison 
operations when they have corrupted sympathetic staff or intimidated or manipulated 
50 IIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 
11 (Take preventative measures to combat corruption to reduce opportunities for radicalization and ensure that 
where corruption exists, its perpetrators are appropriately punished).
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understaffed and undereducated guard forces.51 Manuals produced by violent extremist 
groups, which have been seized by security services, indicate that violent extremist 
groups provide instruction on how to manipulate and corrupt prison staff.52 They 
encourage prisoners to: speak with individual members of prison staff, not groups; 
convince staff that the prisoner is not as bad as they were told; and offer moral guid-
ance to staff. The manuals also provide guidelines to violent extremist prisoners about 
what to discuss with staff, to claim abuse, and protest about their treatment.
Prison administrations should take steps to ensure that staff do not succumb to con-
ditioning and exploitation. Staff should receive training on: the importance of adhering 
to policy and procedures; reporting conditioning immediately; avoiding over-familiarity 
with prisoners (friendly, not friends); dynamic security; establishing boundaries (e.g. 
not sharing personal information); and acting in a professional, reliable and consistent 
manner.
• Intimidation and extortion: Violent extremist prisoners can also resort to intimidation 
and extortion of staff to achieve their goals of escape; creating disorder; or committing 
criminal activities while in prison. In such circumstances, there is a danger that some 
prison staff will respond by retreating into a passive role, in which they do little to 
enforce rules or correct prisoners’ behaviour.
3.7 Contribution of specialist staff and other people
Faith professionals53
Member States should consider integrating appropriate faith professionals into the disengage-
ment process, as they can play an important role in the process. In the case of ideological 
and faith-inspired violent extremist activity, a number of incarcerated violent extremists who 
cite religion for their actions may have a shallow knowledge of the religion by which they 
were supposedly inspired. Properly trained faith professionals should be encouraged to engage 
in extensive dialogue with violent extremist prisoners and potentially raise doubts about their 
views on the acceptability of the use of violence.
Not every faith professional will be well suited for a therapeutic function. Faith professionals 
who are incredibly knowledgeable and experienced in their pastoral work may find it difficult 
to operate in the prison environment, as the rehabilitation of violent extremists requires a 
different set of skills and aptitudes. Assessing the faith professional’s willingness and ability 
to work in the therapeutic environment should therefore be a key factor in the selection 
process.
51 Central Intelligence Agency (2002) Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars, p. 3. Available at: www.
fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf
52 See for example, “al-Qaeda training manual – Lesson 18: Prisons and Detention centres”, quoted above.
53 The term faith professional is used in this context to refer to religious scholars, faith advisors, and spiritual 
care givers from all faiths and religious traditions who have an extensive knowledge of their particular faith. 
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Guidance on the role of religious scholars and other ideological experts
Governments should provide religious scholars with specialized training related to their functions 
before they begin this work. They will need training both in how to operate in the prison setting 
and in dealing with inmates, and in making the transition from the traditional pastoral role to 
include a more advocacy position in the therapeutic community. Basic training in psychology 
would also be an important component of the training for the religious scholars, as their work will 
involve a large psychological dimension.
Governments should take steps to vet religious scholars before they are allowed to work in the 
rehabilitation setting to ensure that their substantive knowledge and views are acceptable, in line 
with the therapeutic objectives and are not likely to result in counterproductive activities.
Governments should also vet material that is used by religious scholars and that is brought into 
the prison setting, to ensure that it is supportive of the rehabilitation goals and does not condone 
or support extremist ideology.
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute / Government of Spain (2013): Building on the GCTF’s 
Rome Memorandum – Additional Guidance on the Role of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes.
A faith professional who comes from the same tribal, ethnic or linguistic groups as the violent 
extremist prisoner can, in some circumstances, be more effective than one who comes from 
a different segment of the community. However, since these scholars might become targets 
for violent extremists, Member States should consider taking steps to ensure their safety 
throughout this process.54
 For further detail on faith-based interventions, see chapter 5.7
Careful attention should be given to the selection and training of faith professionals who will 
be leading interventions when it comes to different sects and teachings. Some disengagement 
programmes have faced challenges where faith professionals cannot agree on the kind of 
sectarian doctrine to be used in countering violent extremist ideology. In such circumstances, 
emphasis should be placed on the central role of religious doctrines that promote peace and 
tolerance. The training for faith leaders should transcend their sectarian affiliations and be 
committed to issues of peace and security common to all in countering violent extremism.
Psychologists
Psychologists can play a key role in the disengagement process and should be fully integrated 
into those disengagement interventions.55 They can help identify factors in the social context 
and psychological make-up that made the individual vulnerable to violent extremism and the 
motivational factors that contributed to his or her decision to engage in violent extremist 
activity. This information helps to inform the risk and needs process and to design an 
54 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 10.
55 See Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2013): Building on the GCTF’s Rome 
Memorandum: Additional Guidance on the Role of Psychologists/Psychology in Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
Programs.
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individualized plan for each violent extremist prisoner. In addition to “disengagement”-related 
activity, psychologists are important for more general areas, including where there are mental 
health concerns that have little or nothing to do with ideology. Addressing these more general 
matters can indirectly effect change or disengagement.
Psychologists should be specially trained to do this type of work.56 They should have at least 
a baseline understanding of violent extremism and terrorism and, where possible, a basic 
understanding of the foundational elements of disengagement and reintegration interventions 
in a prison setting. However, psychologists should also recognize that working with other 
offender populations is also valuable experience for dealing with violent extremists, and should 
not regard this particular segment of offenders as too challenging or different to work with.
 For further detail on psychological and cognitive interventions, see chapter 5.8
It should be noted that in many jurisdictions, particularly in lower-resourced countries, there 
may be few, if any, psychologists operating in prisons. Where this is the case, this should not 
be seen as a reason to delay work on disengagement interventions. Other staff can have a 
key role to play in developing disengagement assessment methods and interventions. These 
staff groups include: general prison staff, teachers, vocational training instructors, sports and 
exercise instructors, pastoral care providers, faith scholars and social workers.
Victims and victims’ advocates
Victims and victims’ advocates can be powerful voices and Member States could consider 
including them in disengagement interventions, where appropriate. If approached correctly, 
there may be the potential for victim-perpetrator contact to contribute to the physical and 
psychological well-being of the victims. It also might be beneficial for the perpetrators. Hear-
ing first-hand how their violence tragically impacts ordinary citizens might evoke a mind-shift 
in violent extremist prisoners.57 Moreover, dialogue between violent extremist prisoners and 
victims or their advocates may reduce psychological tension and may contribute to the violent 
extremist’s disengagement and successful reintegration. It is important to carefully consider 
when, how, and which victims are introduced, so that prisoners are most receptive to their 
messages and perhaps more importantly so that potential negative side-effects for the victims 
are minimized—since revictimization is a possibility.
 For further detail on victims in the context of violent extremist prisoners’ social reintegration, see chapter 8.6
Former violent extremists
Former violent extremists can be influential with those prisoners going through the disengage-
ment process and could be included where possible and appropriate. Former violent extremists, 
particularly those who have been through the disengagement process themselves, may be influ-
ential with violent extremist prisoners participating in these interventions. The testimonials of 
56 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 8.
57 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 12.
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former violent extremist prisoners can be dramatic evidence of the benefits of change.58 Their 
testimony on subjects including: the process of indoctrination; extricating themselves from 
violence; and the harsh realities of life as a violent extremist can have a big impact on cur-
rent violent extremists. This being said, these former violent extremists must be carefully 
vetted and selected. Since these former violent extremists may themselves become targets for 
violent retaliation, Member States should consider taking steps to ensure their safety through-
out this process.59
Family members and significant others
Consideration should also be given to the integration of family members and significant 
others into disengagement interventions. Families can play an integral role in the success of 
disengagement interventions and are particularly instrumental after release in reintegrating 
the individual and keeping him or her from returning to a life of violent extremism. Disen-
gagement interventions should therefore actively involve family members of prisoners.60 This 
will also help the family understand and be sympathetic to what the prisoner is going through 
and be more readily able to provide a supportive environment for the prisoner once he or 
she is released. Any meaningful role for families will only be possible if family members feel 
safe and are not subject to intimidation. Their relationship with the State may initially be 
one of suspicion and fear, and therefore, their experiences may demand additional 
assurances.
There are cases, however, where family members have contributed to the violent orientation 
of the prisoner, and prison administrations should carefully assess the family members’ 
involvement in these situations based on a risk assessment.61
58 See for example: Speckhard, A., Shaikh, M., and Stern, J. (2014). Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18, Al 
Qaeda Inspired, Homegrown, Terrorism in the West, Advances Press; Husain, E. (2007) The Islamist: why I joined radical 
Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left, London: Penguin Books, pp. 48-66; Jacobson, M. (2010). “Terror-
ism Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left”, Policy Focus: 101, The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy; Choudhury, T. (2009) Stepping out: supporting exit strategies from violence and extremism. Project: European 
network of former extremists, feasibility assessment, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
59 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 13.
60 Disley, E. et al (2011) Individual disengagement from Al Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence 
Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, United 
Kingdom Home Office, pviiv.
61 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 14. See also: Chernov Hwang (2016) Jihadist Disengagement from 
Violence: Understanding Contributing Factors, RSIS Commentary No. 139 – 9 June 2016.
INDONESIA: Using former terrorists in disengagement activity
The Indonesian police’s approach to “de-radicalising” terrorist convicts is focused heavily on the 
former JI leadership group. In addition to offering financial incentives to some individuals, they 
have included elements of a counter-ideology program to convince militants that violence is not 
part of religion. Accordingly, the police have spearheaded an initiative using former militants who 
have revised their stances on violence to engage other militants in prisons. This is based on the 
assumption that former hardliners have a more lasting impact on supporters of violent jihad than 
appeals from moderate religious figures.
Ungerer C. ’Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian prison experience’. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2011; 
40: 1-20.
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SINGAPORE: Support for families of violent extremist prisoners
An Interagency After-Care Group (ACG) was established in Singapore to sustain and/or facilitate 
family stability during the period that the violent extremist was in prison. The main driver for ACG 
was to support the families of prisoners in order to prevent extremist groups stepping in to do so 
after the detention of the prisoner. The Group overcame suspicions of prisoners’ spouses in very 
practical ways—for example, by providing financial assistance, as the prisoners were often the sole 
breadwinners. They also helped the spouses find work, taught them to read and ensured that the 
education of prisoners’ children continued uninterrupted, through various means such as 
enrolling them in tuition programmes, securing school fee waivers and providing pocket money.
Contribution submitted by the Singapore Prison Service in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the 
Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
Members of the community
Members of the community, including celebrities and other influential personalities, can also 
help inspire change among violent extremist prisoners, and could be included in disengage-
ment interventions. The motivational themes and public service messages they deliver can 
be quite captivating and effective.
Community involvement is vital for effective design and implementation of successful CVE and 
de-radicalisation programs. Participants thus called for more community involvement in such 
policies and the need to identify credible and genuine community group partners for the design 
and development of socialisation process. Community involvement provides assurance and 
transparency on the true situation of inmates, how they are treated and looked after, thus 
countering one of the main narratives of VEs. It also improves relations between the state and its 
communities, and fosters trust and collaboration.
Global Counterterrorism Forum: Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Detainees (2012), Solution Strategy 6 .
Consideration should also be given to involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
community sector organizations and the private sector. These bodies are often not seen as 
being part of the system or State and therefore may find it easier to establish relationships 
with violent extremist prisoners. Engaging these groups brings the added benefit of continuity 
of care for the reintegration of violent extremist prisoners upon release.
GERMANY: Violence Prevention Network
Since 2001, the NGO “Violence Prevention Network” has been working successfully in reducing 
ideologically motivated and religious-motivated, serious crime and extreme acts of violence 
committed by youth. In the method of Verantwortungspädagogik® (Education of Responsibility), 
the Violence Prevention Network has identified a way to address people who have affiliated 
themselves with anti-democratic structures without humiliating them, thus facilitating their 
reversion to the democratic community.
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The vision is that ideologically vulnerable people and violent offenders motivated by extremism 
change their behaviour through deradicalization efforts, lead independent lives and become part 
of the democratic community, in order to prevent extremism of any kind. The Violence Prevention 
Network works to ensure that people have the tools and resources available to reflect on and 
overcome their previous behaviour patterns. The goal is to enable them to live a life in which they 
do not harm themselves or others.
Violent extremist prisoners are more likely to talk to facilitators who are not perceived as “part of 
the system”. It is easier to gain access and it is much easier to engage on eye-level, since there are 
no power relations or hierarchy as is the case when dealing with prison staff. The trainers should 
be people that the violent extremist prisoner can relate to, and prison staff/public servants are less 
likely to have a personality with which he or she could identify. NGO practitioners can continue to 
work with him or her upon release, i.e. the former violent extremist prisoner can turn to the trainer 
he or she already knows and trusts instead of having to deal with a stranger.
Contribution submitted by the Violence Prevention Network in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the 
Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
The prison authorities should carefully assess external bodies before they are permitted to 
engage with violent extremist prisoners. Consideration should also be given to entering into 
a written agreement with the body concerned and for that agreement to specify what the 
organization should and should not do.
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4. Assessing and managing 




The proper risk assessment of prisoners is one of the fundamental components of good 
prison management policies. It enables the efficient use of resources, individualization of 
sentences, protection of the public and upholding the human rights of prisoners. Investment 
made in developing and implementing effective, evidence-based systems of risk assessment 
can also enable Member States to improve the prospects of getting violent extremist prison-
ers to disengage from violence.
The management of prisoners cannot be successfully undertaken without assessments of the 
risks they pose. A careful appraisal, sometimes known as “screening”, should be made by 
the prison administration, therefore, of all prisoners when they are first admitted to prison 
and a more detailed risk assessment repeated at regular intervals thereafter. The range of 
risks assessed during the initial screening should include:
• Harm to self, to other prisoners or to people working in or visiting the prison (harm-
related risk)
• Threat to good order in the prison and radicalizing other prisoners to violence (order-
related risk)
• The likelihood of escape (security-related risk)
• Committing another serious offence on prison leave or release (recidivism-related risk)
• Instigating the commitment of offences in the community in cooperation with associ-
ates in the outside world (crime-related risk)
• Establishing who is a violent extremist, including where the alleged or actual offence 
is not directly related to violent extremism
The type of risk a violent extremist prisoner poses should have a significant impact on the 
risk management strategy, as it should in the case of all prisoners. For example, the risk 
management of prisoners who are assessed to be a serious escape risk will need to emphasize 
security routines and measures, while that of prisoners who are assessed to represent a risk 
to order may not need to emphasize security so much as efforts to change attitudes and 
behaviour. In the case of prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences, specific risks that 
need to be covered include: their role within their organization or group (i.e. high or low 
level); their recruiting or radicalizing other prisoners to violence (i.e. degree of charismatic 
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leadership or appeal); maintaining or creating operational command structures in prison; and 
plotting violent and criminal activities from prison, in communication with outside 
contacts.
It is very important to understand that violent extremist prisoners do not comprise a 
homogenous group. The motivations, circumstances and reasons why individuals commit 
violent extremist offences are often varied and complex.62 The risk assessment of such pris-
oners needs to be informed by a sophisticated understanding of the characteristics of any 
organization to which they belong, and their motivations. It should also not be assumed that 
all prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences are committed to bringing about political 
or social change or to fight for a moral or religious cause. Practice has shown that some 
become engaged in such activity because of more conventional criminal motives (e.g. for 
financial gain, for the excitement or simply for the gratification of committing violence) while 
others get involved to fulfil more intrinsic or existential needs and desires (e.g. the need for 
status, belonging or meaning). In some cases, on the other hand, prisoners are convicted of 
an offence unrelated to violent extremism but their intention was related to violence extrem-
ism. The application of a thorough and reliable risk assessment will identify those prisoners 
whose true motivation was related to violent extremism.
It is critical, therefore, to assess each individual, including the personal and contextual cir-
cumstances contributing to their violent extremist views that are likely to contribute to such 
offending in the future.
  For further detail, see chapter 4 of the UNODC Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners (2015), 
including specific guidance on: assessments, classification, categorization and allocation and sentence 
planning
4.2 Admission, classification and categorization
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson 
Mandela Rules) require that prisoners always need to be separated according to their legal 
status (pretrial from sentenced), gender (men from women) and age (children from adults). 
Furthermore, an assessment of all prisoners should be undertaken upon admission in order 
to determine the risk they may pose to themselves and/or others as well as their needs. Such 
individual assessments are crucial in order to ensure that the necessary measures are put in 
place to minimize these risks and to respond to prisoners’ needs in a manner that will enable 
their eventual social reintegration. On the basis of his or her risk and needs assessment, each 
prisoner should be classified according to criminal record, character and treatment needs, 
including the assignment of a security category that corresponds to the findings of the risk 
assessment.63
Prisoners’ classification and categorization are essential to decide their allocation to a suitable 
prison or unit within a prison and, together with the findings of their risk and needs assess-
ment, provide the basis for the development of individualized sentence plans. These basic 
rules apply to the management of all prisoners. In fact, they are particularly important in 
the case of violent extremist prisoners, where any shortcomings in their assessment, 
62 See, for example: Stys, Y. & Michel, S. (2014). Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada’s Federally 
Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders (Research Report R-344). Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.
63 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 11, 89(1)-(2) and Rule 93.
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classification, categorization and allocation can have far-reaching and severe consequences 
both for the prisoner and the public.
An important first step can be developing an effective intake, assessment and classification system 
for new inmates. The important first steps in correctional management begin when a new inmate 
enters the prison facility. Target populations of rehabilitation programs could thus be narrowly 
and unambiguously defined according to set criteria. Knowing as much as possible about the 
inmate’s personal background, criminal history, personality traits, ideology and behavior in prison 
is important for making sound classification decisions and in designing effective individual 
rehabilitation programs.
Rome Memorandum: Good Practice 3.
Special attention shall be paid to admission procedures of all prisoners as the good carrying out of 
such procedures allows feelings of trust and safety to be established in prisoners, enabling proper 
assessment of their health condition at entry, and contributing to good risk and needs assessment, 
sentence planning, classification, allocation and accommodation.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, 
Principle 19.
Knowing as much as possible about the violent extremist’s co-defendants, personal back-
ground, criminal history, significant contacts, and ideology allows for more accurate registra-
tion and appropriate categorization and allocation. In Somalia, for example, prison staff have 
been trained to use a simple and basic assessment tool which involves asking prisoners a set 
of 45 questions. This assessment was used on over 800 alleged and sentenced violent extrem-
ist prisoners, and identified that only 148 were ideologically or religiously motivated; the 
others were motivated by financial inducements provided by the violent extremist group. 
These prisoners were driven to join the violent extremist group by poverty rather than ideol-
ogy or religion.
In addition to information collected by interviewing the violent extremist prisoner, informa-
tion should be gathered from a variety of other sources. Access to quality information from 
law enforcement agencies and courts familiar with the cases is important, as it promotes 
better informed registration and classification processes by the prison administration. Court 
records and assessments made by social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists can also 
provide a valuable source of information, as can contact with the violent extremist’s family 
and friends.
Assessments should be based on multiple sources of information to increase reliability. The 
sources should consist of:
• Actuarial data: about the individual and the offence.
•  Dynamic factors: such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc. Changes in 
these factors in particular may form triggers to increase risk, or mitigating circumstances that 
reduce risk.
•  Clinical factors: professional judgement and experience, using the personal and professional 
experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading.
HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST PRISONERS44
•  Information from partners in a multi-agency framework: information coming from social workers, 
the police, intelligence services, etc. about an individual’s case.
Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and 
Probation–practitioners working paper, p5.
It is also important to develop an effective prisoner file management system and database 
to record information and account for all violent extremist prisoners from the time that they 
first enter the prison to the end of their sentence. The importance and major elements of a 
prisoner file management system are equally outlined in the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).64
 For further detail, see the UNODC Handbook on Prisoner File Management (2008)
Assessments should be conducted by appropriately trained, and where appropriate, certified 
staff. As the assessment needs to cover a variety of risks and issues, staff with different spe-
cializations should be involved in the assessment.
• Separation: As described earlier, prisoners need to be separated according to their legal 
status, gender and age. For most prisoners, these factors are static and change only 
in very few circumstances, for example, when a child becomes an adult. This separa-
tion is an overriding factor when it comes to the allocation to a prison or a part of 
a prison65 and is not dependent on any risk assessment.
• Classification: Classification further differentiates the separation of prisoners, and facili-
tates their placement to the most appropriate prison (section) that will (a) adequately 
address the issues of health, safety and security; and (b) contribute to the timely 
preparation of their eventual release. The classification process is based on the infor-
mation gained through the individual risk and needs assessment of each prisoner, and 
may be further informed by potential health issues assessed in the course of the medi-
cal examination upon admission.
1. The purposes of classification shall be:
(a) To separate from others those prisoners who, by reason of their criminal records or characters, 
are likely to exercise a bad influence;
(b) To divide the prisoners into classes in order to facilitate their treatment with a view to their 
social rehabilitation.
2. So far as possible, separate prisons or separate sections of a prison shall be used for the 
treatment of the different classes of prisoners.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for The Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 93; also 
see United Nations Rules for The Treatment Of Women Prisoners And Non-Custodial Measures For Women Offenders 
(the Bangkok Rules), Rules 40 and 41.
64 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 6-10.
65 Ibid., Rule 11.
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• Categorization: As with all prisoners, violent extremists should also be categorized 
according to the security risk (escape) and control risk (likelihood of participating in 
activity that would disrupt the prison or radicalize other prisoners to violence) that 
corresponds to the findings of their risk assessment. Security categorization refers to 
assigning a security category to prisoners, which should be the lowest category con-
sistent with managing the prisoner’s assessed security-related risks, and to subsequently 
allocating him or her to a prison regime suitable for the management of his or her 
individual security level and other risks and needs.66
In most jurisdictions, prisons are described according to their security category, which may 
be high, medium or low. The security category of the prison is based on the level of security 
that exists in the prison. A high-security prison would have significant physical, procedural 
and dynamic security arrangements in place so that it would be impossible for a prisoner to 
escape. In contrast, a low-security prison may have no locks on cell doors and a low perim-
eter fence. In deciding on the allocation of prisoners, the principle that all prisoners are held 
in the least restrictive setting necessary for their safe and secure custody should be respected, 
based on their individual risk assessments and without discrimination.
Violent extremist prisoners who are assessed and categorized as high-risk would usually be 
allocated to a high-security prison or a high-security unit within a prison of a lower security 
category (e.g. a medium-security prison). The small number of violent extremist prisoners 
who are considered to be particularly dangerous may need to be held in special maximum 
security facilities, which may be special prisons or separate units within another prison (e.g. 
within a high-security prison where other high-risk prisoners are held).
In countries with low resources, and especially in post-conflict contexts, individualized risk 
assessments are rarely carried out. The classification and categorization of prisoners is usually 
undertaken on the basis of gender, age and sometimes also pretrial status, though even this 
kind of separation is not always in place. Those prisoners convicted of violent extremist 
offences may automatically be held in extremely restricted high-security conditions, not based 
on an individualized risk assessment, but purely on the length and nature of their sentences 
or charges. Chronic overcrowding exacerbates the challenges presented by the lack of a proper 
assessment and classification system. In these circumstances, ensuring safety and security in 
prisons where violent extremist prisoners are held is particularly challenging. It is of funda-
mental importance that efforts are made, even in countries with scarce resources, to put in 
place measures to develop a system of individualized assessments, at least to separate those 
who are genuinely high risk from others, and to ensure that those who are in need of pro-
tection are protected.
The screening assessment of a prisoner on admission is only the beginning of the process 
of risk assessment. A full assessment should take place to identify their violent extremism 
related risk and needs, with further assessments undertaken at regular intervals during the 
period that the violent extremist prisoner is in custody.
66 Ibid., Rule 89(2); also see the Bangkok Rules, Rules 4, 40-41; European Prison Rules, Rule 51(4) and 53(5).
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UNITED STATES: Security Threat Group Validation and Management
In the 1980s, the number of prison violent extremist groups, also referred to as security threat 
groups (STG) in United States prisons began to grow dramatically. Prison officials across the 
country faced the challenge of managing the violence and criminal activity associated with these 
prisoners while, at the same time, ensuring that their civil and due process rights were not 
infringed.
One of the most valuable tools developed in the United States is the process called STG validation. 
Validation involves assessing an inmate’s possible membership in a STG, based on an objective 
review of predetermined factors such as the nature of the current criminal offence, criminal 
history, self-admission, tattoos, association with known STG members, possession of STG 
symbolism and/or documents, photographs, etc. Each factor is assigned a numerical value. If an 
inmate reaches a certain threshold he/she may be validated based on their level of involvement 
and activity with the group. Due to differences in statutes and regulations, as well as cultural 
differences across the country, the factors and the weights assigned to them may differ from state 
to state, but the process is essentially the same. In most U.S. states, the inmate may appeal a 
determination that he/she is associated with an STG, since that determination can affect decisions 
about custody classification, housing, programmes and other aspects of his/her incarceration.
It is important to remember that STG validation is not the same thing as classification. All inmates 
still undergo an objective classification process to determine their risks and needs. The STG 
validation process serves to inform classification decisions. It also helps to avoid “labelling” of 
inmates as STG members by ensuring that the same transparent, objective, documented process is 
followed in all cases. Another important factor is that STG validation and classification is an 
ongoing process. As an inmate’s situation and behaviour changes, the STG validation and 
classification may be revisited.
The STG validation process is a key component in the effective management of STG members in 
United States prisons and jails. It has also led to the sharing of information among STG units 
throughout the country and the formation of state and regional gang investigator networks, 
essential to effectively monitoring the activity of these groups, which often cross jurisdictional 
lines.
Contribution submitted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States of America, in the course of the two UNODC 
Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 
and 1-3 June 2016).
4.3 Allocation and accommodation
All prison administrations need to decide how to house violent extremist prisoners within 
their prison system.67 This decision revolves around a number of questions, including whether 
violent extremist prisoners should be separated from the general prison population (separa-
tion) and, if so, whether they should be isolated from each other (isolation), held in one 
place (concentration), or whether they should be dispersed across a small number of prisons 
(dispersal). The alternative is to integrate violent extremist prisoners with the general popula-
tion (integration). A mix of these approaches can be seen among Member States and, in 
reality, a hybrid approach is often adopted. The security category of each violent extremist 
prisoner, as discussed in the previous section, will also have implications for allocation 
decisions.
67 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 4.
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Regardless of whether prisoners sentenced for terrorist-related crimes are kept in separate prisons 
or wings or are dispersed across the prison system, the risk they may pose, including the risk of 
radicalising other prisoners, shall be evaluated individually before their allocation is defined and 
shall be reviewed at regular intervals.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principle 20.
There is no one right answer and prison administrations will need to determine the best 
approach to accommodation, based on specific factors within the country.68 These factors 
include:
• The size of the violent extremist prison population to be segregated or dispersed
• The state of the prison infrastructure and the administration’s ability to ensure secure 
custody if violent extremists were dispersed to a number of prisons
• The capacity, size and skills level of staff
• The financial resources available to manage the violent extremist prisoner 
population
• The legislative framework and responsible authorities
• The cultural, political and social context
• The risk that an individual presents for being further radicalized, or for radicalizing 
others to violence
• The modus operandi and organizational structure of the violent extremist group
FRANCE: Accommodation of violent extremist prisoners
The creation of dedicated prison wings for violent extremist prisoners (VEPs) in France is one of the 
principle measures adopted by the prison administration in the context of the fight against 
terrorism. The selection of prisons where these measures are implemented is made according to 
the architecture, the location and the capacity of the sites. Staff assigned to work in these prison 
wings follow a three-week training course. Of the five prison wings, two are dedicated to the 
assessment of radicalized prisoners or prisoners on the path of radicalization to violence, whereas 
the three other prison wings are dedicated to the management of violent extremist prisoners.
Only adult male prisoners are allocated to dedicated prisons wings for VEPs. The selection of 
prisoners is made during a meeting involving prison directors, as well as the directors of social 
reintegration services, and the probation service. Allocation decisions are based on the prisoner’s 
profile/background and receptiveness.
As a general rule, allocation in dedicated prison wings for VEPs is in individual cells, most notably 
in order to respect the principle of separation between pretrial detainees and sentenced 
prisoners. The treatment of prisoners in the dedicated wings is in line with the regular prison 
regime as far as rights and obligations of prisoners are concerned, including the right to maintain 
contact with family, access to constructive activities, etc. The management of prisoners in the 
dedicated prison wings for VEPs varies according to the prison wings. For example:
68 IIJ Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization, Recommendation 
6 (Consider appropriate factors when determining whether to segregate or disperse inmates with special attention 
given to terrorist ideologues and leaders and those susceptible to their violent extremist messages).
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•  In some prison wings, programmes are compulsory, meaning that prisoners have to participate 
in general training activities (courses delivered by teachers from the Ministry of National 
Education), discussion groups and all other necessary activities that address identified risks.
•  In other prison wings, the management of detainees will be individual, i.e. professionals from 
different disciplines will provide services / conduct interviews on an individual basis.
The management of VEPs comprises three phases: (a) gaining the prisoner’s trust; (b) work on 
ideologies and beliefs; and (c) self-appraisal and projection into the future. The work performed in 
the dedicated prison wings is multidisciplinary. At a first level, there are prison guards, prison staff 
in charge of social reintegration, probation officers as well as psychologists and teachers. At a 
second level, there are other relevant partners working with prisoners, such as from the national 
education system, health-care units, etc.
Case study submitted by the Directorate of the Prison Administration, France, in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group 
Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
• Separation: Separating violent extremist prisoners from the general population could 
make them easier to manage and reduces the risk of them radicalizing others to vio-
lence.69 In addition, necessary resources including extra security measures and training 
for prison officers and specialist personnel may only be needed in a limited number 
of locations. However, there are also negative aspects to separation. Keeping violent 
extremist prisoners separate from the general prison population can generate risks. 
Separation may elevate their status in the eyes of other prisoners or groups in the 
community. Grouping together violent extremist prisoners who exhibit widely disparate 
levels of radicalization to violence risks the less-radicalized prisoners being influenced 
by more radical prisoners.70 Incarcerating violent extremist prisoners in separate prison 
wings may also enhance rejection or stigmatization of these prisoners, which could 
make it difficult for them to integrate into the mainstream prisoner population when 
they are transferred to a regular prison regime (for instance, in pursuit of a disengage-
ment or reintegration agenda). In addition, separation often bestows unwanted levels 
of status/feelings of importance to the separated group.
69 For examples of separation see: Netherlands–Veldhuis, T.M. & Lindenberg, S. (2012a) “Limits of Tolerance 
under pressure: A case study of Dutch terrorist detention policy”. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5, 425-443); Kenya 
– Kenya to tackle radicalisation with new prison for “extremists”, 16 February 2016, Available at: http://uk.reuters.
com/article/uk-kenya-prison-idUKKCN0VQ0S4; Saudi Arabia–Boucek, C., (2008) “Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s 
special terrorist prisons”. Terrorism Monitor, 6, 4-6; Philippines–Morales, R. (2012) “Integration versus segregation: 
A preliminary assessment of de-radicalisation in two Philippine correctional facilities”. Studies in Conflict and Terror-
ism Journal, 35, 211–228; Australia – Brown, D. (2008) The effect of terrorism and terrorist trials on Australian 
prison regimes, in C.Cunneen & M. Salter (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second Australia and New Zealand Critical 
Criminology Conference, Sydney, Australia, 19–20 June. (pp. 61-76). Sydney: University of New South Wales.)
70 See for example, Adeline Hazan (French Prison Controller): "When I visited the prison in Fresnes, I noticed 
that they had placed a young man who left for Syria on a whim [in a cell] with a completely radicalized leader.", 
quoted in: Jublin, M. (2015) “France’s Prison Controller Thinks Grouping Radical Inmates Together Is a Terrible 
Idea”, Vice News, June 30, 2015.
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INDONESIA: Terrorist Allocation Policy
Given the overall size of the Indonesian prison population, the number of terrorist prisoners is 
quite small, and amounted to 274 prisoners in November 2014. These prisoners are relatively 
dispersed in the system and are held in approximately 26 different prisons, with some of the more 
hard-line prisoners being held at a variety of prisons on Nusakambangan island. The biggest 
concentration of terrorist prisoners is probably at Jakarta’s Cipinang Prison, which held 54 in 2013.
The Indonesian authorities initially tried to concentrate terrorist prisoners. For example, during the 
conflict with GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (or Free Aceh Movement)], efforts were made to 
concentrate the GAM prisoners. This changed, however, to a more dispersed policy, especially for 
prisoners who had received sentences in excess of three years. The change in approach was more 
a response to accommodation issues rather than a conscious government policy on dispersal. A 
similar issue has occurred with later terrorists prisoners. While these prisoners are often held in 
maximum security prisons, they are not isolated from other prisoners and enjoy the same 
privileges in terms of visiting rights. Indeed, their ability to move around prison and access visiting 
areas is superior to most other prisoners, as some staff are intimidated by the terrorist prisoners.
Serious concerns have been raised about the freedom that these prisoners have to mix with other 
terrorist prisoners, including leaders and ideologues, as well as their ability to mingle freely among 
other types of prisoners, and the relatively relaxed regime that allows terrorist prisoners large 
numbers of visitors. One terrorist leader was recorded as having 900 separate visitors over the 
course of a year. Within the prison visiting areas, the terrorist prisoners are free to move around 
and congregate.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
• Isolation: Violent extremist prisoners are held in isolation in some countries, where 
each prisoner is held in a single cell, totally isolated from the outside world and from 
other prisoners. Their contact with staff is also kept to an absolute minimum and their 
one hour of exercise a day does not usually involve any contact with prisoners or staff. 
Such practices amount to prolonged solitary confinement. In other countries, some 
violent extremist prisoners may be permanently segregated from others in a single 
person cell with very restricted or no access to regime activities, which can also be 
described as prolonged solitary confinement. It is important to note in this regard 
that the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
unambiguously identify prolonged (in excess of 15 days) or indefinite solitary confine-
ment as one of the practices that should be prohibited. Permanent and total isolation 
may further violate Member States’ obligations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Punishment.71
• Concentration: Violent extremist prisoners in one or two prisons enables the prison 
administration to focus all its resources including extra security measures and training 
for prison officers and specialist personnel in limited locations. With a single 
71 Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 43(a), (b); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, on Art. 7 of the 
ICCPR (1992); Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports 
of the United States of America (United Nations Ref. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5), 19 December 2014, para. 20; also see 
the Istanbul Protocol on the use and effects of solitary confinement (A/63/175, Annex); Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on torture to the United Nations General Assembly, 5 August 2011 (A/66/268), in particular paras. 75, 76, 
80, 81 and 84.
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institution, it is also possible to try and create a more therapeutic environment in 
which the impact of interventions can be fostered. However, concentrating violent 
extremist prisoners in one or two prisons can have some disadvantages. First, it can 
make that prison the focus for external attacks mounted to free the prisoners. Second, 
the control of prisoners may present management challenges if violent extremist pris-
oners are located in a single institution, for example, if the prisoners decide to cause 
a disturbance. Housing all violent extremist prisoners together could increase the risk 
of prison violence and the chances of illegal activities being carried out. Where tightly 
structured violent extremist organizations are involved, they may attempt to recreate 
their operational command structures, put pressure on disengagement efforts, and 
present the prison authorities with a united front. Staff manipulation or threats against 
staff may also represent a higher risk.
ALGERIA: Classification and separation
Detainees charged with terrorism-related offences are strictly separated from the rest of the prison 
population and divided into three categories according to their personality and the gravity of the 
alleged offence:
Violent extremists: Those individuals whose behaviour is characterized by the resort to armed 
violence, disobedience and an absence of respect for laws and prison regulations, coupled with a 
strong will to dominate and manipulate other prisoners.
Ideological extremists: Those who, while not being violent and respecting the laws and regulations, 
discretely glorify terrorism within prison facilities.
Others: Those who are charged with the failure to report terrorist attacks, e.g. for fear of retaliation. 
This category of prisoners represents the least dangerous, and is generally disciplined, follows 
prison regulations and sometimes even cooperates with national authorities.
Separation of these categories is key to avoiding radicalization to violence and/or recruitment of 
other prisoners. The objectives of classification and separation are to allocate violent extremist 
prisoners into suitable groups—ranging from isolation of the most dangerous individuals to small 
groups for the less dangerous ones—and to separate them from the rest of the prison population. 
In Algeria, the Administration of Penitentiary Establishments and Reintegration considers it 
important not to concentrate a high number of prisoners charged with terrorism-related offences 
in one single prison facility.
Case study submitted by the Administration of Penitentiary Establishments and Reintegration of Algeria, in the course of the 
two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 
2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
Finally, there are also particular concerns from the perspective of treatment with humanity 
and dignity. There is a higher likelihood of the balance between control and care being 
undermined, in favour of more control in prisons holding a concentration of violent extremist 
prisoners. As there can be only a limited number of such institutions in one prison system, 
there is an increased likelihood that prisoners will be placed far from their homes, which 
will hinder or limit family contact. Housing violent extremist prisoners together may therefore 
actually contribute to, rather than eliminate, potentially conducive conditions to radicalization 
to violence. Concentration models are sometimes accompanied by restrictive prison regimes 
for violent extremist prisoners, which may arouse feelings of discrimination and unfair 
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treatment among the respective prisoners and their support network and thereby fuel the 
frustration and anger that lies at the root of extremist violence.72
In summary, housing violent extremist prisoners together with like-minded peers might create 
opportunities for them to form close-knit groups and collectively plot violent extremist activi-
ties, and harsh confinement conditions may arouse anger and frustration and spur intensifi-
cation of ideological commitment. Moreover, it is feasible that prisoners in specialized prisons 
for violent extremists might become heroes in the eyes of their followers, thereby creating a 
stronger support base for violent extremist activities. Alternatively, they may also be labelled 
and rejected as a consequence by the general public, which may cause reintegration problems 
after release and increase the risk of recidivism. Previous experiences with concentration 
strategies for violent extremist prisoners demonstrated that such policies can generate a range 
of undesired side effects such as intense resistance among prisoners, further mobilization of 
support for the prisoners’ political objectives, and increased violence among their support 
community. Likewise, the imprisonment and confinement conditions of incarcerated members 
are central in the narratives of many violent extremist movements, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Irish Republican Army and, more recently, the Islamic State, and appear 
to have been driving factors in the establishment of a support base for these movements.73
Detaining violent extremist prisoners with like-minded peers also increases the probability 
for a charismatic leader to emerge, and that prisoners come together into a cohesive subgroup, 
polarize even further and adopt even more violent extremist attitudes. Although a cohesive 
group with an identified leader does provide a useful structure for a prison service to work 
through, if such processes do occur, the ultimate result may be that concentration models 
run the risk of reinforcing, rather than curbing, the probability of violent radicalization, which 
could lead to an enhanced (or at least sustained) extremist threat.74
• Dispersal: In some jurisdictions, violent extremist prisoners are dispersed among the 
high-security prisons within the prison estate. Where high-security prisons do not exist, 
or are insufficient, violent extremist prisoners may be allocated to regular prisons, to 
be held either in a separate high-security unit or placed in cells that are furnished 
and equipped to provide a high level of security. Such cells will usually be located in 
parts of the prison that offer the most protection from the outside world.
ENGLAND AND WALES: Dispersal of violent extremist prisoners
The “high-security prison estate” in England consists of eight prisons, which house the “Category 
A” inmates deemed to pose the greatest potential risk. There are currently a total of around 120 
terrorist prisoners, just over 20 of whom are on remand [and] held in prisons in England, most of 
whom are dispersed among the eight high-security prisons. Ninety are identified as Al Qaeda 
influenced, with the remaining 30 including animal rights, separatist and other domestic terrorists.
72 Williams, R. “Why some prisons produce terrorists”, The Globe and Mail, 4 February 2015. 
73 McCoy, T. (2014) “How the Islamic State evolved in American Prison”. The Washington Post. 4 November 2014.
74 Veldhuis, T. (2015), Captivated by fear. An evaluation of terrorism detention policy, PhD thesis, University 
of Groningen; Ungerer C. (2011), Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian prison experience. Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 40: p. 12.
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Following the conclusion of a government-ordered review into prison-based radicalisation to 
violence, however, the Ministry of Justice announced an important policy shift in August 2016, 
namely that the most dangerous Islamist extremists will be removed from the general prison 
population and held in “specialist units” in the high-security estate. The review had concluded that 
some charismatic prisoners were exerting a “radicalising influence” over fellow Muslims. It further 
claimed that some had encouraged aggressive conversions to Islam and/or had been involved in 
the intimidation of prison imams.
Pickering, R.: “Terrorism, extremism, radicalisation and the offender management system in England and Wales”, in: A. Silke 
(2014): Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism, p. 162; Ministry of Justice (2016): Government sets out new measure to tackle 
extremism in prisons, Press release, 22 August.
However, some prison administrations believe that the policy of dispersing violent extremist 
prisoners over several high-security prisons can be problematic, creating logistical, security 
and operations difficulties.75
• Integration: In some countries, integrating violent extremist prisoners among other 
categories of prisoners has proved to be the best approach, as it prevents the forma-
tion of tight groups and confronts violent extremists with alternative perspectives and 
ideas that might contribute to their disengagement from violent extremism.76 However, 
integrated or dispersed imprisonment of violent extremist prisoners conveys the risks 
of radicalization to violence and recruitment of other prisoners.
75 See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 2. In England and Wales, for example, 
76 Jones, C. and Morales, S. (2012) concluded that the integration of terrorist inmates with prison gangs may 
temporarily encourage disengagement and set the foundations for deradicalization. However, without a specifically 
designed intervention strategy, the terrorist inmates may revert to militancy once they have returned to their original 
social settings–Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for 
De-Radicalisation, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:3, 211-228.
MOROCCO: Concentration and Dispersal of Terrorist Prisoners
In 2015, approximately 600 prisoners in Morocco’s prison system were described as political 
extremists. These prisoners are typically motivated by a radical interpretation of Islam, and often 
have links to groups such as AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb] and IS [Islamic State]. The 
prison authorities initially decided to concentrate extremist prisoners in a small number of prisons 
and to separate them from the mainstream prison population. The two populations were kept 
apart, partly due to fears that the extremist prisoners would radicalize other prisoners. However, 
this separation policy was judged to have failed. Concentrating the terrorist prisoners was found 
to lead to an increasing radicalization among these prisoners and to undermine other efforts to 
encourage deradicalization. Prisoners’ commitment to the cause hardened in the context of 
incarceration with prisoners from similar backgrounds. In order to address this, a new policy of 
dispersal has been introduced. This has seen the 600 extremist prisoners dispersed to 
approximately 40 different prisons.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
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CANADA: Integration-Separation Accommodation Model
The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) does not accommodate its terrorist-convicted offenders 
in dedicated prisons, instead utilizing an Integration-Separation accommodation model. This 
approach focuses predominantly on the integration of radicalized offenders in an open general 
population environment; however, it permits for the physical/geographical separation of these 
offenders where security information suggests that the direct association of two or more 
radicalized offenders poses a threat to the offender, institution, or staff. Separation may be 
achieved through placement of a radicalized offender within a different living unit at the same 
correctional facility, or via placement at a different institution or correctional setting. Managing 
terrorist-convicted offenders consistently with other types of offenders that pose a security threat 
avoids providing unwarranted status onto the radicalized offender and defuses any potential 
“recruitment/radicalization” power base.
Case study submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the 
Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
In a number of Member States, violent extremist prisoners are frequently moved to different 
institutions to deal with structural overcrowding or, in the case of leaders, on security grounds. 
Frequent transfers can disrupt disengagement and rehabilitation efforts.77 Thus, transfers 
should be limited and effectively managed to minimize their impact on the disengagement 
and reintegration process.
Some Member States adopt a mixed approach based on the role of the violent extremist 
prisoner in their organization or type of violent extremist organization. For example, violent 
extremist ideologues and charismatic leaders are assessed as more likely to radicalize others 
than mere followers and foot soldiers, and to act as an intensifying influence on (already 
violent extremist) fellow prisoners. Therefore, the ideologues and leaders are separated from 
the general population, while followers and foot soldiers are integrated with the general 
population.
SPAIN: Different strategies for dealing with specific terrorist groups
The Spanish terrorist prisoner allocation policy represents a distinctive case, as the country has 
adopted different strategies for dealing with specific terrorist groups. Historically the main terrorist 
threat in Spain since the 1970s has come from the Basque separatist group, ETA [Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna]. Initially, the Spanish authorities operated a concentration policy for ETA prisoners, 
holding them in a small number of facilities. In the late 1980s, this policy was changed to a 
dispersal policy to spread ETA prisoners throughout the prison system. In contrast, as violent 
Islamic terrorists emerged as a significant threat in the 2000s, Spanish policy was to keep these 
prisoners concentrated and to avoid dispersing them throughout the system. Thus, the Spanish 
prison service operates two distinctive allocation policies simultaneously.
The decision to disperse ETA prisoners was based on an analysis of the group. ETA is a relatively 
large terrorist group which has a highly structured organization and has adopted a military-style 
hierarchy. Prior to 1986, ETA prisoners were concentrated. The authorities noted that this allowed 
the group to retain close control over its members and kept the prisoners very cohesive and 
organized. In order to undermine this, after 1986 the Spanish authorities started to distribute the
77  See Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism, Principle 22. 
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ETA prisoners more widely throughout the Spanish prison system. Initially, this involved sending 
the prisoners to 54 different jails where the number of ETA prisoners varied from anywhere 
between 1 to 41. Some prisoners were sent more than 4,000 km away from the Basque region to a 
prison in the Canary Islands. A further motivation for the dispersal strategy is that it provided the 
Government with a bargaining issue for negotiations with ETA. The ETA prisoners would prefer to 
be located in prisons closer to their home region, and the dispersal strategy allowed the 
Government an issue to potentially make concessions in return for other concessions from ETA or 
the prisoners.
Violent Islamic terrorists, however, represented a quite different challenge as judged by the prison 
authorities. In contrast to ETA, the 75 violent Islamist terrorist prisoners did not belong to a single 
cohesive organization, and do not possess a clear hierarchy or chain of command. Thus, the 
training and organization seen with ETA prisoners is not a feature of the violent Islamist prisoners. 
Further, there were significant concerns that the violent Islamist prisoners might be more likely to 
attempt to radicalize other prisoners, compared with ETA. As a result, the Spanish authorities have 
not implemented the dispersal strategy used for ETA with the violent Islamist prisoners. While 
most of the violent Islamist prisoners have been held in isolation wings, some have been allowed 
to mix with other prisoners and this has been linked to instances of radicalization.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
4.4 Assessing different types of risk: tools and approaches
There has been some progress in violence risk assessment during the last decade. Much of 
this progress has been seen in the improved capacity to accurately identify individuals at 
high risk for future violent behaviour, in populations including adults with severe mental 
illness, correctional populations, mentally disordered offenders and sexual offenders.78
In developing objective risk assessment tools and protocols, it is vitally important that officials 
identify and clearly define the types of risks they seek to assess. For example, prison staff 
should determine if they want to evaluate whether a violent extremist prisoner will pose a 
risk within the prison or if they seek to review the risk the prisoner poses to the outside 
community, or both. They should likewise assess what are the likely risks to the prisoner, 
including being vulnerable to radical influence and hence a potential for being radicalized 
to violence. In all cases, these risk assessment tools should be evidence-based and culturally 
appropriate, rather than based on personal biases, speculative considerations or something 
adopted without contextualization from other jurisdictions.
In assessing security-related risks, the overriding consideration in risk assessment is the pro-
tection of the public. A number of criteria have been identified for assessing these risks, 
which are equally applicable to violent extremist prisoners:
• The threat the prisoner might present to the community if he or she were to escape
• The likelihood that the prisoner will try to escape either on his or her own or with 
external assistance
78  For a summary of developments see: Heilbrun, K. (2003) “Violence Risk: From Prediction to Management”, 
in Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, Second Edition, edited by D. Carson and R. Bull. John Wiley & Sons.
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• Any previous history of attempting to escape and access to external help
• The nature of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted
• The number and types of any previous offences
• The potential for threat to other prisoners and staff
• The potential risk to the public via contacts with the outside world
• Previous behaviour in prison
• The likelihood that the prisoner will seek to radicalize others to violence
It is also critical to assess the personal and contextual circumstances which contribute to a 
violent extremist prisoner’s offending and are likely to contribute to reoffending—namely, 
assessing the risk of committing future violent extremist-related offences. Within the prison 
context, and for this type of offender, it is generally agreed that the most effective approach 
is to use structured professional judgement in making the assessments.79
Structured professional judgement is the most common approach to risk assessment. It is impor-
tant to note that the term “professional” is used to allow for the reality that there are non-
clinical professionals (for example, prison staff and religious leaders, etc.) who conduct vio-
lence risk assessments. The evaluator must conduct the assessment according to guidelines 
that reflect current theoretical, professional and empirical knowledge about violence. Such 
guidelines provide the minimum set of risk factors that should be considered in every case. 
The guidelines will also typically include recommendations for information gathering (e.g. 
the use of multiple sources and multiple methods) and communicating opinions. Structured 
professional judgement is centred on individuals, not groups of violent extremist prisoners. 
Information is gathered, weighted and combined according to the assessor’s judgement, often 
assisted by a specialist risk assessment tool. The approach is therefore empirically guided and 
improves consistency, as each assessor is encouraged to consider the same set of risk assess-
ment factors for each person they assess. It supports consistency but it is not intended to 
produce identical assessments. Rather, assessments are reproducible (follows the guidelines 
for completion, grounded in empirical knowledge) and transparent (it should be clear why 
risk factors have been identified as relevant, i.e. they should be based on evidence gathered 
about the violent extremist prisoner; it should also be clear how these risk factors link to 
needs).
Specialized risk assessment tools provide a guide and set the minimum set of risk factors 
that should be considered. In some instances, some of these factors may not be relevant; in 
others, additional risk factors may need to be added. Each assessment should consider all 
risk factors, even if some are later rejected as not relevant to that particular case. Many of 
the risk assessment tools and protocols currently available, however, have questionable relevance 
to violent extremists because the factors used to assess risk do not necessarily relate to the 
background and motivations of this group of violent offenders. In order to establish individual 
disengagement interventions for violent extremist prisoners, assessment tools specifically 
tailored to identify risks of radicalization to violence, and risk of undertaking future violent 
extremist related activities, will therefore need to be used, if available.
A limited number of specific tools, discussed below, have so far been developed to assess 
violent extremist prisoners. These tools have, to date, only been used with limited numbers 
79 See Monahan, J. (2012) “The individual risk assessment of terrorism”, Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, 34; Borum, R. (2015) “Assessing Risk for Terrorist Involvement”, Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management, 2, 2, 63-87.
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of prisoners, and in specific jurisdictions and contexts, so their validity may be limited.80 
Both tools potentially provide useful guidance in the area of extremist violence, but care 
should be taken in using the assessments in all jurisdictions. It should also be noted that it 
may not be realistic to deploy tools as comprehensive as these in jurisdictions with limited 
resources, in post-conflict situations, or when there are many hundreds of violent extremist 
prisoners that require assessing. More basic and simple assessment tools have been developed 
in some jurisdictions.81
The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA-2)82 was designed to be used with people who 
are suspected of being radicalized to violence, who are in the process of being radicalized to 
violence, who have a history of extremist violence, or who have been convicted of such 
offences. It is applicable to people interested in furthering any of a spectrum of violent 
extremism ideologies including political, social, religious or other ideologies or causes. VERA-2 
contributes to a multi-modal risk assessment process that is reliant on information initially 
obtained, analysed and validated by intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies. Fol-
lowing conviction, decisions are made for the security classification and initial placement of 
the offender within the correctional system. The needs and risks identified pertinent to radi-
calization to violence and violent extremism, as well as any criminogenic risk and needs that 
are identified, become the focus of programme interventions during the period of incarcera-
tion. VERA-2 focuses on a number of factors: attitudes-beliefs-ideology risk factors; social 
context and intention risk factors; history and capability risk factors; motivational and com-
mitment elements; and protective indicators. An augmented version, the VERA-2R, includes 
additional indicators related to mental health background and status and motivation.83
Another tool, the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+),84 was developed to help assess each 
individual, and the personal and contextual circumstances which contributed to their violent 
extremist offending and/or are likely to contribute to such offending in the future. These 
guidelines adopt a case formulation approach: a method of analysing the specific individual 
and contextual circumstances in a person’s life that appear to have a functional link to their 
offending. It is particularly appropriate for idiosyncratic offending, where there is less certainty 
about its cause or functions. Structured professional judgement is employed (described earlier 
in this chapter) and a framework is provided to help make these judgements systematic, 
considered and transparent. Assessors consider three dimensions: (1) engagement, (2) intent, 
and (3) capability. Twenty-two factors have been identified that seem to contribute to extrem-
ist offending and these typically map on to the three dimensions. Assessors are asked to 
consider these to ensure that they do not neglect specific circumstances which may contribute 
significantly to offending. This assessment is dynamic, in that it can measure the impact of 
changes in people’s lives on their level of engagement, intent or capability (including the 
impact of intervention on these areas).
80 Cook, A. (2014) Risk Assessment and Management of Group-Based Violence, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, 
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Canada, p. 4.
81 See, for example, the tool developed by the Nigerian Prisons Service – Barkindo, A. and Bryans, S. (2016) 
“De-radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic prison based de-radicalisation programme”, Journal for 
Deradicalisation, Nr.7, Summer 2016. 
82 Pressman, D. and Flockton, J. (2014) “Violent extremist risk assessment; issues and applications of the 
VERA-2 in a high-security correctional setting”, chapter 9 in Silke, A. (ed.) Prisons, Terrorism and Extremist – Critical 
Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform. 
83 Pressman E., Duits, N., Rinne, T and Flockton, J. (2016) VERA–2R Violence Extremism Risk Assessment 
– version 2 Revised: A structured professional judgement approach, Nederlands Institut voor Forensische Psychiatrie 
en Psychologie. 
84 Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) “The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist 
Offenders”, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2015, Vol. 2, No. 1, 40–52.
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Whatever tools are employed, it should be remembered that risk assessment is not an exact 
science and that it will not provide a definitive answer as to whether a violent extremist 
prisoner is likely to reoffend after release. Such tools are indicators of underlying reasons for 
someone being a violent extremist and can provide some insight into whether the risk of 
reoffending is reducing as a result of interventions. Assessments should be validated using 
other sources of information such as staff observations and security intelligence. The key 
point is that an assessment informs decisions about how risk can best be managed and miti-
gated in the future.
It is important that information received from violent extremist prisoners is also validated 
against other available sources and with other staff members. If the information provided by 
violent extremist prisoners conflicts with that obtained from reports and records, the staff 
member must explore these discrepancies. When completing the assessment tool, the staff 
member must draw conclusions about the reliability of the sources from all the available 
evidence before completing the relevant sections of the documentation. If it is difficult to 
distinguish which source is more reliable, the staff member doing the interview should use 
professional judgement and record reasons. This is essential so that when the case conference 
takes place, other staff members can understand how decisions relating to the assessment 
were made.
At the end of the assessment, each staff member may reach a slightly different conclusion 
based on their interviews with the violent extremist prisoners. The staff member should share 
their assessment based on their individual judgement and seek to reach a consensus on the 
overall risks and needs for each violent extremist prisoner, as part of a case conference.
Conducting assessments is by no means an easy task. Many practitioners might feel anxiety, 
pressure and insecurity to do the assessment “right”. This might lead to biases and risk 
aversion. To avoid this, staff members should be supported in managing their anxiety and 
being confident about their decisions, both those based on the results from the assessment 
tool and on their professional insights. A support structure for verification can be put in 
place.85 Anxiety can also be addressed by having staff trained and certified in the application 
of the specialized tools. Assessments should not be administered by those who have not been 
trained and certified on their correct application.
4.5  Understanding the reasons for prisoners’ violent extremist 
behaviour
Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an inten-
tion to cause harm, so “intent” as an additional dimension is an important consideration. 
Intent factors describe the mind-set that is associated with a readiness to use violence and 
address what the individual would do and to what end. Again, not all those who have intent 
to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to 
cause violence take a high level of personal or group capability, resources and networking to 
be successfully carried out. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration 
when assessing risk of violence. Factors can include: individual knowledge, skills and compe-
tencies; access to networks, funding or equipment; and criminal background and capability.
85 Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN 
Prisons and Probation–practitioners working paper, p. 5.
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Undertaking the detailed risk assessment will enable the prison administration to identify 
which of the wide variety of motivations and factors have “pulled” and “pushed” individuals 
towards violent extremism. Understanding why individual prisoners have gone down the path 
of violent extremism is critical for a number of reasons: (a) to design appropriate interven-
tions; (b) to monitor progress and impact of those interventions; (c) to determine the risk 
of future violent acts; (d) to help identify protective factors; (e) to assist with identifying 
other management strategies; (f) and to prevent assumptions about groups directing strate-
gies for individuals (which may be counter-productive).
In the past decade and a half, research has been conducted on the drivers of violent extremism. 
However, there is no authoritative statistical data on the pathways towards individual 
radicalization. While there are some recognizable trends and patterns, there are only a few areas of 
consensus that exist among researchers. Qualitative research, based mainly on interviews, 
suggests that two main categories of drivers can be distinguished: “push factors”, or the conditions 
conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges; and “pull 
factors”, or the individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas 
and grievances into violent extremist action …
Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), para. 23.
It is important not to assume that there is a typology of violent extremists against which any 
individual can be matched. As was made clear earlier, each violent extremist prisoner is 
unique and factors that motivated them to commit violent acts vary from person to person. 
That said, a number of underpinning generic reasons can be identified for violent extremist 
behaviour. More specifically, there appear to be certain recurrent drivers, which are common 
among a wide variety of countries and regions and which lead, sometimes in isolation and 
sometimes in combination with other factors, to violent extremism:
• Lack of socio-economic opportunities: Countries that fail to generate high and sustainable 
levels of growth, to create decent jobs for their youth, to reduce poverty and unemploy-
ment, to improve equality, to control corruption and to manage relationships among 
different communities in line with their human rights obligations, are more prone to 
violent extremism and tend to witness a greater number of incidents linked to violent 
extremism. Citizens may consider weak development outcomes as confirmation of the 
lack of a government’s legitimacy, making State institutions less effective in responding 
to violent extremism when it arises. The absence of alternative employment opportuni-
ties can make violent extremist organizations an attractive source of income.
Working with reason and justice, we can rebuild a fundamental sense of loyalty and belonging 
throughout our societies. Discrimination should be fought, and equality promoted in schools, 
work-places, courtrooms, police-stations, prisons, neighbourhoods and communities. Equal access 
for all to economic, social and cultural rights will contribute to immunizing individuals and 
societies from violent extremism. It is particularly vital that we promote the resilience of affected 
communities. This requires genuine efforts and action to eradicate real or perceived exclusion and 
marginalization.
Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the Geneva Conference on 
Preventing Violent Extremism, 8 April 2016.
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• Marginalization and discrimination: No country is completely homogeneous and diver-
sity in and of itself does not lead to or increase a country’s vulnerability to violent 
extremism. However, when a country experiences insecurities such as scarce resources, 
and when one group, whatever its demographic weight, acts monopolistically in politi-
cal and economic sectors at the expense of other groups, the potential for inter-
communal tensions, gender inequality, marginalization, alienation and discrimination 
increases, as expressed through restricted access to public services and job opportuni-
ties and obstructions to regional development and freedom of religion. This, in turn, 
may incite those who feel disenfranchised to embrace violent extremism as a vehicle 
for advancing their goals.
• Collective grievances and victimization: Historical legacies of, or collective grievances 
stemming from, domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention can enable 
narratives of victimization to take hold. These narratives can provoke simple and power-
ful emotional reactions which may then be exploited by violent extremists: the memory 
of past or present actual or perceived oppressions is upheld so as to fuel the thirst 
for revenge against oppressors. Violent extremism does not occur in a vacuum. Violent 
extremist campaigns are strongly influenced by the wider political and socio-economic 
contexts in which they occur. This environment can either support and encourage 
violence, or inhibit and undermine it.
• Poor governance, violations of human rights and a lack of the rule of law: Violent extrem-
ism tends to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy 
deficits, corruption and a culture of impunity for unlawful behaviour engaged in by 
the State or its agents. When poor governance is combined with repressive policies 
and practices which violate human rights, the potency of the lure of violent extremism 
tends to be heightened. Violent extremists also actively seek to exploit State repression 
and other grievances in their fight against the State.
• Prolonged and unresolved conflicts: Prolonged and unresolved political, cultural or inter-
national conflicts tend to provide fertile ground for violent extremism, not only because 
of the suffering and lack of governance resulting from the conflict itself but also 
because such conflicts allow violent extremist groups to exploit deep-rooted grievances 
in order to garner support, seize territory and resources and control populations. 
Although the conditions conducive to violent extremism affect entire populations, only 
a small number of people are actually radicalized and turn to violence. Both complex 
individual motivations and human agency play a key role in exploiting these conditions 
and transforming ideas and grievances into violent action.
As its definitions indicate, radicalisation is a process of change, a transformation from one 
condition to another. Hence, it is not sudden and people do not snap and become radical, 
although a certain incident (e.g. experienced act of discrimination, perceived attack on Islam such 
as the 2003 war on Iraq, or moral crisis such as the death of a beloved person) can accelerate the 
process. Most female suicide bombers in Iraq were said to have had family members (father, 
brother, son, etc.) killed by the multinational forces or state forces in the country.
Al-Lami M. (2008) Studies of radicalization: State of the field report. London: University of London, p.2.
• Individual backgrounds and motivations: Negative personal experience that resonates 
with the narrative of violent extremist ideologies can heighten the chances that an 
individual will embrace violent extremism. Individual motivations vary: researchers 
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have reported precipitating events as diverse as experiencing or witnessing torture, the 
death of a relative or friend at the hands of the security forces or a foreign power, 
unfair trials, the loss of property or the humiliation of a parent. While some highly 
educated people have played consequential roles in violent extremist organizations, 
many members are poorly educated, often not having completed secondary education. 
A large number have only rudimentary literacy levels and almost no religious knowl-
edge or education, making them vulnerable to indoctrination.
• Distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences: Violent 
extremist groups cynically distort and exploit religious beliefs, ethnic differences and 
political ideologies to legitimize their actions, establish their claim on territory and 
recruit followers. Ideology can play a significant role in facilitating extremist violence, 
although it may not be the most important factor. Recruits to violent extremist move-
ments often have a simplistic understanding of the ideology that the movement’s 
leadership endorses. Indeed, for some, a deeper ideological understanding only comes 
after time spent in prison with other members, which allows them time for detailed 
debate and discussion. In assessing risk, key issues to consider are whether the indi-
vidual’s behaviour or attitudes endorse a movement’s ideological values. To properly 
do this, the assessor needs to have an understanding of the ideological framework of 
that particular movement. Violence committed “in the name of religion” (on the basis 
of, or claimed without justification from, religious tenets of the perpetrator) and “on 
the grounds of religion or belief” (on the basis of the religious affiliation of the victim), 
is a complex phenomenon in different parts of the world. For many people, religion 
is a very emotional issue, deeply connected to feelings of identity, devotion and group 
attachment. Religious convictions can drive people to push their boundaries and per-
form acts of solidarity, compassion and charity. However, this enormous potential can 
also turn into a destructive force, feeding violent extremism.
• Leadership and social networks: While contextual factors, personal experiences and col-
lective grievances can all contribute to the emergence of violent extremism, there is 
also a social context that provides some form of organization and direction for these 
elements. This is often established through the intervention of a charismatic leader or 
political entrepreneur, and through informal family and social networks. Research high-
lights that social factors are probably the single most important element in the radi-
calization to violence process. Proponents of the social network and social movement 
theories contend that radicalization to violence is transmitted and intensified through 
social affiliations, bonds of friendship, kinship, discipleship and other social networks.
• Other motivations: It should also be remembered that some people just get “sucked 
into” violent extremist groups and may be exploited and conditioned, threatened and 
coerced into fighting. Others may simply be using violent extremist activity as a cover 
for more criminal intentions, such as people smuggling, weapons or drug trafficking. 
Some people join violent extremist groups to maintain, or finance, a drug addiction. 
Some commit offences that have been supportive of the violent extremist group, but 
may not have committed them with that intention. There have also been cases of 
violent extremist groups providing financial loans to potential recruits to enable them 
to set up small business.
In summary, academics as well as policymakers have traditionally focused on finding the 
causes of radicalization to violence in externalities such as political and economic conditions. 
However, the radicalizing effects of individual factors should not be overestimated. External 
factors shape and constrain the individual’s environment but do not have a direct effect on 
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his or her behaviour. Radicalization to violence is an individual condition that is prominently 
caused by a combination of social and individual causal factors.86 In other words, dynamics 
in which the individual is directly involved prominently cause radicalization to violence, which 
implies that in addition to personal characteristics, the individual’s (perceived) position in 
relation to relevant others affect his or her behaviour.87
4.6 Need for regular reassessment of risk
While risk assessment protocols can be administered at the outset—and can be used to shape 
the initial classification, categorization, allocation and intervention decisions regarding indi-
vidual violent extremist prisoners—it is particularly important that assessing risk is undertaken 
on an ongoing and regular basis. In fact, the assessments performed later in the process may 
be more accurate, as prison staff will have had more time to interact with and observe the 
violent extremist prisoner. It is also important to recognize that an assessment is dynamic, 
and that prison staff need to accommodate change and protective factors and circumstances 
emerging. Unlike most other types of offending, changes to an individual’s relationship with 
a group, cause or ideology may be particularly important to assess with this particular group.
Behaviour in custody is an important factor for every prisoner in terms of risk assessments. 
Violent extremist prisoners who engage in violence against staff and other prisoners, partici-
pate in political protests (e.g. hunger strikes) or actively attempt to compromise the operation 
or security of the prison (e.g. escape attempts) may be showing strong commitment to the 
cause and a willingness to engage in serious violence on its behalf. In contrast, prisoners 
with a good behavioural record have shown an ability to comply with the regime, which may 
indicate a genuine desire for reform. For example, how prisoners relate to prison faith lead-
ers may provide considerable insight into their general outlook and attitude. Another impor-
tant issue to consider is whether the prisoner has shown a willingness to complete prison-
based interventions designed specifically for violent extremist prisoners. If they have engaged 
with such interventions, the outcome of such involvement is clearly significant to a risk 
assessment.
Readministering risk assessment protocols at regular intervals is important, therefore, to 
inform risk assessment and management decisions, including placement and security catego-
rization. Good practice suggests reassessments at least every six months or in response to 
specific incidents. Furthermore, an oversight mechanism for risk assessments should be put 
in place, where results and outcomes are challenged and analysed.
The results of these periodic assessments will also assist prison officials in estimating the 
impact of the intervention strategies, detecting changes in prisoner attitudes, and deciding 
whether particular intervention strategies need to be modified.88 Different categories of pris-
oners will require different intervention strategies according to the risk indicators identified 
86 For a recent summary of studies on the causes of radicalisation see: Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) 
The Root Causes of Violent Extremism, RAN Issue Paper.
87 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (2008) Causal factors of radicalisation. Some jurisdic-
tions have conducted detailed research in order to better understand the drivers for violent extremism. For example, 
in Nigeria, the Office of the National Security Adviser undertook studies in 2015 as part of development of their 
Countering Violent Extremism programme, including understanding the complex causes and processes of 
radicalisation.
88 Assessment can also inform management strategies more broadly, such as surveillance, supervision, detention 
and intervention strategies, as set out in the UNODC Handbook on Managing High Risk Prisoners (2016). 
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in the course of their assessment, and these may change as the violent extremist prisoner 
goes through various interventions.
In the case of violent extremist prisoners who are eligible to be considered for early or con-
ditional release, arrangements must be made to conduct a risk assessment to inform the 
decision of conditional release authorities (for example, release decision made by a parole 
board). Prior to the final release of a violent extremist prisoner, a formal multi-agency meet-
ing which includes the police and, where they exist, a probation violent extremism lead, 
should take place to review a final risk assessment and to inform decisions after release.
A final prison-based risk assessment of the likelihood that the violent extremist prisoner will 
commit further violent extremist offences is critical to ensuring public safety. In some juris-
dictions, where the risk of the individual committing further violent extremist offences is 
considered to be very high, preventative detention is permissible under the law. In all other 
jurisdictions, violent extremist prisoners must be released at the end of their prison sentence, 
even if they continue to pose a risk to society. Where the risk is assessed as high, suitable 
arrangements should be put in place to closely monitor the released prisoner.
4.7 Violent extremist prisoners with specific needs
Women violent extremist prisoners: When women violent extremists are held in prisons, it is 
imperative to ensure compliance with the relevant international standards, particularly the 
United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures 
for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules).
Women’s participation in violent extremism has evolved from auxiliary roles supporting their 
male counterparts, to gathering intelligence, providing health care, and maintaining safe 
houses, to direct engagement in violent acts, including suicide bombings.89 Between 1985 
and 2010, female bombers committed over 257 suicide attacks (representing about a quarter 
of the total) on behalf of many different violent extremist organizations, according to one 
report.90 Another report suggests that girls and women now make up 30 to 40 per cent of 
the combatants in numerous violent extremist groups.91
Violent extremist groups across the political and ideological spectrum have utilized female 
forces for a range of activities including: logistics; recruitment and awareness-raising; opera-
tions, suicide bombing and combat; fundraising; and investigation and interrogation in conflict 
zones.92 Women in violent extremist movements can assist in preparing and committing 
crimes, provide ideological support, and strengthen the social cohesion within the movement. 
But they can also be coerced into becoming part of violent extremist movements and can 
be both victims as well as perpetrators.
89 Hearne, E. (2009). Participants, Enablers, and Preventers: The Roles of Women in Terrorism. December 
2009. research paper presented at the British International Studies Association annual conference, Leicester, United 
Kingdom, December 2009.
90 Bloom, M. (2011). “Bombshells: Women and Terror”, Gender Issues Vol. 28, Numbers 1-2, 1-21.
91 Ness, C. (2007) “The rise in female violence”, Daedulus, Winter 2007, Vol. 136, No. 1, Pages 84-93.
92 See for example: Institute for Strategic Dialogue: “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part” Gender and the ISIS phe-
nomenon (2015); Algeria female “imams” battle Islamist extremism (2015); Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human 
rights in the affected countries (2015); Penal Reform International (2015)–International Experts Roundtable on 
Preventing Radicalisation in Prisons: Developing a Coordinated and Effective Approach. 
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Many conditions conducive to terrorism impact both on the potential violent radicalization of men 
and women. It is however critical to understand how these factors may be experienced differently 
along gender lines. Gender-based discrimination may indeed possibly overlap with and 
exacerbate discrimination and violations of rights on other grounds, such as race, ethnicity or 
belief. Moreover, specific conditions conducive to the terrorist radicalization of women may 
include gender-based inequality and discrimination, violence against women, lack of educational 
and economic opportunities and lack of opportunities for women to exercise their civil and 
political rights and engage in the political process with lawful and non- violent means.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2013) Women and Terrorist Radicalization–Final Report, 
paragraph 6.
Women are not only victims, but have long been involved with groups engaged in violent 
extremism. Their roles vary according to each group and can include conducting suicide 
bombings, participating in women’s wings or all-female brigades within armed organizations and 
gathering intelligence. Women can also be sympathizers and mobilizers through providing health 
care, food and safe houses to violent extremists and terrorists. For example, while mothers can be 
an entry point for prevention efforts, they can also be a source of radicalization.
Countering Violent Extremism While Respecting the Rights And Autonomy Of Women And Their Communities, Chapter 9 
in: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing The Peace–A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325, (2015), p225.
Although the role of women as violent extremists remains relatively unexplored, studies sug-
gest that most of the factors that prompt men to become terrorists motivate women in the 
same way.93 A variety of additional motives for women becoming involved in violent extremism 
have also been suggested.94 Women can be more vulnerable than men to being drugged, raped, 
physically coerced, and emotionally and socially blackmailed, especially in traditionally patri-
archal societies where they have little recourse to alternative mechanisms of empowerment or 
independence. Like some of their male counterparts, women can also be influenced or coerced 
to participate in violent extremism by family members, to avenge a sense of personal or familial 
dishonour, or to transform their status from victims of sexual violence into ideological icons. 
Although men can do the same, it is often more difficult or unusual for women to do so in 
societies where they are not encouraged to take on public or combat roles.
Among the estimated 5,000 individuals within the EU who have left for Syria and Iraq to join ISIL, 
there are at least 550 women. The underlying motivations for women in the West to leave their 
countries to join ISIL in Syria and Iraq are multi-varied and complex. Often it involves a 
combination of religious, ideological, political and personal reasons.
Radicalisation Awareness Network (2015) The Role of Gender in Violent Extremism, p. 3.
93 Chowdhury Fink, N., Barakat, R. and Shetret, L., (2013), “The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict and 
Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United National and International Actors”, Centre on Global Counterterrorism 
Cooperation, and for a description of these motivations and an extensive list of studies on the roles of women in 
terrorism, see Maj. Marne L. Sutten, “The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform 
Counterterrorism Strategy,” United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009.
94 See for example: Carter, B. (2013) “Women and violent extremism”, GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services; 
Penal Reform International (2015) International Experts Roundtable on Preventing Radicalisation in Prisons: Devel-
oping a Coordinated and Effective Approach; Sutten, M, (2009), The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism 
and the Need to Reform Counterterrorism Strategy, United States Army, Monograph; Cunningham, K., (2003), 
“Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26:171–195, 2003; Alison, M., (2003), 
“Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, Civil Wars, 6(4), 37-54; Jacques, K., Taylor, P., 
(2013), “Myths and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism”, Law and Human Behaviour, 37(1), 35-44.
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In other circumstances, violent extremist groups may provide safe havens for women or 
provide self-esteem and a sense of accomplishment by taking on roles that are challenging 
societal gender norms. Involvement may result from a shortage of men within the organiza-
tion, due to personnel being captured, killed or unwilling to participate. Women who are 
victims of violence and discrimination may feel that they had no non-violent option. Pro-
longed displacement can also affect their decision to join violent extremist groups. All of 
these experiences shape women’s political identities, often creating highly committed female 
violent extremists.
Those staff undertaking risk assessments in prison should ensure that they fully explore the 
role that the women prisoner played in the violent extremist activity. Given the complexity 
of women’s involvement in violent extremism, it is important that consideration is given to 
designing effective gender-sensitive disengagement activities.95 Gender issues can be of key 
importance for the methodology of interventions. To be effective, disengagement, reintegra-
tion and after-care interventions should be gender-sensitive and address these varying experi-
ences, as well as the specific obstacles and challenges that women may face.
Develop gender-sensitive disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs that address 
the specific needs of women and girls on a path to terrorist radicalization or involved in violent 
extremism.
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015) Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 10.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has pointed out that “it is important 
to appreciate that women have a role in the design and implementation of counter-terrorism 
measures, as well as to recognize their contributions in combating terrorism.96” It is therefore 
necessary to ensure that women are able to participate and be represented in policy develop-
ment discussions and that gender expertise is included at the very outset of designing inter-
ventions for women violent extremists. There is currently no specific risk assessment tool for 
women violent extremist prisoners.
As pointed out in chapter 3, gender-sensitive techniques should also be adopted to correct 
the gender imbalance through the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women in prison 
administrations. Women staff should be recruited and trained to work with women violent 
extremist prisoners and to deliver gender-appropriate interventions. Women religious leaders, 
teachers and community elders could also be used to provide counselling, education and 
training for women violent extremist prisoners and to assist in facilitating their reintegration 
into mainstream society, especially following their release.
For those women who were compelled to travel to marry, or who were forced to marry after 
being abducted, it is very important to understand that they are victims of sexual violence 
95 United Nations Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) calls for greater integration of gender throughout 
activities to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Resolution 2242 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at 
its 7533rd meeting, on 13 October 2015, S/RES/2242 (2015), paragraph 13.
96 United Nations General Assembly, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Counter-
ing Terrorism: Note by the Secretary-General, A/64/211, 17 March 2010 (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism).
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who are in need of psychological treatment, otherwise the damage they feel may lead to 
increased violent extremism. They are often young and it can be harder to deal with them 
as violent extremists unless there are gender-sensitive interventions.97
It is not just in relation to prison-based interventions that women have special needs. If a 
woman has been convicted of a violent extremist offence, it can be very challenging to rein-
tegrate her, owing to the stigma she is likely to face from her family and community and 
the risk of revenge. Additional interventions, tailored towards the gender dimension, may be 
necessary. Women violent extremist prisoners may have troubled family relationships and 
histories (experience with domestic violence, sexual abuse and honour-related violence). A 
risk assessment should be undertaken to establish whether it is safe—on both a psychological 
and physical level—to return home. Upon return, issues need to be addressed (including 
those relating to honour/shame). Additionally, trauma therapy by a psychotherapist is often 
necessary. Although women and girls may not have entered into combat, they are quite often 
traumatized by their experiences.98
  For general guidance on the treatment of women prisoners, see the UNODC Handbook on Women and 
Imprisonment (2nd edition, 2014)
Foreign terrorist fighters: The term “foreign terrorist fighters” has been defined by United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 as “…. nationals who travel or attempt to travel 
to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel 
or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation 
in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection 
with armed conflict.”99
According to some sources, there are nearly 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters currently 
deployed.100 The number of criminal cases involving foreign terrorist fighters has grown in 
recent years. This is not only due to the increasing number of foreign fighters and returnees, 
but also due to the broadening of the scope of national legal regimes—and especially criminal 
codes—which are being adapted to more effectively address the foreign fighter phenomenon, 
and violent extremism in general. For instance, United Nations Security Council Resolution 
2178 (201) indicates that Member States should criminalize in their domestic legislation the 
(attempt to) travel for terrorism-related acts, the financing, organization or other facilitation 
of such acts. It is likely, therefore, that the number of violent extremist-related prisoners 
entering the criminal justice system, including prisons, will probably rise.
Returning foreign terrorist fighters who are held in prisons, whether pretrial or sentenced, 
require individual assessments in which their motives for travel can be better understood. 
97 Saltman, E. and Smith, M. (2015) “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part” Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, Institute 
for Strategic Dialogue.
98 Radicalisation Awareness Network (2015) The Role of Gender in Violent Extremism, p. 5.
99 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014): Adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd 
meeting, on 24 September 2014,S/RES/2178 (2014). For an alternative definition see: de Guttry, A., Capone, F. 
and Paulussen, C. (eds.)(2016), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, T.M.C. Asser Press.
100 United States Congress Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Ter-
rorist and Foreign Fighter Travel. Washington, D.C., September 2015, pp. 11 – 12; E. Schmitt and S. Sengupta, 
“Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global Efforts”, New York Times, 26 September 2015; United Nations 
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Action Against Threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters Must Be Ramped Up, 
Security Council Urges in High-Level Meeting, 29 May 2015; Schmid, A. (2015) “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter 
Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues”, ICCT Policy Brief, October 2015.
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Risk assessment frameworks, as they relate to foreign terrorist fighters, should be shared 
between partner States, where appropriate, to help ensure a comprehensive approach that 
reflects good practices.101
Driving factors that may lead to a decision to travel to a conflict zone may include: the sense 
of outrage at what is alleged to be happening in the country where the conflict is taking 
place and empathy with the people being affected; adherence to the ideology of the group 
an individual wishes to join; and a search for identity and belonging. Other drivers may be: 
foreign policy grievances; national policy; intergenerational conflict; and peer pressure.102 
While many may seek specifically to join a violent extremist group, others may have believed 
that they were protecting civilians from oppression. Others may simply have been motivated 
by adventure or monetary gain, while some may have travelled to provide humanitarian 
assistance before becoming engaged in violent extremism. Some have allegiances, which may 
be cultural, ethnic, and/or economic, that transcend contemporary political borders and so 
they do not perceive themselves as foreign fighters.
The challenge for the prison administration is identifying the most appropriate interventions 
for foreign terrorist fighters given their varied motivations and, in many cases, their decision 
to voluntarily disengage from the violent extremist cause.103 The situation may be made even 
more complex if the returning foreign terrorist fighter is suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, trauma, behavioural unpredictability, emotional instability, or mental health issues 
brought on as a result of participating in violent extremist activity.
Develop comprehensive reintegration programs for returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). 
Comprehensive reintegration programs – including in prisons – are a critical component to 
respond to the potential threat posed by returnees … Key principles for consideration to guide 
engagement and the development of such programs include: (1) the need to articulate the goal of 
activities to reduce the risk of returnees committing terrorist acts; (2) the importance of 
developing targeted and tailored engagement strategies based on the specific motivational 
factors; and (3) the need to involve multi-disciplinary actors in law enforcement, communities, and 
faith-based organizations.
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2014) “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF) Initiative. The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on 
Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon, Good Practice 19.
101 Global Counterterrorism Forum “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF) Initiative (2014): The Hague – Mar-
rakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon, Good Practice, 
No. 16.
102 Frenett, R. and Silverman, T. (2016) “Foreign Fighters: Motivations for travelling to foreign conflicts”, in 
de Guttry, A., Capone, F. and Paulussen, C. (eds.)(2016), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, chapter 5, pp64-75.
103 Entenmann, E. et al. (2015) Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities 
for the Criminal Justice Sector, ICCT Policy Brief, December 2015; European Commission–Radicalisation Aware-
ness Network (2013) “Declaration of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention, Outreach, 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration”; Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): Countering Violent Extremism 
and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda, Action 9; Jones, C. (2014). 
“When foreign fighters return: managing terrorists behind bars”. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/
when-foreign-fighters-return-managing-terrorists-behind-bars-31054.
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“Lone wolf” violent extremist prisoners: The frequency of attacks by domestic “lone wolf” violent 
extremists104 continues to increase. Even though such attacks remain less common and pre-
cipitate fewer casualties than violent extremist acts by organizations and groups, there are 
certain trends among “lone wolf” violent extremists that can be identified:105 increased tar-
geting of law enforcement and military personnel; increased radicalization to violence via the 
Internet and extremist media; and proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming 
affinity to specific, organized violent extremist groups. In particular, the expansion of the 
Internet and social media offers individuals the ability to become radicalized to violence 
without physically interacting with others and to research various attack methodologies unde-
tected. “Lone wolf” violent extremist prisoners may have specific needs and require specific 
interventions that should be identified following a thorough risk assessment.
Pretrial violent extremist prisoners: In many countries, individuals suspected of terrorism-related 
offences may spend many years in detention awaiting trial, while in other countries individu-
als may spend substantial time in military or immigration detention facilities. Pretrial popula-
tions are more transient and less stable than sentenced prisoner populations. Planning mean-
ingful support is also more difficult in the absence of a fixed horizon (for example, the 
prisoner’s sense of an exit from prison and the prison authorities’ inability to determine the 
duration of a prisoner’s detention). Furthermore, due to legal or policy restraints, pretrial 
prison populations in certain countries are not always able to avail themselves of the same 
prison services and programmes as sentenced prisoners. In addition, detainees are at their 
most vulnerable in the period immediately following their arrest, and therefore their suscep-
tibility to the efforts of violent extremist recruiters may be higher during this pretrial period. 
It is important that these risks and challenges are reflected in the assessment and manage-
ment of pretrial violent extremist prisoners. However, prison administrations must also be 
aware that any intervention including pretrial violent extremist prisoners may have an impact 
on their respective court cases—a factor which may discourage participation.
104 A “Lone Wolf” violent extremist can be defined as: a single actor who uses violence linked to a formulated 
ideology, whether his own or that of a larger organization, and who does not receive orders, direction, or material 
support from outside sources.
105  National Security Critical Issues Task Force (2015) Lone Wolf Terrorism, Georgetown University. See also: 
Hamm, M. and Spaaij, R. (2015) Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways 
to Forge Prevention Strategies, Indiana State University: Marlatt, G. (2016) Lone Wolf Terrorism – A Brief Biblio-








“I take complete responsibility for my actions. I acted purely in the name of my religion … I can 
assure you that one day, should I be set free, I would do the same, exactly the same …”
Mohammed Bouyeri, the killer of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gough quoted in: Al-Lami M. (2008) Studies of 
radicalization: State of the field report. London: University of London.
Interviewer: “If you had met me at that point, would you have tried to kill me?” Former al Qaeda 
member: “Of course. I would have killed you. But now I see you and I can live together in peace”
Interview with a former al Qaeda member at a rehabilitation centre in Saudi Arabia. CBS News, This Morning (November 18, 
2014).
The question facing prison administrators is whether it is possible to convince violent extrem-
ist prisoners to disengage from violence, and, if it is possible, what interventions should be 
put in place to achieve the desired disengagement.
Disengagement from violent extremism has been a neglected area, not only in counter-terrorism 
policies but also in research on violent extremism. However, some recent studies are beginning 
to provide valuable insights.106 This is despite the fact that disengagement remains potentially 
as complex a process as initial recruitment and radicalization to violence. There have, however, 
been a number of attempts to develop case studies of disengagement from violent extremist 
groups and to formulate policies and interventions directed at facilitating individual disengage-
ment from such groups. Any effort to understand the factors that drive or facilitate disengage-
ment for each individual will necessarily be based in, or derived from, a particular context. 
106 For recent research on the subject see: Altier, M., Thoroughgood, C., & Horgan, J. (2014). “Turning away 
from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology”. Journal Of Peace Research, 51(5), 647-661; 
Braddock, Kurt and Horgan, J. (2015). “Towards A Guide For Constructing And Disseminating Counternarratives 
To Reduce Support For Terrorism”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39 (5), 381-404; Williams, M.J., Horgan, J., & 
Evans, W.P. (2015). “The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory 
of Vicarious Help-Seeking”. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (October). 45-65; Horgan, J., 
Altier, M. B., Shortland, N., & Taylor, M. (2016). “Walking Away: The Disengagement and Deradicalization of a 
Violent Right-Wing Extremist”. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (March), 1-15.
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However, although the political and ideological context may be very different, the social and 
psychological processes involved may well be similar, or at least comparable.
Current research suggests that violent extremism is not caused by a distinct personality trait, 
disorder or profile. However, understanding how various mental illnesses may facilitate 
extremist violence continues to evolve. Treating mental illness or supporting people with 
emotional or psychological disturbance may be an appropriate strategy for some.107 Any such 
assessment and treatment should only be undertaken by qualified health-care professionals, 
and be linked to psychosocial interventions.
Radicalization to violence is a process of belief and attitude change towards an extremist 
orientation that justifies the use of violence to achieve its goals. In some cases, the process 
may take many years; with other people, it may take only a few months. Driving their violent 
extremism orientation is a collection of experiences, memories, feelings, emotions, thoughts 
and beliefs. Radicalization to violence is best viewed, therefore, as a process of change, a 
personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Scholars argue that 
becoming radicalized to violence is, for most people, a gradual process that requires a pro-
gression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily. A person does not 
become a violent extremist overnight, although the influence of an incident which may act 
as a “catalyst event”, such as an experienced act of discrimination, perceived attack on a 
religion, or a “moral crisis” with the death of a loved one, may accelerate the process.
Underpinning the approach of disengagement interventions is the concept that if an individual 
can adopt radical beliefs and attitudes that lead to violent extremism, then that individual 
can also abandon the use of violence through changing those beliefs and attitudes that justify 
its use.
The pathway to disengagement may not necessarily be the same for everyone, nor are the 
qualities of that disengagement process as experienced by the individual the same for each 
person … the reality of individual accounts is such that physical, psychological, voluntary and 
involuntary issues and experiences can combine even within one individual case to characterize 
the true complexity of one person’s disengagement experiences. The reasons for disengagement 
can be numerous, conflicting, competing and exceptionally complex even within a single case. 
Indeed it is the case for many individuals engaged in terrorism that disengagement is as complex 
as the process that characterized how they become involved in terrorism in the first place.
Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: Routledge, 
p. 27.
It is clear from research that no single model of disengagement is universally applicable. Dis-
engagement interventions cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another, even 
within the same region.108 To be effective, efforts must be highly tailored to the country and 
culture involved, the nature of violent extremist group, the individual prisoners participating 
and the environment into which the former violent extremist detainee is ultimately released.
107 Post, J. (2007) The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda. New York: 
Palgrave-MacMillan. See also Post, J. (2009) Foreword in Horgan, J. Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of dis-
engagement from radical and extremist movements. London: Routledge, p xii.
108 Porges, M. (2011): “Reform School for Radicals: Deradicalization programs are justified by their indirect 
effects”. The American Interest. Vol. 6, No. 6.
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That is not to say that good practices cannot be identified. Interventions should focus on 
the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement 
in, violent extremism is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement 
and engagement in violent activity. Interventions achieve this aim by addressing the reasons 
why people are motivated to engage and offend, as well as those attitudes, beliefs and per-
ceptions that enable them to offend. They should also provide opportunities to learn new 
skills and coping mechanisms.
5.2 Defining intervention goals and outcomes
In developing interventions, it is important to clearly define goals and objectives, as well as 
indicators of success and failure.109
Perhaps most important is defining from the outset whether the goal of the intervention is 
to change the views, values and attitudes (deradicalization) or the behaviour of the violent 
extremist prisoner (disengagement from violence). Interventions that aim for the latter are 
likely to be more successful in achieving their goals. They do not attempt to change a pris-
oner’s radical or extremist beliefs and views but instead seek to get a prisoner renounce the 
use of violence to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee held that a domestic “ideology conversion system”, which was applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion with a view to altering the political opinion of an inmate by offering 
inducements of preferential treatment within prison and improved possibilities of parole, had 
violated the freedom of expression and of the manifestation of belief on the discriminatory 
basis of political opinion.110 Consequently, this handbook focuses on disengagement rather 
than deradicalization.
A second question that Member States will need to consider is whether interventions should 
focus on lower and mid-level violent extremists or those in leadership positions. In the case 
of those in leadership positions, the goal may be collective disengagement or for them to 
motivate their supporters to follow them in the disengagement process. Focusing on the 
leadership group may have a more significant impact in the longer term, but may be far 
more difficult to achieve.
5.3  Understanding the reasons for, and the process of 
disengagement
Former violent extremists who have reintegrated most successfully and who report feeling 
the most connected in mainstream society are those who have made significant changes in 
six domains: “social relations”; “coping”; “identity”; “ideology”; “action orientation”; and 
“disillusionment”.111 In many cases, development within these domains occurs over a period 
of years.
109 Rome Memorandum, Good practice, No. 1. 
110 Yong-Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, Views of the Human Rights Committee of 15 July 2003, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999, para. 7.2.
111 Five domains were set out in: Barrellea, K. (2015) “Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after 
extremism”, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Volume 7, Issue 2, 2015, pages 129-142. The sixth 
domain is identified as a common theme in other research (see below).
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Social relations: A range of supportive and meaningful relationships. Relationships are one of 
the primary vehicles for disengagement from violent extremism and, further, appear to be 
what most optimally enables subsequent engagement of a former violent extremist elsewhere 
in society. Research suggests that ties to family or friends can act to pull people away from 
the involvement in violent extremism.112 The importance of social ties in drawing people out 
of violent groups has been highlighted in a number of jurisdictions.113 These ties can also be 
an anchor for those who have disengaged. For this reason, maintaining, or re-establishing, 
family and community links will be essential to assist people wishing to leave violent 
extremism.
 For further detail on families in the context of violent extremist prisoners’ social reintegration, see chapter 8.5
Coping: An ability to address personal health issues, both psychological and physical. A person 
who has left a violent extremist group may well need professional support for physical or 
emotional issues. It is common for a person to be distressed by the loss of purpose, friend-
ships, belonging and identity. Some people feel paranoid that the group will be looking to 
punish them; others feel, sometimes correctly, that the community they intend to move back 
into after release will reject them. Depending on the individual’s history, problems with 
depression, anxiety, trauma, trust and relationship issues may be present. Coping skills and 
self-care are necessary for anyone facing personal challenges. Therefore, psychological and 
health services need to be incorporated into any disengagement activity in prison.
Identity: Disengagement is a transformative identity process during which a person discon-
nects from a violent extremist group and reconnects elsewhere, re-establishing their own 
sense of self as they do so. The stability and cohesiveness of a former violent extremist’s 
personal and social identity underpins his or her ability to connect with others outside the 
group. The emergence and/or development of personal identity is a critical factor in well-
being generally, and is a particular challenge for many former violent extremists, especially 
if they have been in the violent extremist group for a long time. Most of them need to 
develop multiple new threads of identity to determine where they belong.
Ideology: Change in ideology such that the individual no longer believes that violent methods 
are justified; tolerating or accepting that other people hold different beliefs and belong to dif-
ferent identity groups; a coherent set of ideas and beliefs that enable peaceful cohabitation. 
Former violent extremists indicate that guidance about foundational/seminal knowledge in their 
faith or ideology tradition from a respected source was critical in their change of views. An 
ability to challenge ideas and beliefs that support violence in a respectful way is tremendously 
valuable to support the disengagement process.
Action orientation: Non-violent action orientation such that the individual can participate in 
their own life, or wider community life on release, to the full extent that they desire. 
112 See, for example: Noricks, D. (2009) “Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs”. In 
Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, Davis, P. K. and Cragin, K. (eds), pp 299-321. Santa 
Monica, SA: RAND Corporation: Horgan, J. (2009a) “Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis”. In 
Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (eds), pp 17-29. London: 
Routledge; Jacobson, M. (2008): “Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining From Al Qa’ida’s Losses”, CTC Sentinel, 1(8), pp. 1-4; 
Fink, N. C. and Hearne, E. (2008): Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism, 
New York International Peace Institute; Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F. and Tillie, J. (2008): Decline and 
Disengagement – An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation Amsterdam: IMES Amsterdam.
113 See, for example, programme review of deradicalization interventions for Pakistani militants in Beg, S. and 
Bokhari, L.: “Pakistan: In search of a disengagement strategy”, in: Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving  Terrorism 
Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, pp. 224-242. London: Rutledge.
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Depending on their socialization prior to entering a violent extremist group, some individuals 
leaving these groups need additional support in finding constructive and law abiding ways 
to pursue their cause, or live their life. Active participation in family, work, community or 
prosocial activities each exemplify different manifestations of a non-violent action orientation. 
Providing violent extremist prisoners with employment skills to assist them in getting a job 
can make a significant contribution in this area.
Disillusionment: The factor most commonly cited in literature as being associated with disen-
gagement from all types of violent extremism.114 People can be disillusioned with the way 
that the group operates, the ideology of the group, the behaviour of the leader or the rules 
of the group. New recruits report a discrepancy between their vision of mobilization to the 
“cause” and their “on the ground” experience. Some members of violent extremist groups 
report that this was a factor in their decision to disengage from violence. Others become 
increasingly disillusioned with the effectiveness of the tactical use of violence to achieve their 
objectives, which can act as a powerful catalyst for re-assessing the use of violence and their 
involvement in the violent extremist group.
In light of the above, disengagement from violent extremism can be brought about through 
a complex set of interacting processes that support change in all six domains.
Some factors that can influence a violent extremist prisoner to disengage from violence occur 
outside of the control of the prison administration, such as ageing (people are less likely to 
remain actively involved in violent extremism the older they get) and experiencing a turning-
point event (such as the death of a close friend or family member). Changing personal 
priorities, such as the desire to begin leading a quieter life, begin a family or take up employ-
ment, and spending time away from the violent extremist group are also associated with 
violent extremists disengaging from violence.115 Moreover, disengagement does not happen 
in a vacuum and the actions of the State towards the prisoner’s family and community will 
directly influence what is possible in the prison setting. Other factors, such as social griev-
ances, are also outside of the scope of what prison interventions can address.
Having completed a thorough risk assessment of the reasons why a prisoner committed, or 
supported, violent extremist activities, it is possible to identify the “needs” associated with 
those risks. “Needs” in this context can be understood as issues that must be addressed by 
“interventions” that will lead to disengagement from violence. This approach is known as 
the “risk-needs-responsivity framework”.116 Member States are encouraged to develop appro-
priate interventions to assist violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence.117
114 Horgan, J.: “Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis” and Barrett, R. and Bokhari, L.: “Deradi-
calization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world”, both 
in: Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, pp. 17-29. 
London: Routledge; Jacobson, M. (2008): “Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining From Al Qa’ida’s Losses “ CTC Sentinel, 
1(8), pp. 1-4; Fink, N. C. and Hearne, E. (2008): Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent 
Extremism. New York International Peace Institute.
115 Abuza, Z.: “The Rehabilitation of Jamaah Islamiya detainees in South East Asia” and Horgan, J.: “Individual 
Disengagement: A psychological analysis”, both in: Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving Terrorism Behind: 
Individual and Collective Disengagement, pp. 193-211. London: Routledge; Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F. and 
Tillie, J. (2008) Decline and Disengagement An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation Amsterdam: IMES 
Amsterdam.
116 See: Andrews, D. A., Bonta, J., & Hoge, R. D. (1990). Classification for effective rehabilitation: Rediscovering 
psychology. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17, 19-52; Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2006). The psychology of criminal 
conduct (4th ed.). Newark, NJ: LexisNexis; UNODC Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the 
Social Reintegration of Offenders (2012), p. 37.
117 See for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) para. 4 on “developing and 
implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for Foreign Terrorist Fighters”. 
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More important … is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and 
tailor prison programs to their needs … there is no single intervention that can produce a 
rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for 
many different reasons.
International Crisis Group (2007) “Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons” Asia Report N°142. International Crisis 
Group, p. 16.
In addition to responding to those specific needs, it is important (in accordance with desist-
ance theory), to help prisoners “look at their lives through some new lenses”118 by attempting 
to build personal maturity, renegotiate relationships, and constructing or reconstructing per-
sonal narratives.
5.4 Impact and types of interventions
Interventions in this context are defined as “the planned and structured processes designed 
to assist violent extremist prisoners to abandon engagement in violent extremist acts or, for 
those considered to be at serious risk of becoming radicalized to violence, to avoid commit-
ting such offences in future”. It should be noted at the outset that interventions for violent 
extremists will, in many respects, overlap with what should be provided to rehabilitate other 
prisoners (such as education, vocational training, psychological and behavioural therapy, and 
after-care), in particular where the assessed needs of the violent extremist prisoners are similar 
to those of other prisoners. They differ primarily in their emphasis on religious or ideological 
motivated interventions. Interventions should always be targeted to address the specific needs 
of each individual.119
To these ends, all appropriate means shall be used, including religious care in the countries where 
this is possible, education, vocational guidance and training, social casework, employment 
counselling, physical development and strengthening of moral character, in accordance with the 
individual needs of each prisoner, taking account of his or her social and criminal history, physical 
and mental capacities and aptitudes, personal temperament, the length of his or her sentence and 
prospects after release.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 92.
Interventions can take various forms ranging from the general, providing a supportive and 
transformative institutional environment, to the highly specific, delivering structured, high-level 
interventions to address deep-seated ideological convictions that predispose to acts of violent 
118 Porporino, F.: “Bringing sense and sensitivity to corrections: from programmes to “fix” offenders to services 
to support desistance”, in: J. Brayford, F. Cowe and J. Deering (2010): What Else Works? Creative Work with Offenders, 
Cullomption: Willan.
119 See: Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). Violent extremists in federal institutions: 
Estimating radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population, Research Report 
R-313. Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada; and Stys, Y. & Michel, S. (2014). Examining the Needs and 
Motivations of Canada’s Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders, Research Report R-344. Ottawa, ON: Cor-
rectional Service of Canada.
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extremism. Disengagement related interventions normally consist of a variety of activities includ-
ing: psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work 
interventions; faith-based debate and dialogue; education; vocational training; creative therapies; 
physical therapies (e.g. yoga, sport, exercise); family activity; and social, cultural and 
recreation.
MALAYSIA: Deradicalization programme, Kamunting Prison
The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), in cooperation with the Department of Islamic Development 
(JAKIM), developed a deradicalization programme which could be used with the Internal Security 
Act detainees being held at Kamunting Prison. Most of these detainees were believed to be 
connected with violent Islamist-inspired groups. These prisoners were held in separate wings from 
other “ordinary” prisoners but were allowed to mix among themselves.
The deradicalization programme involves a variety of different elements, ranging from religious 
counselling to vocational training and psychological support for prisoners. It employed 
psychologists as well as religious experts from JAKIM, police officers and the prisoner’s family 
members. The objectives of the programme is to: (1) tackle the radical ideology which motivated 
the prisoner’s past offending and demonstrate how this contrasted with other teachings of Islam; 
(2) instil appropriate civic values in the prisoner; (3) provide psychological support to improve the 
prisoner’s self-esteem; and (4) provide vocational training to prepare the prisoner for life after 
release.
Prison staff provide most of the training, but external staff also play an important role. Religious 
scholars from JAKIM provide religious instruction to the prisoners, with religious classes taking 
place every day and lasting on average 90 minutes. This is also supplemented by guest talks from 
university professors, who are particularly respected by the prisoners, as they are seen as 
independent from the Government. Most classes take place in a group format. Psychologists 
provide counselling support for the prisoners, both at a group level and on a one-to-one basis as 
needed. Hard-line prisoners who are judged to be obstructing the process for other prisoners, are 
moved away and held at a different location.
Overall, the programme draws on a variety of elements which have been associated with 
successful intervention programmes elsewhere. These factors include: tackling violent ideological 
justifications; improving prisoner self-esteem and psychological health; involving the prisoner’s 
family in the deradicalization process; removing hard-line prisoners from those who are willing to 
engage with the programme; and, providing practical support for life after prison.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
As discussed earlier, it is imperative to tailor interventions to local conditions, cultures and 
legal traditions of the countries concerned, as well as to context-specific root causes of prison-
ers’ engagement in violent extremism.120 Research also suggests that broader contextual cir-
cumstances can be as important as specific targeted interventions in achieving disengagement 
from violence. These contextual circumstances include: a supportive prison environment; healthy 
relationships; feeling safe; and opportunities to walk away from groups or causes.
120 See RAND Corporation (2010): “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists”; Hinds, R. (2013): Islamic Radicalisa-
tion in North and West Africa: Drivers and approaches to tackle radicalisation. GSDRC, University of Birmingham; 
Morris, M., Eberhard, F., Rivera, J. and Watsula, M. (2010, May). Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with 
Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Deganging and Deprogramming. Institute for Homeland Security 
Solutions.
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Disengagement interventions should seek to address those attitudes, beliefs and perceptions 
that enable violent extremist prisoners to support or participate in violent acts. Interventions 
therefore need to focus on the following key issues:121
• Fulfilling needs legitimately: Helping people identify opportunities to develop alternative 
commitments to meet their needs; questioning how adequately their involvement really 
meets their needs; encouraging prisoners to feel that they no longer “fit in” with other 
members of the violent extremist group; and exploring any dissatisfaction or disillu-
sionment with their involvement.
• Developing supportive attitudes, beliefs and thinking: Exposing inconsistencies or inaccura-
cies in their current beliefs that support violence; reducing identification with a group 
or cause (which can begin to weaken the bonds of ideology); making it more difficult 
for them to see other groups in simplistic ways through diluting “us and them” stereo-
types; and recognizing the complexity of other people’s values and commitments and 
commonalities between groups.
• Increasing emotional tolerance and acceptance: Making individuals more aware of how 
their emotions are associated with their values and beliefs; helping them to tolerate 
emotions more effectively and “let go” of these; making changes in their lives to make 
circumstances that impact on the things they identify with feel less personal.
• Increasing personal agency: Educating individuals about how and why people can adopt 
the values and beliefs of others without question; reconnecting them with their personal 
identity rather than just being defined by the extremist group, cause or ideology; sup-
porting them in taking steps to form new commitments to reflect who they want to 
be in order to meet their needs; and helping them to manage intimidation and pres-
sure from others to prevent them from disengaging.
• Expressing values and pursuing goals legitimately: Challenging people about their sense 
of entitlement to use violence for a specific cause (or on behalf of a group of people); 
exploring whether such behaviour is counter-productive to their cause; examining the 
consequences of such behaviour on other people; increase their understanding that 
the wider political and social environment has changed and that political violence is 
no longer necessary, leading to a reappraisal for the need or justification for continued 
violent extremism; and encouraging them to express disillusionment with the violent 
extremist group’s policies, leadership, objectives (e.g. unwillingness to negotiate) or 
with specific operational tactics (e.g. the targeting of civilian areas).
• Developing delayed deterrence: Encouraging violent extremist prisoners to think about 
the risk of future incarceration; the anxieties connected with a violent extremist life-
style; and the serious personal costs they face if they continue to commit violent acts, 
while at the same time questioning their ability to cope with these costs.
• Aspiring to a “normal” life: Assisting the individual to evaluate past decisions and reassess 
life goals, provoking a re-evaluation of their involvement in violent extremism; encour-
aging them to focus on wanting a “normal” life (marriage and showing more respect 
and concern for their own children); and helping prisoners to learn skills so that they 
can gain employment on release.
121 Based on: Dean, C.: The healthy identity intervention: The UK’s development of a psychologically informed 
intervention to address extremist offending, in Silke, A. (2014): Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues In 
Management, Radicalisation and Reform, p. 99-100.
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Most of these cognitive changes require a holistic approach across a number of disciplines 
and specializations and a range of interventions. Developing interventions that assist violent 
extremist prisoners in defining the issues that pushed them towards violent extremist behav-
iours in the first place is a challenging task. It is an even more challenging task to help them 
in formulating objectives and identifying and implementing solutions. Each type of interven-
tion can be used to focus on a specific issue. For example:
• Religious interventions to challenge justifications for violence based on an interpreta-
tion of a religious document
• Education intervention to counter nationalist ideology and develop critical thinking
• Psychological interventions that foster the resocialization of violent extremists
• Social work intervention to establish a clear vision of a better future
• Vocational training to gain the skills needed to secure a job on release
• Sports and exercise to develop team work, trust and self-fulfilment without the need 
for violence
• Arts therapy, such as theatre, as an opportunity to express emotions
Different types of intervention tend to build on each other and the overall impact is cumula-
tive, sometimes taking a long time to have an impact. It should also be remembered that 
violent extremist prisoners may feel remorse and sorrow for victims as part of the disengage-
ment process. The prison administration should ensure that appropriate support mechanisms 
and interventions are put in place.
Violent extremists experiencing remorse and guilt
A common theme amongst terrorists is the issue over remorse/guilt. Many mentioned their 
feelings of sorrow at what they had done and thought they would never be totally free, even when 
released. It was difficult for them to express any real empathy with their victims without betraying 
their family/community/group. The sorrow came from knowing they had done something wrong. 
Where remorse is concerned, there is a stronger hope of moving on. However, when that remorse 
turns to guilt, then there can be feelings of suicide and rejection. If we take these issues seriously, 
then we need staff and other people in the prisons who can cope with these mental health 
problems relating to remorse/guilt/suicide, so that prisoners may be reintegrated into their 
communities safely with a better chance of rehabilitation.
Contribution submitted by the International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care in the course of the two UNODC 
Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 
June 2016).
Specific mentoring programmes are also often used to support violent extremist prisoners 
who are participating in disengagement activities, as well as for individuals deemed vulner-
able to radicalization. A mentor can provide one-to-one, individually tailored support to meet 
the specific needs of the prisoner. Mentors can be a valuable supplement to the interventions 
taking place in prisons, as well being a stand-alone intervention. Mentors are usually recruited 
from civil society, which means that they are able support the prisoner while in prison, upon 
release, and during the crucial transition phase. In order for a mentor programme to be 
effective, mentors should be carefully vetted, trained and offered professional supervision. 
Similarly, individual mentor plans should be formulated and coordinated with the prisoner’s 
HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST PRISONERS78
action plan and the requests of the prisoner. Structured follow-ups and adjustments should 
be established. In comparison to other interventions, mentoring programmes are relatively 
low-cost, and can be adjusted to meet different structural and cultural settings.
DENMARK: A Mentoring Training Programme
The overriding objective of the mentor training programme "Deradicalization–Back on Track" is to 
offer targeted mentoring to people with extremist tendencies who are convicted of or charged 
with criminal offences, and thereby give them the help and support they need to get back on track 
and break out of radicalized groups—both while in prison and in connection with their 
subsequent re-entry into society.
The training programme for mentors consisted of three two-day seminars and two follow-up 
seminars, also lasting two days each. In addition to this, the Danish Ministry of Children, Gender 
Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service provided a 
tailored, supplementary two-day course on extremism and radicalization. Network days were also 
held for the mentors. Effective mentoring is a complex task. The key to its success is to establish a 
relationship of trust and to have properly trained mentors with a wide range of competencies–
mentors who can draw on their own experiences but also draw inspiration from others; mentors 
who can reflect on their own practice in order to be able to adapt their approach for the benefit of 
the mentee.
Danish Department of Prisons and Probation and the Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social 
Affairs (2014) Deradicalization − Back On Track: Concept for mentor training programme with a focus on extremism and 
radicalization.
Each of the main types of intervention is discussed in more detail in the following sections.
5.5 Education
1. Provision shall be made for the further education of all prisoners capable of profiting thereby, 
including religious instruction in the countries where this is possible. The education of illiterate 
prisoners and of young prisoners shall be compulsory and special attention shall be paid to it by 
the prison administration.
2. So far as practicable, the education of prisoners shall be integrated with the educational 
system of the country so that after their release they may continue their education without 
difficulty.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 104.
Education can be a direct antidote to violent extremist messages.122 Disengagement interven-
tions should therefore include a range of educational activities. Basic education, including 
literacy courses, maths, history and civics, can open a world of understanding for violent 
extremist prisoners and end their reliance upon other people who tell them what to think. 
Improving the prisoners’ educational abilities will also increase their self-esteem, self-confidence, 
opportunities, and status within their communities.
122 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 16.
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The education levels of VEOs [violent extremist offenders] vary greatly. Many come from 
marginalized backgrounds. It is important to offer a wide range of educational programs and 
learning activities for all levels, from basic primary education to advanced concentrations such as 
university level degrees and legal courses. Courses can include literacy, math, history and civics, 
but it is important that both the type and the content of courses are based in local culture and 
practices. They should be tailored to the needs and capabilities of the inmates. Education can be 
delivered by a range of actors, including government educators and civil society groups. Educators 
should be carefully recruited, vetted, and monitored to ensure suitable people deliver the courses 
and appropriate content is discussed. The education gained by VEOs will better prepare detainees 
for continued schooling and job opportunities. Inmates with an aptitude for learning can become 
teachers or teacher’s aids and may help their fellow inmates with their education. Learning from 
peers was also seen as a way to help inmates develop their social skills.
Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (2015) Detention and Reintegration Working Group Workshop on Education, Life Skill 
Courses and Vocational Training for Incarcerated Violent Extremist Offenders.
The risk assessment process should identify violent extremist prisoners who have little or no 
basic education, particularly in numeracy and literacy, and should assess how such deficits 
may have contributed to their openness to extremist views justifying violent behaviour. If 
time spent in custody is to be positive, providing someone who is illiterate and innumerate 
with opportunities to learn and to achieve nationally recognized qualifications will result in 
significant personal and social benefits, including: acquisition of knowledge; improvement of 
social skills based on ability to read, write and make everyday calculations; qualifications; 
greater self-esteem; and increased opportunities for employment.
Prison changed everything. When I went to prison, it was there when I really started to study. The 
first year I was there, I began to study philosophy. For a whole half year, I just read and read … 
I learned for the first time in prison that it is possible to look at the world in many ways, many 
different ways. There doesn’t have to be a right or wrong answer. There’s a lot of different ways.
Norwegian right-wing violent extremist convicted for his role in bombing a mosque. Quoted in: Horgan, J. (2009) Walking 
Away from Terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements, London: Routledge, p46.
Education does not come to an end with the attainment of basic skills. Many violent extrem-
ist prisoners will be able to read and write before entering the institution, and some will 
have higher education qualifications. It is important that those violent extremist prisoners 
who are literate and numerate, or who have completed basic education courses while in the 
institution, should have opportunities to progress further. There is ample evidence to show 
that the provision of a broad educational curriculum in prisons that also includes higher 
education can improve prospects of employment in higher paid and responsible jobs after 
release. Holding down a responsible and rewarding job inevitably leads to a higher degree 
of engagement in the community and greater likelihood of maintaining pro-social attitudes 
and lifestyles.
International experience has shown that many violent extremist prisoners, and particularly 
the leaders, are well educated and from financially comfortable backgrounds. Risk factors 
will not be linked to ignorance or poverty but may arise from a search for identity in a world 
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in which they may feel disengaged from the institutions of the State, articulating their sense 
of alienation in cultural, religious or ethnic terms. Further education in a supportive, col-
laborative and rational environment can help them to review and revise their beliefs and 
convictions.
Education should also focus on developing life skills, communication skills and foster par-
ticipation, civic values and the decision-making abilities of each person. Education can 
improve individual self-confidence, self-esteem and feelings of self-worth. It can help develop 
self-awareness, assisting an individual to reflect on beliefs and behaviour, and create a posi-
tive self-identity as an achiever. It can instil critical reasoning, helping to shape a new mind-
set in which formerly held feelings of perceived injustice, anger and revenge are questioned, 
leading to new interpretations of the world and how and why things are.
THE PHILIPPINES: Alternative Learning System
The Alternative Learning System is offered as an intervention programme to all inmates including 
those charged with terrorism-related cases. This is an educational programme composed of 
secondary, elementary and basic elementary classes. The jail officers serve as their teachers, and 
with permission from the inmates, during class session, they are videotaped. The recordings of 
each class session are then put on a CD-ROM and given to the wives, and for their children to be 
used. The package is like an extended ALS Class that does not only cater the inmate-students, but 
also their families and more importantly their children.
Contribution submitted by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, The Philippines, in the course of the two UNODC 
Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 
June 2016).
Space should be provided within the wider education curriculum for learning about citizen-
ship, reinforcing the values, rights, duties and responsibilities of individuals towards each 
other and in relation to the State. Learning about law, justice, fairness, human rights and 
ethics in public life, democracy, the role of government, critical thinking and constructive 
debate is essential in countering subjective interpretations of the world propagated by violent 
extremists. Civic responsibility and citizenship may also build a shared sense of culture within 
a society that consists of a diverse mix of ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. However, 
it should be noted that in some countries and regions, implementing or even justifying the 
need for civic duty education in curricula could be challenging.123
By engaging in discussions on citizenship, violent extremist prisoners are able to explore 
contesting narratives critically and objectively and to develop their own views on what it 
takes to be a good citizen. In this way, education becomes re-education. Education can help 
to challenge distorted beliefs about the injustices of historical events and the modern State 
propagated by violent extremist groups and often included in the curriculum in extremist-
controlled educational institutions. In cases where there may be grounds for beliefs about 
historical and continuing injustice and oppression, education can provide alternative strategies 
for legitimate challenge through established State institutions and without a need to resort 
to violence. Counter-narratives or dialogues, particularly those that discredit false assertions, 
identify hypocrisies and misrepresentations, are particularly important in achieving 
123 Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Hedayah (2013): The Role of Education in Countering 
Violent Extremism, Meeting Note, December 2013.
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disengagement from violence.124 Education interventions focused on discrediting and delegiti-
mizing the ideology that drives violent extremism should therefore be part of any disengage-
ment activity.
5.6 Vocational training
1. So far as possible the work provided shall be such as will maintain or increase the prisoners’ 
ability to earn an honest living after release.
2. Vocational training in useful trades shall be provided for prisoners able to profit thereby and 
especially for young prisoners.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 98.
To successfully reintegrate into society, it is critically important that a former violent extrem-
ist prisoner is employable and able to support his or her family. Employment can also reduce 
the need for, and the appeal of, rejoining a violent extremist group. Vocational skills training 
and employment is therefore an important component of disengagement activity. Opportuni-
ties for vocational training and institutional work experience are also useful ways of keeping 
violent extremist prisoners occupied, helping to relieve boredom and inactivity that can 
adversely affect physical and mental wellbeing potentially leading to disruptive behaviour.
I therefore recommend that Member States:
Encourage individuals to leave violent extremist groups by developing programmes that place an 
emphasis on providing them with educational and economic opportunities.
Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), para. 49(c).
Prison should provide inmates with a range of opportunities to gain experience working in 
occupations such as metal working, farming, painting, tailoring, upholstery, hand crafts, and 
performing arts. In some prisons, goods produced by inmates in fields such as carpentry, iron 
welding/construction, jewellery and pottery, are sold to the government or local communities. In 
the short term, learning vocational skills provides VEOs with a structured environment and sense 
of purpose. The long-term benefit is a skill set that allows released individuals to secure 
employment, earn a living, provide for their family and contribute to society in a positive way.
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015) Detention and Reintegration Working Group Workshop on Education, Life 
Skill Courses and Vocational Training for Incarcerated Violent Extremist Offenders.
124 See for example: Green, S. N. (2015) “Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda”. 
Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Jacobson, M. (2010) “Terrorism Dropouts: Learning from Those 
Who Have Left”. Policy Focus: 101. Washington – District of Colombia, United States of America: The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy.
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The risk assessment process should identify those violent extremist prisoners who were unable 
to find regular work prior to their detention and will determine whether this is likely to be 
a risk factor associated with their attraction to a violent extremist group or cause. The frus-
trations arising out of the inability to find or maintain a job can lead to feelings of disillu-
sionment, anger against the State and attraction to a group or cause that promises a better 
future in the form of improved self-worth, a sense of belonging and even financial 
well-being.
As far as possible, the skills to be acquired in vocational training courses should be matched 
to an individual’s talents, potential and preference, as this will make it more likely that the 
violent extremist prisoner will achieve the necessary qualifications, along with the self-esteem 
and rewards that drive and accompany progress. It is also important that there is a match 
between skills required and opportunities available in the outside community.125
TURKEY: Prison vocational training, workshops and education
Teachers in prisons hold an “interview” with prisoners who are received into prison in order to 
identify their educational needs. At the end of the interview, an education plan is prepared 
covering educational activities that will take place with the prisoner until his or her release. A 
range of educational provision at different levels is made available within the prison including: 
basic literacy; elementary school; high school and an education faculty. Use is made of distance 
education and examinations take place within the prison.
The workshop system in prisons in Turkey was established in 1997 in order to help unemployed 
prisoners to gain a profession and to improve their current professions. In 2015, approximately 
47,000 prisoners gained a vocational profession while working in 262 prisons across Turkey. 
Prisoners are able to earn an income and also have insurance. There are three separate systems in 
workshops to provide prisoners with an occupation. In the first system, prisoners may work in 
workshops that are in prisons; in the second system, prisoners in open prisons may work in public 
institutions such as municipalities and courthouses; in the third system, prisoners may work in 
workshops that are established by the private sector within the open and closed prisons.
Contribution submitted by the Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses, Turkey, in the course of the two 
UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 
and 1-3 June 2016).
Some vocational skills will be in broad demand throughout the country. Others will need to 
be tailored to the work opportunities available in the area or community in which the former 
violent extremist prisoner eventually intends to settle. For this reason, it is important to 
undertake a work and training needs analysis of work available in the community and the 
associated skills required. This should inform decisions on what work and training should 
be made available to violent extremist (and other) prisoners. In post-conflict countries, for 
example, a number of skills are of particular importance, such as construction and welding 
skills, and these skills could be taught in prisons.
125 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 17.
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Examples of vocational skills training in prisons
Carpentry Metal fabrications Paint making
Tailoring Farming and husbandry Furniture making
Printing Bread making  Soap making
Building trades Electronics  Shoe-making
Hairdressing Painting Industrial cleaning
Car mechanics Jewellery Pottery
The institution should liaise with employment agencies and potential employers in order to 
keep up-to-date with work skills required and opportunities available, so that vocational 
courses can be kept relevant and violent extremist prisoners advised in preparation for their 
release. Good liaison will also support them in making decisions about where to apply for 
work and how to apply (job searching, completing application forms, curriculum vitae and 
interviewing skills). It could also provide a service in planning for release by introducing 
violent extremist prisoners to potential employers.
Prison administrations will need to take the appropriate security precautions, which may 
mean that some violent extremist prisoners have to be excluded from certain types of work, 
based on their risk assessment. Some courses and work experience may be inappropriate, 
particularly if the assessment process raises concerns that an individual could employ skills 
gained to further their own and others’ ambitions to commit violent extremist acts or to 
undermine the security of the institution or even national security. Staff should never under-
estimate the ingenuity that can stem from deprivation of liberty and commitment to a cause 
and how seemingly innocuous courses and course materials could provide the skills and raw 
materials that could lead to the manufacture of weapons, poisons, even explosives, or to 
serious abuse of the internet.
5.7 Faith-based interventions
Prison-based faith interventions have a long record of contributing to prisoner rehabilita-
tion.126 However, care should be taken in terms of the content of those interventions. The 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has emphasized that it is not govern-
ment’s role to look for the “true voices of Islam” or of any other religion or belief. Since 
religions or communities of belief are not homogenous entities, it is advisable to acknowledge 
and take into account the diversity of voices. The Special Rapporteur has reiterated that the 
contents of a religion or belief should be defined by the worshippers themselves, while mani-
festations may be limited according to article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, for example to prevent worshippers from violating the rights 
of others.127
126 See: Schaefer, L., Sams, T. , and Lux, J. (2016): “Saved, Salvaged, or Sunk: A Meta-Analysis of the Effects 
of Faith-Based Interventions on Inmate Adjustment”, The Prison Journal, June 10, 2016; Johnson, B. (2004): “Reli-
gious Programs and Recidivism Among Former Inmates: A Long-Term Follow-Up Study”, Justice Quarterly 21, 
pp. 329-354; Johnson, B. Larson, D. and Pitts, T. (1997) “Religious Programming, Institutional Adjustment and 
Recidivism Among Former Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs,” Justice Quarterly 14, pp. 145-166.
127 See the remarks by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief in A/HRC/7/10/Add.3, para. 76.
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Many violent extremists use their faith as a justification for their violent activity. In reality, 
their knowledge of their faith, and its interpretation, may be limited and has often been 
shaped by faith leaders who seek to promote a particular interpretation that advocates the 
use of violence.
Religious sources and normative codes of conduct always accommodate different readings 
that are actively undertaken by human beings. Thus, human agency is inevitably involved in 
interpreting religious traditions, dogmas, laws or identities. Open-minded interpretations that 
encourage tolerance, empathy and solidarity across boundaries may exist alongside narrow-
minded interpretations of the same religion, which lead to polarized world views and a militant 
rejection of people holding other persuasions.128 Whenever violence is justified by the invoca-
tion of religion or arrogated to religious tenets (i.e. religious ideas, concepts, images or anxi-
eties), it should be remembered that human beings ultimately bear responsibility for the 
practical consequences that they draw from the interpretation of their faith.
The significance of faith-based interventions is based on the role that a particular interpreta-
tion of religious ideology can play in justifying violent extremism. As such, any intervention 
requires understanding the religious ideologies (or the interpretation of them) that justify 
violent acts, and countering them with alternative scholarly arguments.
Religious professionals should be fully integrated as members of intervention teams in the 
prison environment. While their work may be different, in some respects, from other experts 
involved in these programmes—such as psychologists, psychiatrist, social workers and educa-
tors—they should nonetheless work closely with all members of the team. Each has his or 
her own special contribution to make. Other members of the intervention team should have 
a clear understanding of the role of religious faith leaders in this process, to ensure that their 
efforts are complementary, mutually supportive and well-articulated.
Beyond a clear condemnation of violence committed in the name of religion, communities and 
their leaders should positively promote empathy, tolerance and an appreciation of diversity. They 
should challenge the religious extremists’ authenticity claims by exposing the ignorance of their 
views of the charitable core messages contained in religious traditions. Religious communities and 
scholars may also play an important role in rehabilitation and reintegration programs for violent 
extremist offenders and foreign fighters who returned to their country of origin, also with a view 
to neutralize possible future radicalization efforts. (…)
Religious communities and their leaders should promote empathy, respect, non-discrimination 
and an appreciation of diversity. They should challenge the authenticity claims of religious 
extremists by exposing their views as being ignorant of the charitable core messages contained in 
religious traditions. Additionally, they should share with others their beliefs in the importance of 
respecting the rights of others, thereby contributing to a sense that the rights of all will be 
respected.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of religion or belief, Human Rights Council, 29 December 2014, A/HRC/28/66, 
paras. 65 and 105.
128 For a summary of religious scholars challenging justifications for violence see: Glenn, C., Nada G. and 
Nozell, M. (2015): “Muslims Condemning Violent Extremism? Count the Ways”; available at: www.usip.org.
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Countering the narratives of violent extremists requires a thorough understanding of their 
academic and intellectual sources. This reality underlies the important role of religious pro-
fessionals in tackling religious extremism. The narratives applied for countering violent 
extremist ideologies should not be dictated by the views of any particular sect but rather be 
directed by the central message of those religious ideologies with regards to tolerance, bal-
ance, and the spirit of co-existence that guide good relationships with others and bring peace 
and security in society. In addition to countering the narratives of violence, the opportunity 
should be used to offer alternatives that send positive and non-violent messages.
NIGERIA: Religious interventions
Nigeria’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme recognizes that behavioural change is 
central to deradicalization. Since the current specie of terrorism in Nigeria is based largely on 
religious colouration, one major component of treatment for VEPs in custody is intervention by 
religious leaders or scholars. A key component of their work is the offer of alternative 
interpretation of text and the promotion of Islamic principles that proffer non-violence and 
peaceful coexistence. VEPs explained that the only interpretation they were exposed to was that 
of insurgency leaders and they were not aware of alternative meanings of texts. They are also not 
aware of the sources of such interpretations. Many cannot read or write Arabic and are generally 
illiterate and with no vocation. Through a careful and humane approach, religious leaders in 
Nigerian prisons have been able to thaw rigidly held views. Once this barrier was broken, VEPs 
became amenable to participate in other interventions designed towards deradicalization. The 
success recorded by religious leaders for the management of VEPs in custody in Nigeria is 
significant and is being studied by other jurisdictions .
Contribution submitted by the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions West Africa, in the course of the two 
UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 
and 1-3 June 2016).
Positive dialogue with members of extreme groups, whether violent or non-violent, in order to 
clarify issues, removes doubt or clear misconception is recommended for those who have 
knowledge. Scholars are well positioned to engage extremists in positive dialogue with a view to 
calling them to the truth, establishing proof, refuting dubiety, rejecting unsound opinion, 
differentiating between truth and falsehood, showing the strongest arguments in controversial 
issues, or narrowing the gap of disagreement.
Mr. Ahmad Bello Dogarawa (2015), Role of Scholars in Countering Terrorism in Nigeria.
Some of the violence in Nigeria is committed by Christian groups against Muslims. Countering 
extremist and violent ideologies in Christianity requires three approaches. These approaches must 
be taught, followed and constantly evaluated with utmost commitment and loyalty, particularly 
for those engaged in the deradicalization and rehabilitation of violent extremists. It is important to 
emphasize that Christianity is centred on love, peace and justice. Another level of countering 
violent extremism and radical views in Christianity is demonstrating the meeting point between 
Christianity and Islam. This is to emphasize what unites Christians and Muslims rather than what 
divides them. Over the years, there have been efforts coordinated by religious scholars, churches 
and Christian organizations aimed at fostering inter-religious dialogue and peaceful co-existence 
between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. This is intended to tame the tide of extremism and 
cultivate the spirit of tolerance and accommodation.
Fr. Atta Barkindo, African Conflict and Security Analysis Network, ACSAN, and the Kukah Center for Faith, Policy and 
Leadership Research, Abuja, Nigeria.
Care should be exercised, however, as the broad majority of faith-based violent extremists may 
not possess even a basic level of critical understanding of religious texts and doctrine sufficient 
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to be convinced by a rational critique of those texts or ideologies, at least at the outset of any 
intervention.129 Religious professionals may need to adjust their approach based on background, 
knowledge level of the prisoner and their position in the organization. Religious professionals 
may be able to use more complex, in-depth arguments with more knowledgeable members, 
while simplifying their narrative and counter-narratives with other followers.130
Religious professionals must have credibility with the prisoners, as well as with government 
officials and organizations. There are a number of different criteria involved in the establish-
ment of the necessary credibility and trust. Religious professionals should have the appropriate 
professional background and experience, education and credentials in this area. They will 
also need to demonstrate to the violent extremist prisoners that they have some measure of 
independence from the State and from prison authorities. Prisoners who have strong, nega-
tive views of the State and with State institutions such as prisons, may make it more difficult 
for the religious faith leaders to establish the necessary relationship, based on trust, with the 
prisoner. Before beginning in-depth discussions on religious subjects, the religious faith leader 
should first come to know the prisoners personally, and keep the discussions focused on 
family, welfare and other similar topics.
The point in the disengagement process where an intervention by religious faith leaders 
would be most effective will differ from person to person, with the intervention team making 
the decision regarding the most appropriate timing to expose violent extremist prisoners to 
religious faith leaders. For some prisoners, the period immediately following sentencing will 
be ill-timed, as they are still adjusting to life in the prison environment, while for others, this 
type of intervention might give them immediate hope for their post-prison life. Determining 
when to intervene should be made on a case-by-case basis.
5.8 Psychological and cognitive interventions
Psychological programmes have been available in prisons for many years, and thousands of 
prisoners have passed through them, with good research evidence that “cognitive-behavioural” 
courses can reduce reoffending, as well as make prison life calmer.131 Psychological 
129 See, for example, Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the twenty first century, Philadelphia, 
United States of America: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 14.
130 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (2013): Additional Guidance on the Role 
of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes.
131 Andrews, D. and Bonta, J. (2010): The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (5th Edition), (New Providence, NJ: 
LexisNexis).
I know that some prisoners will always view me negatively, because I am a government imam. 
With the person who was ready to blow himself up, I can’t be sure I have changed him. But I can 
say I have shown him another way, and that their theology is wrong … I don’t have a thought 
detector, so I don’t know what’s happening in a prisoner’s mind. I just have the hope that through 
honesty and prayer, I can lead them towards self-improvement.
Prison Imam quoted in: Rose, D. (2012) Inside Britain’s terror cells: A chilling insight into how gangs of convicted 
terrorists recruit prisoners for Al Qaeda–and the courageous men and women sent in to “turn” them.
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interventions should not, however, be seen in too “pure” a psychological sense (such as 
psychotherapy) when actually they may be fundamental to facilitating change, disengagement 
and desistance. Psychosocial interventions, based on established principles for effective interven-
tions to address other forms of offending, can be specifically designed to promote disengage-
ment and desistance by integrating unique features and approaches to address violent extremism 
specifically.
States could consider developing cognitive programs that assist offenders in defining the issues 
that pushed them towards violent extremist behaviors in the first place and subsequently in 
formulating objectives and identifying and implementing solutions
Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, Number 15.
Psychologists should understand that treating violent extremist prisoners can often be differ-
ent from treating other violent offenders. Some violent extremist prisoners may have little 
outward psychopathology, but research shows that many are emotionally vulnerable and have 
identity and status issues.132 Intervention plans should be designed accordingly.
Some professionals have argued that the most effective types of treatment for prisoners are 
based on cognitive-behavioural and social learning approaches, in particular when they take 
into account the offender’s personal characteristics such as interpersonal sensitivity, interper-
sonal anxiety and verbal intelligence.133 Prisoners also need a set of skills, for example, com-
municative, emotional and reflective capabilities, that can be developed through cognitive-
behavioural interventions and that will assist them to engage in other types of interventions. 
Some have also argued that established, evidence-based principles and approaches to prevent 
other forms of offending are also likely to have utility in preventing violent extremism.134
PAKISTAN: Therapy for violent extremist prisoners
Pakistan's most populous province, Punjab, has decided to train prison staff in criminal psychology 
in a bid to curb terrorism. About 300 to 350 hardened criminals are currently detained in 36 jails of 
the province for terrorist activities, sectarian killings and other crimes of a heinous nature who will 
be given specialized psychological therapy. The training of prison staff in the first phase covers 
different topics and is meant to enhance their skills for assessing the psychology of criminals. The 
trained staff could then make assessments of the prisoners, citing certain symptoms in the 
prisoners' behaviour, which they have been trained to identify. In the second phase, the prison 
officers prepare a list of inmates they recommend for therapy and submit the list to psychologists. 
This training aims to reduce the crime rate in society and terrorism from the country.
Farooq Nazir, Inspector General of Punjab Prisons, Pakistan, available at: Available at: www.upi.com/Top_News/World-
News/2015/04/09/Pakistan-fights-terrorism-with-therapy-for-violent-prisoners/71423538815150/ .
132 Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2013): Building On The GCTF’s Rome 
Memorandum: Additional Guidance on the Role of Psychologists/Psychology in Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
Programs.
133 See, for example: Andrews, D., Bonta J.,and Hoge, R. (1990): “Classification for effective rehabilitation: 
rediscovering psychology”, Criminal Justice and Behavior, vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 19-52.
134 Mullins, S. (2010): “Rehabilitation of Extremist Terrorists: Learning from Criminology”, Dynamics of Asym-
metric Conflict, pp. 162-193.
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Research on the extent to which effective approaches to preventing other types of offending 
also apply to preventing violent extremism is still limited. Identifying what unique approaches 
may be required for violent extremist prisoners is still at an early stage, as facilitating disen-
gagement is not a process focussed on to prevent most other types of offending.
GERMANY: Taking Responsibility—A Programme on Breaking away from Hate and Violence
The “Taking Responsibility—Breaking away from Hate and Violence” programme was initially 
developed in 2001, focused on right-wing extremism. The aim of the project was to help 
deradicalize young people who had been arrested for ideologically motivated acts of violence. 
The programme has since been expanded for use with militant Islamists, and more recently has 
also been adopted for ethno-nationalist conflict.
The programme seeks to distinguish between the offence and the offender. A recurring theme is 
to question the ideology used to justify violence and to identify and critique past strategies used 
to justify offences. The programme seeks to achieve its different objectives through a variety of 
approaches, including training courses, role-play, presentations, coaching sessions, 
deradicalization training and other education courses. The programme is a voluntary one, and an 
important element is a positive relationship between the trainers and trainees based on mutual 
trust.
The programme is divided into 20 weekly sessions that cover a series of modules. Each training 
group is composed of two trainers and between six to nine prisoners. For brief periods, one-to-
one work may take place if a prisoner finds the group environment too intense. The trainers come 
from a variety of backgrounds, but cannot be staff at the prison or detention facility in which the 
prisoner is being detained. That the trainers come from outside the prison system is believed to be 
an important element in building effective relationships with the prisoners.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
Psychosocial interventions
• Facilitating behavioural change




• Facilitating client potentials, development and growth
• Improvement of self-knowledge and understanding
• Reconstruction of experience and character for adjusted living
• Healing of emotional pain and resolution of confusion
• Improvement of critical thinking and problem solving skills
• Facilitation of acquisition of effective coping mechanisms
Psychosocial interventions can play an important role in facilitating desistance, for example, 
addressing identity issues, supporting coping, addressing beliefs and ways of thinking that 
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support violence and supporting action orientation. These interventions can provide the plat-
form upon which violent extremist prisoners can appreciate why other forms of intervention 
may be important in their lives, for example, strengthening social networks, educational and 
vocational activities, etc. Crucially, psychosocial interventions can help provoke and support 
individuals through the process of disengagement.
Where possible, administrations should try to ensure continuity in the psychological counselling 
for violent extremist prisoners, and have the same psychologist(s) remain with the prisoner 
throughout. A lack of continuity can make it far more difficult to build trust and rapport.
5.9 Creative, cultural and recreational activities
Recreational and cultural activities shall be provided in all prisons for the benefit of the mental and 
physical health of prisoners.
Every prisoner who is not employed in outdoor work shall have at least one hour of suitable 
exercise in the open air daily if the weather permits.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 105 and 
Rule 23(1)
It is generally acknowledged that participation in arts- and sports-based interventions is unlikely 
to lead to desistance from criminal activity by itself, but it can make a significant contribution 
to desistance in indirect forms.135 Sports, arts and culture can provide compelling alternative 
narratives.136 They offer a valuable means of talking about differences and diversity, and of 
underscoring common histories, experiences and hopes for many people. Drama and the arts 
can provoke critical thinking and discourse on shared histories and experiences that may cross 
political boundaries. Sports can also be a powerful uniting force. Sports, arts and culture can 
also help develop alternative, positive means of understanding and addressing grievances and 
tensions that can contribute to a support for violent extremism.
Arts-based interventions have been shown to: (a) increase the capabilities of prisoners to 
express themselves; (b) contribute to developing their personal and social strengths; (c) create 
an opportunity for prisoners to explore their own identity; (d) assist them to locate hope 
and motivation in a personal discourse which makes sense to them and which they own; and 
(e) provide judgement-free spaces for prisoners to recognize their interconnectedness with 
others without external pressure to comply.137
135 Hughes, J., Miles, A. and McLewin, A. (2005): Doing the Arts Justice: A Review of Research Literature: 
Practice and Theory, Unit for Arts and Offenders. 
136 Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2015): Thinking Outside the Box–Exploring 
the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism, Policy Brief, February 2015.
137 See for example: McCourt, E. (2005): “Art of the possible: the place of art therapy in work with high risk 
offenders”, Irish Probation Journal, 2 (1), pp. 35-41; Albertson, K. (2015): Creativity, Self-exploration and Change: 
Creative Arts-based Activities’ contribution to Desistance Narratives, Howard Journal, vol. 54, No 3, pp. 277-291; 
Bolton, G. (1999): The Therapeutic Potential of Creative Writing: Writing Myself, London: Jessica Kingsley; Ander-
son, K. (2015): “Documenting Arts Practitioners’ Practice in prisons: What do you do in there?”, Howard Journal, 
vol. 54, No 4, pp. 371-83: Nugent, B. and Loucks, N. (2011): “The arts and prisoners: experience of creative 
rehabilitation”, Howard Journal, 50(4), pp. 356-70; O’Keeffe, C. and Albertson, K. (2012): “The Good days are 
Amazing; An Evaluation of the Writers in Prison Network”, Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University: Parkes, R. and 
Bilby, C. (2010): “The courage to create: the role of artistic and spiritual activities in prisons”, Howard Journal, 49, 
pp. 97-110.
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“I find it difficult to express emotion, but here, it felt safe to do that, a place of safety. A place where 
we can be open about how we feel to be men, honestly and openly. We all progressed through the 
sessions together and expressed freely. It was very empowering to discuss things so openly. 
(Offender focus group, SC11)”… Creative arts-based programmes offer a genuine strengths-based 
approach to character development from which subjective changes and transformational 
identities may spring in desire and commitment, which are both realistically grounded and can be 
imagined and actualised by offenders … Opportunities for offenders to observe and practise 
reflective subjective-linked functions, express emotions and engage in moral conversations in a 
safe and non-judgemental place within prison are, sadly, rare.
Albertson, K. (2015) Creativity, Self-exploration and Change: Creative Arts-based Activities’ contribution to Desistance 
Narratives, Howard Journal, vol. 54, No 3, p. 287.
During participation in arts-based interventions, violent extremist prisoners are, at the very 
least, engaging in “conversation” about an object (be it a novel, song, speech or play) and 
thereby practising critical thinking and communications skills. It is only with good commu-
nications skills—vocal, verbal, textual, visual imagery or performance-based—that a person 
can begin to engage in the analysis of their own self and life. Communications about lives, 
histories and feelings is an essential starting point from which new meanings can emerge 
and from which they may transform their life journey. Practising critical thinking and com-
munication skills can also result in developing positive messages that help violent extremist 
prisoners to disengage from violence.
Engagement in arts-based interventions can also provide opportunities for violent extremist 
prisoners to take on more pro-social self-concepts and identities. Introducing violent extremist 
prisoners to reflectivity through arts ensures that they can engage in opportunities to try to 
make sense of their lives in terms of attaining some kind of coherence that is both sensible 
and meaningful to them.
It is important to have a diversity of activities on offer; activities which may illicit different 
modes of engagement. A range of creative pursuits can be encouraged and adapted as inter-
ventions. Such activities may include indigenous arts such as music, drumming, dance, cal-
ligraphy, group performances and traditional handicrafts. But staff will need to be aware of 
activities that promote the development of a positive national identity and that can be effective 
in alleviating trauma, as well as alert to activities that serve to reinforce belonging to a violent 
extremist group or cause.
Sports, arts, and culture play a major role in prison life: they provide inmates with (physical) ways 
of expressing themselves, increase their confidence, and help them create positive relationship 
with others (including prison staff). They help develop a greater understanding of different 
cultures and practices. These types of activates assist in the assessment of the needs, feelings and 
attitudes of VEOs for the purpose of rehabilitation programming and targeted interventions.
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015) Detention and Reintegration Working Group Workshop on Education, Life Skill 
Courses and Vocational Training for Incarcerated Violent Extremist Offenders.
One intervention that has proved to be popular and effective in addressing behavioural and 
attitudinal change in custodial institutions is art therapy. Art is creative and thereby edifying, 
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providing a sense of fulfilment for those who prefer to express their talents through this 
particular medium. The creative process also enables the communication of feelings and 
emotions associated with significant life events and can help in coming to terms with trauma, 
depression and mental health issues. The skill and sensitivity of the art therapist in nurturing 
a communicative relationship with the artist is paramount.
SRI LANKA: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Rehabilitation Programme
In designing the LTTE rehabilitation programme, the Sri Lankan government faced a variety of 
challenges not the least of which was the large number of prisoners who needed to be dealt with. 
In order to try to rehabilitate these prisoners a multi-pronged programme was introduced. Key 
elements included:
(1) Hard core members of the LTTE who remained highly committed to the cause were separated 
from the rest of the prisoner population, so that they were not able to actively try to undermine 
the rehabilitation programme
(2) The authorities did not refer to the LTTE members as “prisoners” or “detainees”. Instead, they 
were referred to as “beneficiaries”. It was believed that this language had more positive 
connotations and would help foster better relations with staff, and creates a different and more 
positive self-image for the “beneficiaries” themselves.
(3) Prisoners were encouraged to take part in a variety of activities designed to encourage 
individual development. This included taking part in yoga to develop spiritual insight, and artistic 
activities to facilitate individual expression. The emphasis on individual development in these 
programmes, was designed to counter-act the heavy collectivistic and group focus which 
dominated the prisoners’ time in the LTTE.
(4) Prisoners also took part in vocational programmes, which were designed to develop skills that 
would help the prisoners to successfully reintegrate into society after their release. These 
programmes included courses on construction, electronics and carpentry, as well as courses on 
cosmetics and the clothes industry specifically for female prisoners.
The evaluation of the programme showed a significant drop in support for continued political 
violence among prisoners who experienced the rehabilitation programme compared to those 
who did not. Similarly, prisoners in the programme showed a significant increase in positive 
attitudes towards the staff running the centres. Overall, the evaluation showed a positive impact 
of the rehabilitation programme even among more hard core individuals among the LTTE 
prisoners.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
It is important to clarify the distinction between the general understanding of “art as being 
therapeutic”, focusing on the creative process as therapy, and the more specific development 
of a form of psychotherapy practised through the medium of art by qualified registered 
therapists and known as “art therapy”. What is important is the symbolic expression of deep-
seated feelings and attitudes that can be analysed and interpreted by therapist and artist in 
a therapeutic relationship. There is an opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of violent 
extremists and counter their narratives by drawing on local cultural and artistic traditions 
that in many instances reflect a more tolerant society.
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Art work and art therapy provided a medium for expression and assessment. The beneficiaries 
engaged in artwork to give expression to issues close to their hearts. They expressed their desires 
for family life, freedom, peace, and unity. Creative writing exercises included poetry, short stories, 
and booklets related to the themes of freedom, loss, appreciation of rehabilitation, new thinking, 
future plans, and development … Creative therapy rehabilitation provided effective ways for 
participants to express their inner thoughts and feelings through indirect means. Creative 
therapies can have a healing effect on large groups of people. Examples of creative therapy 
conducted in the centers included theatre, drama, and music programs designed to helped 
beneficiaries communicate and transform.
Hettiarachchi, M. (2013) Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter terrorism and Counter 
Insurgency, Prism: Vol. 4, Issue 2, (2013), p.105-122, Macquarie University, Australia, Centre for Policing, Intelligence 
and Counter Terrorism.
Sport, particularly football, basketball and athletics, is popular in many prisons. It is well 
represented in some custodial institutions with staff who are dedicated specialists, some of 
whom have achieved national and international recognition.
People in every nation love sport. Its values are universal. It is a global language, capable of 
bridging social, cultural and religious divides. It can be a powerful tool for fostering 
understanding, tolerance and peace … I believe sport contributes to personal development and 
growth. It teaches us teamwork and fair play. It builds self-esteem and opens doors to new 
opportunities. This, in turn, can contribute to the well-being of whole communities and countries.
Speech by the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 1995-2006, on “The Impact of Sport in the World”, 
Davos, Switzerland, 2006.
Sport is an important positive intervention as it fosters teamwork, social and leadership skills, 
and promotes goal-setting and instils a sense of identity and belonging. Sport also creates 
opportunities to address other factors that may lead to violent extremism, such as health and 
safety, gender inequalities, and conflict resolution in a setting where learning is interactive 
and viewed as “fun”.138 It is important for those leading sports interventions to set positive 
examples for participants and help foster positive attitudes, good sportsmanship, and team-
work. Through different sports-related interventions, violent extremist prisoners can realize 
their potential and not be confined to a single identity, such as their religion or ethnic 
background, for example.
NIGERIA: The role of sport in prison-based disengagement programmes
Violent extremist prisoners in the custody of Nigeria Prisons Service were, at inception, unruly, 
rude and uncooperative. Most of the VEPs held the view that sport is the pastime of oppressors 
and the very elements they wage war against. Very few VEPs were amenable to participating in 
sport. The Local Treatment Team (LTT), comprising sports therapists from the Nigerian Prison 
Service, persisted. Basic sporting facilities were then brought into the prison and installed: a better
138 Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Hedayah (2013): The Role of Education in Countering 
Violent Extremism, Meeting Note, December 2013.
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football pitch, volleyball, basketball and table tennis. Apart from the appeal of this variety of 
sports, those who volunteered to participate had longer time out in the open. They were provided 
with basic individual kits like tracksuits, trainers, jerseys and spare inner shirts. Following this, 
more VEPs volunteered to participate. The period of sporting activities assisted in anger 
management and reduction of resistance to treatment. The more each person participated in 
sport, the more they become amenable to other interventions. Some began to express the 
possibility of becoming sports professionals upon release. They began to compete among 
themselves with a view to excelling. With sport as a preoccupation, the possibility of further 
radicalization, at least, was reduced. Indeed, sport has been a major intervention in treatment and 
deradicalization of VEPs in Nigeria and the VEPs have competed in football matches against the 
general prison population and prison staff teams.
Contribution submitted by the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions West Africa, in the course of the two 
UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 
and 1-3 June 2016).
Sport will often be the first point of entry into the prison regime—an initial engagement in 
an activity which is likely to be regarded as providing fun and escape from everyday routine 
and less likely to be a public statement of conformity. Sport promotes personal development 
and growth—sporting activities are character-building, promoting self-confidence, self-control 
and self-esteem as well as relief from stress, a sense of physical wellbeing and a means of 
preventing depression. Sport encourages pro-social thinking and behaviour—these include 
the positive values of teamwork, fair play, mutual respect, adherence to rules, civility and 
respect for others, competition without conflict, respect for boundaries and managing anger. 
As such, they instil in the individual agreed values, being essential preparation for more 
targeted psychological interventions.
Sporting activities also provide a neutral context for regime engagement, set apart from the 
daily routines of the institution, and are an opportunity where prisoners and staff can tem-
porarily suspend their differences, interacting as participants, players and sports men or 
women. An effective programme of sporting interventions will require adequate sports facili-
ties, a range of sporting opportunities and a well-trained and professional staff who are fully 
aware of the benefits of sports and games in addressing risk-related needs.
5.10 Reporting, monitoring and evaluating interventions
Reporting on disengagement activity is necessary for ensuring accountability; to facilitate 
monitoring; to enable the adaptation of interventions; for budgeting purposes; as a founda-
tion for evaluation; and for the professional and personal protection of all involved. It can 
be an enabling process if it is designed and implemented accordingly.
In order to facilitate reporting, it is important that the work with individual violent extremists 
is well-documented and that comprehensive and accurate records are maintained. All staff 
expected to complete reports should be trained on the format and content of those reports. 
Documentation is the core material for recording progress of interventions with individuals, 
for reporting and ultimately monitoring. Managers should guide, support and verify the docu-
mentation prepared, collated and filed by the team responsible for delivering interventions and 
submit it to prison administration headquarters in accordance with laid down protocols.
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Reporting of outcomes is the documented recording of the impact and effectiveness or oth-
erwise of the interventions. It also records any changes or incidents linked to the purposes 
of the interventions, for example behavioural change of the violent extremist prisoner or other 
issues that have a direct effect on outcomes. Outcomes must be reported over a time period, 
such as monthly. This allows the intervention team to build up a bank of information that 
illustrates patterns and changes over time. The core sources of information will be individual 
risk assessment and case conference files and a record of the total violent extremist prisoner 
population over that time period. It is also necessary to establish clear, quantifiable indicators 
of effectiveness (that are measureable) in order to inform outcomes.
Indicators of the impact of interventions could include: changes in the prisoners’ behaviour; 
level of engagement with the interventions; number of institutional incidents: reduced security 
level for prisoners; and number of interventions completed. It should also be remembered 
that even if the intervention is not showing any impact on a prisoner’s behaviour, risk assess-
ments and interventions enable the prison administration to find out more about prisoners 
and the risks they pose.
Both activities and outcomes need to be monitored closely. Monitoring should also be under-
taken through observation and recording of those observations. The headquarters supervisory 
team should regularly visit prisons where interventions are taking place to observe all relevant 
matters pertaining to the effective implementation of interventions. The supervisory team 
should prepare and submit information in a way that allows decision- and policymakers at 
prison administration headquarters (and higher authorities) to make informed and well-
reasoned decisions concerning interventions. Prison administration headquarters has the 
responsibility for analysing the level of progress or otherwise and should maintain a database 
of intervention activities and their impact.
In general terms, evaluating an intervention involves determining whether the objectives were 
appropriate, whether the activities were effectively implemented and the extent to which the 
objectives were met. Evaluation helps to understand why and to what extent the intended 
results were achieved by a particular intervention. It also provides information about the 
broader impact of those interventions on stakeholders and institutions. In addition to sup-
porting accountability mechanisms, a proper evaluation is an important source of evidence 
about the results achieved and, as such, is a lesson-learning tool that contributes to building 
knowledge about how best to achieve certain intervention objectives.
CANADA: Applied research programme on offenders radicalized to violence
The Correctional Service of Canada’s (CSC)’s Research Branch has been conducting focused 
research on radicalized offenders since 2012. Its programme of research in this area has examined 
the profile of CSC’s radicalized offender population and how it compares to non-radicalized 
offenders, explored the characteristics of those who may be susceptible to a radicalizing influence, 
and gathered international best practices and lessons learned on the effective management of 
radicalized offenders—all in an effort to inform effective and evidence-based correctional policy 
and practice. The success of this work hinges on the collaborative partnership that has been 
forged with CSC’s Security Branch. Embedding an operational subject-matter expert in the 
research team has been identified as an organizational best practice, resulting in a more reciprocal 
and open internal information-sharing relationship, more relevant and targeted research 
questions, and a more immediate transformation of research results to operational practice.
Contribution study submitted by the Correctional Service of Canada in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group 
Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
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Evaluating the success of interventions which seek to ensure that violent extremist prisoners 
disengage from violence is a universal challenge faced by almost all prison authorities, aca-
demics, practitioners and observers. Despite the massive investment of resources in this field, 
few Member States and multilateral organizations have elaborated robust and succinct meth-
odologies to evaluate the success, or otherwise, of these interventions. Likewise, academic 
literature on the effectiveness of interventions generally remains in its infancy and interven-
tions that have been evaluated often do not meet scientific standards.139 A review of 135 
studies found that they were mostly anecdotal, and that no explicit reference to theory and 
no empirical quantitative or qualitative data was reported.140
The challenge is further complicated by the fact that goals and objectives of such programmes 
vary from one place to another, as well as States’ capabilities and resources devoted to 
implementation. However, Member States should seek to develop simple mechanisms and 
metrics that would allow them to measure the effectiveness of their interventions.141 Govern-
ments should further release such research in view of the global learning and academic 
interest this would provide. Evidence-based interventions cannot be developed without the 
evidence being made public. When making evaluations public, governments should specify 
whether these were completed by independent research bodies.
Sufficient resources should be allocated to carry out scientific research and evaluation of existing 
programmes tackling radicalisation. Any such programmes shall be knowledge-based and shall be 
regularly reviewed.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, 
Principle 40.
At a simple level, desistance from violence is the desired outcome of disengagement and 
reintegration interventions and it is usually measured by an indicator such as reoffending, 
reconviction or reimprisonment for a terrorism-related offence. But recidivism rates can be 
misleading. They are often inaccurate, reflecting only what is known to security services and 
the criminal justice system, which can be limited. Measuring the impact of interventions also 
suffers from the “dilemma of attribution”, that is, relating improved indicators, such as 
reduced incidences of violent extremism and recidivism rates, to the interventions themselves. 
There are several other factors (local, national and international in nature) that can affect 
operations and the success or failure of interventions.142
Since recidivism cannot be identified until well after a violent extremist prisoner’s release, it 
is important to consider whether it is possible to gauge the prisoner’s progress while they 
139 See for example: Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010): “Rehabilitating the terrorists? Challenges in assessing 
the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programs”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, pp. 267-291; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
A. (2010): “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 33, 797-814; Carline, A. (2011): Report to the home secretary of independent oversight of Prevent review 
and Strategy. London: HM Government; Christmann, K. (2012): Preventing religious radicalisation and violent 
extremism: A systematic review of the research evidence. United Kingdom: Youth Justice Board; Lindekilde, L. 
(2012): “Introduction: Assessing the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies in northwestern Europe”. Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 5, pp. 335-344. 
140 Feddes, A. and Gallucci, M. (2015): “A Literature Review on Methodology used in Evaluating Effects of 
Preventive and De-radicalisation Interventions”, Journal for Deradicalization, winter 15/16, No. 5.
141 See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 9.
142 Ibid., Internal Challenge 6.
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are still in custody. A regular risk assessment, as discussed earlier in this chapter, can provide 
evidence of reduced risk. This requires significant resources and individualized attention, a 
particularly difficult proposition when working with large numbers of violent extremist pris-
oners and few staff. But although refining such assessment tools is crucial (as they are 
indicative of behavioural change), they will never provide a perfect real-time measurement 
of an intervention’s success and an absolute guarantee that the violent extremist prisoner 
will not continue his or her engagement in violent extremism after release.143
 For further detail on post-release and monitoring, see chapter 8
Furthermore, the flow of information should not be one way. An effective feedback loop 
should be established so that information is passed back to intervention team members on 
the findings from monitoring and evaluation. This will enable them to refine and amend 
interventions in the light of evidence of “what worked”.
A key element for ensuring intervention development, learning and advocacy is independent 
research of the highest quality. Member States are encouraged to commission research or 
consider research proposals. Any research will have to have an enabling and a practical benefit, 
e.g. it directly informs future interventions in the jurisdiction or elsewhere. In addition, all 
research activities must be fully compliant with ethical and security parameters.
143 Stern, J. and Porges, M. (2010, 1 May): Getting Deradicalization Right, Council on Foreign Relations. 
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Facilitating violent extremist prisoners to disengage from violence is a challenging task. The 
disengagement activity will need to be organized and managed. Each violent extremist pris-
oner will require a range of different interventions, as described in chapter 5, to meet their 
multiple needs that relate to the risk that they pose. A timetable will need to be developed, 
facilities created in which to run the interventions, materials and resources acquired, and 
prisoners engaged effectively.
It is very unlikely for one person, or an individual specialism, to successfully convince a violent 
extremist prisoner to renounce violence. A team approach, making good use of a range of 
individuals and specialisms, has the greatest likelihood of helping prisoners to change. Adopt-
ing an approach in which many individuals are working together to address a violent extrem-
ist’s risks and needs will be a new development in some jurisdictions. It is important, therefore, 
that a teamwork methodology is adopted and that the team operates in an integrated way. To 
support this integrated teamwork, shared procedures, tools and ethical standards are required.
6.2  Integrated case management and the disengagement 
process
Integrated case management can be described as a prisoner-centred, multidisciplinary 
approach to working with prisoners with provision for initial assessment, needs identification, 
goal setting, a programme of interventions and periodic review to measure progress. An 
emphasis is made on prisoners taking greater personal responsibility for their own develop-
ment through active engagement with both specialist and non-specialist services in the prison. 
Integrated case management uses a common framework, approach, tools and language to 
assess, identify needs, monitor progress and update the outcomes during violent extremist 
prisoners’ detention, transition to release, and community supervision. Adopting an integrated 
case management approach can make a significant contribution to successful disengagement 
from violence as it ensures a structured approach to: implementing interventions; identifying 
roles and responsibilities; working effectively as part of a team; and recording information 
and ensuring that it is treated, appropriately.
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A key element of integrated case management is to ensure that a coherent and comprehensive 
risk management strategy is implemented throughout a violent extremist prisoner’s sentence 
and following release, with the involvement and participation of all relevant agencies, to 
improve effectiveness and prospects of successful resettlement. Integrated case management 
is particularly pertinent to the management of violent extremist prisoners, who present chal-
lenging and complex risk and need profiles requiring the input of services with different 
specializations to address them in the most effective manner.
The four stages in the disengagement process can be summarized in the following way:
• Engagement: The first stage involves staff getting to know the violent extremist prisoner, 
establishing a positive professional relationship, developing trust and entering into a 
constructive dialogue. Part of the engagement process will be to ensure that violent 
extremist prisoners have reasonable conditions such as accommodation, food, water, 
clothing, bedding, exercise areas, etc.
• Risk: All new prisoners arriving in institutions should receive an initial general admis-
sion screening and those who are identified as violent extremist prisoners should be 
referred for a detailed risk and needs assessment. The risk assessment should focus 
on a number of key components, as outlined in chapter 4.
• Needs: Having identified the underpinning reasons for the violent extremist prisoner’s 
involvement in violent extremism, staff should identify risk-related needs. That is, the 
activity that will help to reduce the risk that the violent extremist prisoner will engage 
in, or advocate, future violent extremist activity.
• Response: Once the risk-related needs have been identified, the interventions team 
should agree on what interventions are necessary to meet those needs and when they 
should be delivered. On first arrival at the prison, many prisoners will not be ready 
to open-up about issues and more time may be required before they are prepared to 
engage with the interventions. The interventions team should also agree on who will 
deliver the intervention and when the intervention will take place. This may involve 
having to prioritize which interventions will be delivered first. New or additional 
interventions may be necessary, as the risk and needs change.
6.3  Creating a supportive working environment for 
interventions
An effective custodial setting will provide a supportive operational context for the delivery 
of structured interventions. All practitioners, including security and custodial personnel, ancil-
lary, supervisory and administrative staff members, who do not have a direct role to play in 
delivering structured interventions, contribute to maintaining the conditions conducive to 
intervention delivery and to supporting progress in disengagement.
The prison provides much more than a background—it also facilitates a context. As a complex 
organization designed to help violent extremists to abandon their violent orientation, it exerts 
a powerful overriding impact on the daily lives and attitudes of its residents. Located in an 
institutional context, the violent extremist prisoner’s thoughts and behaviour are routinely 
observed and challenged in all areas where those prisoners and staff interact on a daily basis. 
But challenge should not be unduly direct and provocative, for this can easily reinforce 
embedded attitudes. Rather, it implies encouragement to re-examine beliefs and values so 
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that desired gains in the form of personal needs and goals with regard to meaning, status, 
belonging and justice can be achieved in different ways. Contributing to helping prisoners 
to disengage from violence becomes the responsibility of all staff in the prison.
In order to help achieve a supportive environment, all prisons operating disengagement 
interventions should hold general sensitizing, understanding and awareness-raising sessions 
for staff. Everyone working in the prison should contribute to disengagement activity by 
behaving in a pro-social manner. This will contribute to tackling violent extremist prisoners’ 
anti-social attitudes, thinking and behaviour, and help to reinforce positive change. This is 
applicable to interaction and engagement between staff and violent extremist prisoners in 
the accommodation areas and yards, as well as in more structured settings.
Simple staff behaviours can increase the quality of interaction between staff and violent 
extremist prisoners. These include: taking time to listen; treating violent extremist prisoners 
fairly and with respect; demonstrating pro-social attitudes and professional standards of 
behaviour (acting as a positive role model and encouraging and rewarding pro-social state-
ments and actions); giving strong positive messages about the potential for desistence from 
violent extremism; avoiding labelling; giving focus to practical and social problems as well 
as attitudes, thinking and behaviour; and expressing and encouraging motivation and hope. 
It is also important that the relationship between the custodial and security staff and treat-
ment team are positive, constructive and supportive if the prison and interventions are to 
function effectively.
6.4 Methods and approach to delivering interventions
The approach taken to implementing interventions needs to reflect the scale of the problem 
faced by Member States. What can be realistically delivered to a handful of violent extremists 
held in prisons in some countries will be very different from what can be delivered to many 
hundreds and, in some cases thousands, of violent extremist prisoners detained in other 
jurisdictions. Optimum use should be made of available support. The scale, type and meth-
odology of delivery of interventions should be tailored to the specific number of violent 
extremist prisoners held in each Member State.
Some interventions, such as vocational training, will need to be delivered in a workshop or 
classroom in a traditional manner. Other interventions, particularly cognitive-behavioural and 
faith-based interventions should take into account cultural norms. In some countries, inter-
ventions are likely to be more successful when delivered orally rather than through written 
means. Oral-based delivery, through the use of individual and group discussions, plays, poetry, 
arts and crafts, will be more effective in some cultures, where reading is not dominant.
Where sufficient staff are available, interventions can be delivered on a one-to-one basis (or 
two facilitators to one participant). The individual format has a number of obvious benefits 
over a group format, the most important of which is helping the violent extremist prisoner 
participants to get in touch with their own personal values and beliefs rather than being 
overly influenced by those of their associates. The relationship between the facilitator/s and 
the participants is viewed as crucial to facilitating change and disengagement from violence. 
However, one-to-one interaction may not be realistic where there are few members of staff 
and hundreds of violent extremist prisoners. In such cases, group-based interventions should 
be used, including narrative-based activity.
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6.5  Roles, responsibilities and teamwork when implementing 
interventions
In jurisdictions where staff numbers are low, there may not be the capacity to create separate 
teams to deliver interventions. In such circumstances, existing staff may be expected to under-
take disengagement activities in addition to their normal duties and become the intervention 
team. Good use should be made, in these circumstances, of staff members’ existing skills, 
knowledge and experience in shaping the type of interventions available. For example, general 
prison staff may be: trained carpenters or mechanics who could be used to deliver vocational 
training interventions; artists or sports referees who could run related interventions; or university-
educated psychologists who could be deployed to run anger management interventions.
Where supplementary resources are available, separate intervention delivery teams could be 
set up to focus on the implementation of interventions. The team should include a multi-
disciplinary group of individuals. The complexity of violent extremism means that, in most 
cases, interventions require a multidisciplinary network of professionals, including psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, religious faith leaders, sports instructors, art therapists, social workers, 
vocational guidance officers, teachers and medical staff. Working together and in partnerships, 
they bring different skills, methodologies and perspectives to the work and are thereby able 
to deliver successful results.
Training should be provided for intervention team members on relevant tools, techniques 
and related administration. Given the challenging task of supporting prisoners in the disen-
gagement process, it is good practice for all relevant staff to be professionally trained and 
educated to deal with the complexities of disengagement and reintegration efforts. Prison 
staff and professionals involved in rehabilitation programmes could be trained to distinguish 
signs of radicalization to violence, communicate in a way that is constructive and avoids 
conflict, and respond appropriately to a potential radicalization to violence. The subject of 
staff recruitment and training is explored in chapter 3.
The specific duties of the interventions team should include: undertaking initial assessment 
of violent extremist prisoners; identifying risks, needs and appropriate interventions; complet-
ing and updating case file records; delivering interventions; participating in case conferences; 
completing reassessments; and using the materials, tools, and equipment provided for disen-
gagement interventions.
Intervention team members can be appointed on either a full- or part-time basis. This will 
depend on the resources available, the number of violent extremists participating in interven-
tions and the level and frequency of intervention required. The performance of duties, as 
members of the interventions team, should be reflected in annual performance appraisals. 
Where there is a large number of violent extremist prisoners held within an institution, it 
will be necessary to have sufficient intervention team members in order to ensure that assess-
ments and interventions take place at the required frequency. This may require there to be 
more than one intervention team in the institution, if resources are available.
In order that interventions team members can effectively engage with violent extremist prisoners, 
it is important that each team has one or more members who speak the language of the violent 
extremist prisoners. In some cases, violent extremist prisoners may not speak the official State 
language, particularly if they come from a particular tribe or group, or are foreign nationals. Violent 
extremist prisoners may also refuse to participate in activities during which the official State 
 language is used. The team membership may also need to account for gender and ethnicity.
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Intervention team members should be well supported while they are working on disengage-
ment interventions. This support should take the form of individual supervision, group sup-
port and having a coach and/or mentor to whom they can go when faced with challenging 
situations.
The director of each prison that operates interventions remains accountable for ensuring 
suitable arrangements for the effective delivery of those interventions within his/her command. 
The director is usually also the chief security officer of a prison, and has ultimate responsi-
bility for the safety and security of personnel and prisoners. The intervention team should 
work closely with the director to ensure that he/she is fully aware of intervention requirements 
and activities and that those requirements and activities are appropriate to the security 
arrangements within that prison.
At headquarters level, there should be a supervisory management team that holds the overall 
responsibility for establishing, overseeing the development, implementation and evaluation of 
interventions, as well as providing mentoring and support for the prison-based intervention 
team. The supervisory team should include representation from all the main specialisms and 
professions who are involved in delivering interventions. The supervisory team or, in some 
jurisdictions, a more senior management team, should set policy, ensure that necessary 
arrangements are in place for delivering interventions and coordinate with other government 
agencies for implementation.
Integrated case management is based on the recognition that successful disengagement will 
require the involvement and support of a range of individuals. Teamwork needs to be devel-
oped at each level and in various roles. The multidisciplinary approach reinforces the distinct 
benefits arising from staff working in parallel, i.e. working on the different aspects of disen-
gagement from violence from different perspectives at the same time. Being part of a team 
requires not only the sharing of information, including the case plan as it is developed and 
as it changes over time, but also developing shared strategies and an understanding of how 
to collaborate as members of a team. Lack of collaboration, synergy and mutual trust are 
major constraints that impact on the effectiveness of successful interventions.
6.6  Intervention case conferences, record keeping and 
 confidentiality of information
Intervention team leaders should arrange regular team meetings to discuss day to day business, 
administration, resources, staff management, reporting, and challenges faced. The purpose of 
team meetings needs to be identified, with clear agendas, a nominated chair and minute 
taker for each meeting. An audit of case files should be conducted bi-monthly to ensure that 
all documentation is in order and signed off by relevant supervisory members. Brief case 
reviews could also be conducted at team meetings. Team meetings are different from case 
conferences and must be held separately.
Ongoing case reviews are necessary to review progress of interventions. Case reviews also: 
allow for an opportunity to share what worked well and lessons learned; develop creative 
and effective strategies for working with complex issues; are a safe process to build on exist-
ing skills and knowledge; explore different perspectives and solutions to challenges; and 
confirm whether there is a need to proceed with a formal case conference.
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An intervention case conference should be held at set intervals and the first case conference 
should be held no later than six weeks after a violent extremist prisoner’s arrival at an institu-
tion. The case conference can have the following aims: to examine, utilize and compare risk 
assessments made by all intervention team members; to affirm the prisoner’s level of needs 
across a number of key areas relating to their risk; to explain the above to the prisoner and 
seek his/her views on ways of reducing or managing the assessed risks, particularly by meeting 
the assessed needs through appropriate interventions; and to involve the prisoner in developing 
an action plan for the next reporting period, including referrals for appropriately sequenced 
interventions. Case conferences are held to share interventions, successes, and also to ask for 
assistance or new ideas. Some prison systems bring together staff from external agencies and, 
as appropriate, the family of the violent extremist prisoner, in case conference.
A single dynamic intervention-related case file should be developed soon after a violent 
extremist prisoner’s admission to the prison, which should then be updated and modified as 
he/she progresses through the institution. The intervention case file should contain: an admis-
sions board report; a summary of the violent extremist prisoner’s key biographical informa-
tion; the history of assessments; the names of members of the intervention team; the initial 
assessment records (from individuals); an agreed initial risk and needs assessment (from the 
case conference); an action/treatment plan (from the case conference); case review notes; 
additional actions required (from the case conference); reassessments (next case conferences 
or individual assessment); and other comments and recommendations. Intervention team 
members should keep up-to-date clear case notes of every contact with each violent extremist 
prisoner. These records should cover: progress of intervention; number of sessions and themes; 
changes made/outcomes; significant incidents (life events and/or therapeutic events); strengths; 
assessments; and intervention team member/prisoner relationship dynamics.
It is important that prisoners are informed about the rules on confidentiality and that the 
principle of “informed consent” is applied. Prisoners should have the limitations of confi-
dentiality explained to them clearly before engaging in assessment and/or interventions. Con-
sequences of disclosure need to be carefully understood and assessed, for example for those 
prisoners awaiting trial or sentence and where personal information may lead to insecurity 
for their family members. Violent extremist prisoners’ information is generally held under 
legal and ethical obligations of confidentiality. Disclosure may be authorized, however, by the 
violent extremist prisoner, government or institution regulations or the law, keeping in mind 
that public safety must remain the paramount consideration. Information obtained from a 
violent extremist prisoner should be disclosed to other members of the interventions team 
in so far as it has an impact on the risk and needs assessment. Disclosure of information 
outside of the interventions team should only take place where there is a threat to the safety 
of the violent extremist prisoner; the safety of other prisoners or staff; or the security or 
good order of the prison or national security.
6.7  Codes of ethics, standards of practice and supporting 
 intervention team members
There are four ethical principles, based on good practice, within which intervention team 
members should operate: respect, competence, responsibility and integrity. In their work with 
violent extremist prisoners, intervention team members must act in line with the principle 
of “do no harm” through their intervention. They should develop a constructive and 
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therapeutic culture that promotes psychological growth for the prisoner while offering the 
opportunity for healthy relationships between staff and prisoner to develop, in which relevant 
information can be disclosed by the prisoner to enable appropriate interventions.
Relationships among intervention team members should be conducted in a spirit of mutual 
respect. Intervention team members should endeavour to maintain good working relationships 
and systems of communication that enhance their work. Intervention team members should 
treat all colleagues fairly and foster equality of opportunity. They should not allow their 
professional relationships with colleagues to be prejudiced in any way. It is unacceptable and 
unethical to discriminate against colleagues on any irrelevant personal or professional grounds. 
The challenge of working ethically means that intervention team members will inevitably 
encounter situations where there are competing obligations. In such situations, the interven-
tion team members should discuss the emerging issues with the intervention team leader, 
who will, when necessary, bring it to the attention of the supervisory or management team.
There is a degree of physical, psychological and programmatic risk inherent when working 
with violent extremist prisoners. As intervention team members work with violent extremist 
prisoners, they may develop symptoms that are very similar to post-traumatic stress response 
as a result of hearing about the prisoners’ negative experiences or from hearing what they 
inflicted on their victims. Support and supervision should be provided for those working 
intensively with violent extremist prisoners. It is essential that both the intervention team 
leader and supervisory team monitors any symptoms of vicarious traumatization and put 
strategies in place to reduce the potential adverse impact of this work.
6.8 Timetabling interventions and maximizing use of facilities
Any institution implementing interventions will require at least a minimum range of facilities if 
interventions are to operate effectively. At a minimum, institutions providing interventions should 
provide the following facilities: meeting rooms (for one-to-one interviews and counselling); class-
rooms (for group work, presentations and lectures); worship facilities; vocational training and 
other workshops; sports and exercise facilities; and facilities for creative and arts therapy.
In order to make optimum use of the facilities, there should be a clear weekly timetable of 
activities. A timetable is a powerful administrative tool and can provide an appropriate struc-
tural dimension to the activities required for effective interventions. A timetable also contributes 
to an increases sense of order for violent extremist prisoners. The timetable performs the 
important task of allocating a large proportion of the institution’s resources. The work of the 
intervention team, prisoners’ time and facilities availability should be controlled directly by 
the timetable. The material resources of equipment and supplies, which are largely related 
to interventions, are also indirectly controlled through effective timetabling.
6.9  Engaging and motivating prisoners to participate in 
interventions
Some violent extremist prisoners will, at least initially, resist or reject participation in inter-
ventions. They may be suspicious of the efforts of officials and their motivation for running 
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interventions, and refuse to engage with the prison authorities.144 The challenge for the prison 
administration, therefore, is to overcome the resistance and to get violent extremist prisoners 
engage with interventions. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to delay engaging 
with violent extremist prisoners until after they have spent some time in prison, to give them 
time to come to terms with their imprisonment and the consequences of their involvement 
with violent extremist activity, and to also give time for any potential “natural” disengage-
ment to occur.
One way that staff members can build a relationship with violent extremist prisoners is by 
seeking to arrange for their basic needs to be met by the institution’s administration. Basic 
needs include overall accommodation conditions, contacts with the outside, in particular 
family, and health care. While these are not risk-related needs, meeting them creates the best 
chance of interventions succeeding, as relationships are then nested in a safe, secure, ade-
quately resourced and well-operated custodial setting where the human rights of prisoners 
are respected.145
Prisoners’ feelings of safety and trust in the legitimacy of staff’s actions are likely to induce positive 
change and facilitate their rehabilitation and resettlement. Every effort shall therefore be made to 
preserve and build on such relations of trust in order to help offenders start crime-free life.
Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, 
Principle 12.
It is important that violent extremist prisoners are informed about the purpose of the inter-
ventions and the way that they operate. Staff members should explain to violent extremist 
prisoners that participation in the programme is voluntary and that they can withdraw their 
consent to participate and drop out any time. Violent extremist prisoners should be further 
informed of: intervention objectives; the role of intervention team members; the operation 
of the interventions; timetabling; confidentiality; and limits of the interventions. A written, 
signed consent form is used in some jurisdictions. If that is not feasible, the team member 
should note in writing that the prisoner was informed of all these matters and consented to 
participation.
In no circumstances should provision of all basic conditions outlined in the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) be 
withdrawn from violent extremist prisoners as a means to coerce them into participating in 
disengagement activity. States could, however, consider the use of incentives to encourage 
violent extremist prisoners to participate in interventions. Incentives are used in many prison 
systems for all prisoners to encourage good behaviour and participation in programmes. There 
are a range of incentives that States could offer to violent extremist prisoners when they 
participate cooperatively in interventions, including: enhanced visits with family members; 
increased recreational activities; opportunities to receive payment for work; additional items 
allowed in possession; and other privileges or benefits while incarcerated. States should con-
sider revoking these incentives and privileges in the case of violations of prison rules and 
codes of conduct or evidence of involvement in criminal activity during incarceration, while 
144 See Sydney Memorandum, Internal Challenge 7.
145 See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 2.
105Chapter 6 MANAGING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DISENGAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS 
adhering to applicable human rights obligations.146 Care should also be taken to ensure that 
incentives do not apply to violent extremist prisoners only or else they will be regarded by 
other prisoners as a “special group” which may result in hostility or other prisoners aspiring 
to be violent extremists.
Member States should encourage their prison authorities to consider identifying ways to 
recognize the achievement of violent extremist prisoners who successfully complete interven-
tions. Official recognition of achievement in a variety of interventions (including education, 
vocational training, sports, faith-based activities and cognitive behavioural interventions), 
encourages self-confidence, a sense of self-worth, engagement in institutional programmes 
and improves future prospects after release. Ways to show recognition include graduation 
ceremonies, awarding certificates and medals and inviting family and senior representatives 
of the community and community agencies to attend. Moreover, at different stages during 
the disengagement process, prisoners could be required to certify that they have met certain 
educational, vocational, assessment and experience requirements as a prerequisite to obtaining 
more freedom or privileges.147
6.10 Promoting interventions to the outside community
In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media (news-
papers, television) should take place to explain the positive disengagement activity taking 
place in prison, the types and purpose of interventions being delivered and the evidence and 
results that they can have on violent extremist prisoners.148 This should be done sensitively 
and take into account current political and public option.
The growing popularity of social media offers many opportunities for publicizing disengage-
ment activity and success stories to the public. Social media is a means of communication 
that creates value by using a variety of web-based technologies to promote dialogue and the 
exchange of user-generated content. Typically, the content includes text, audio or video that 
is published on the Internet and shared in an environment that allows users to interact with 
each other. An increasing number of prison administrations are using a variety of social media 
tools to increase the visibility of their programmes and build support for their initiatives. 
Websites, Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, blogs websites and YouTube videos have all been 
used to publicize positive activity taking place in prison.149
146 See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 19; Sydney Memorandum, Solution Strategy 5.
147 See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 18.
148 Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent  extremism, 
Principle 41. 
149 Rakis, J. (2012): Using social media to publicize reentry success.
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THE PHILIPPINES: Promoting intervention programmes
The benefits of using the media to promote intervention programmes for violent extremist 
prisoners are imperative if prison managers want good results. Every time there is an upcoming 
significant event, the agency issues press releases to the media three days prior to the day of the 
event. Mostly, if the media thinks the event is worthy of publication, they publish articles and 
stories about the intervention programmes. To convey gratitude for the support they extended, 
prominent personalities such as the Mayor or Chief Executive and other sponsors are invited to 
grace the event. We do this to our ordinary jails, and hopefully to our facilities holding violent 
extremist prisoners.
Contribution submitted by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Philippines in the course of the two UNODC 
Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 
June 2016).
Care should be taken, however, when it comes to media contact. Intervention team members 
should only speak to the media about the interventions with advance authorization from 
prison administration headquarters. Where approval has been given, consideration should be 
given as to whether the member of staff should be identified by name in the article or televi-
sion programme. There is a risk that public identification may put the member of staff, or 
their family, at risk.
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7. Preventing radicalization 
to violent extremism 
in prison
7.1 Introduction
Prisons are often attributed prominent roles in the emergence and expansion of violent 
extremist movements, and it has been claimed that several violent extremist ideologies origi-
nated behind bars.150 There is a concern that if left unchecked, prisons may serve as locations 
in which violent extremism can thrive and where prisoners can be radicalized to violence or 
where violent extremist prisoners who are co-located can form closer relationships, more 
cohesive networks and mutual reinforcement of violent extremist beliefs. However, recent 
research suggests that such risks are overstated and that there is limited evidence for sug-
gesting that significant numbers of prisoners are being radicalized to violence and proceed 
with committing violent extremist acts upon release.
… Safeguards need to be put in place to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies to other 
prisoners while upholding the protection afforded under international law to persons deprived of 
their liberty, including with respect to international standards and norms relating to solitary 
confinement.
Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674 (2015), para. 31.
The above notwithstanding, violent extremist prisoners may network in prisons, gain access 
to a large pool of potential recruits, and coordinate violent extremist crime outside prison. 
Activities may include, among other things: producing and distributing ideological literature 
and/or propaganda within and beyond the prison population; using prison visits to commu-
nicate with followers in the outside world; providing reinforcement and support to fellow 
prisoners who were punished for subversive activities in prisons; engaging in active resistance 
to the prison authorities through refusing to cooperate in the prison’s regime; intimidating 
prison staff and management; and instigating violent clashes with prison staff.151
150 See: Central Intelligence Agency (2002) Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars, p1. Available at: 
www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf; International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 
(2009): “Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and Deradicalisation in 15 countries”, p. 7: Cilluffo, F. and Saathoff, G. 
(2006). Out of the shadows: Getting ahead of prisoner radicalization. Report by George Washington University, Homeland 
Security Policy Institute, and University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group; HM Government (2013) Tackling 
extremism in the UK–Report from the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism.
151 See RAND Corporation Europe (2008): Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of 
extremist and radicalised prisoners, pp. 27-36.
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Such scenarios not only undermine prison security and safety, but also compromise one of 
the core objectives of imprisonment, the protection of society from crime. Furthermore, they 
undermine the disengagement objective described in earlier chapters.
SOMALIA: Radicalization to violence in prison
Imprisoned al-Shabaab elements make up the vast majority of prisoners at Mogadishu central 
prison in Somalia. Among them are al-Shabaab leaders who use their dominance and expertise to 
remobilize imprisoned young al-Shabaab members and to recruit other inmates who are in a 
vulnerable and emotional situation to follow their terrorist path. Through organized teams in the 
prison, they focus on the encouragement and reactivation of their young imprisoned followers 
and ensure that they keep to their terror cause. They also target young inmates who are weak 
within the harsh environment of the prison or are under chronic stress, which makes them 
vulnerable to radicalization propaganda. They threaten and harass any who do not follow their 
course while they give others incentives to soften them for the purpose. An external extremist 
network works on the infiltration of the prison system in order to provide and feed them with 
propaganda material for the radicalization inside the prison. These elements apply all kind of 
tactics to achieve their goal. This is manifested in Mogadishu central prison through the recovery 
of cell phones containing propaganda lectures. The inmates listen to these propaganda voice 
recordings in small groups at certain times.
Contribution submitted by the Prison Administration of Somalia in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings on 
the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
Countries around the world have responded to the potential threat of prisoner radicalization 
to violence and have implemented a range of measures to contain the spread of violent 
extremist ideology. However, this “security first” approach is geared toward achieving instant 
control, and care must be taken to ensure that this is not achieved at the expense of prisoner 
rights or longer-term considerations, such as social reintegration.
Recent research has begun to challenge the notion that violent extremist ideologies are a 
virus that can infect entire prisoner populations by spreading from one prisoner to the other. 
Specifically, they have questioned the assumptions that: (a) all violent extremist prisoners 
convey an increased risk of recruiting fellow prisoners; (b) fellow prisoners are vulnerable to 
such influence; and that (c) openness to violent extremist belief systems is intensified by the 
deprivations of individual freedoms, which are inherent to the prison experience.152
Several authors have nuanced the risk of prisoner radicalization to violence and have argued 
that claims of radicalization to violence among prisoners are false, or at least overstated, and 
driven by fears more than by empirical evidence.153 Indeed, there are only a few incidences 
in which violent extremism has been linked to (former) prisoners, and in many instances 
these cases are poorly documented or based on ambiguous information. Some commentators 
152 Veldhuis, T. (2015), Captivated by fear. An evaluation of terrorism detention policy, PhD thesis, University 
of Groningen.
153 See for example: Jones, C.R. (2014). “Are prisons really schools for terrorism? Challenging rhetoric on 
prisoner radicalization”. Punishment & Society, 16, 74-103; Klein, G.C. (2007). “An investigation: Have Islamic 
fundamentalist made contact with white supremacists in the United States?” Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 7, 
pp. 85–101; Useem, B. (2012). “U.S. prisons and the myth of Islamic Terrorism”. Contexts, 11, pp. 34-39: Marsden, S. 
(2015) Little evidence to show that prisons have become ‘universities of terror’. Available at: https://theconversation.com; 
Ilardi, J. (2010). Prison radicalisation: The devil is in the detail. Paper presented at the ARC Linkage Project on 
Radicalisation – Conference, Understanding Terrorism from an Australian Perspective: Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation 
and Counter Radicalisation, Monash University, Australia. 
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appear to have succumbed to the temptation to link prisoners’ conversion to a specific faith 
with violent extremist activities, as if there is some inevitable path from prison conversion 
to violent extremism. Others assume that a prison experience on the part of a suspected or 
convicted violent extremist played a role in the development of that person’s violent extremist 
beliefs and behaviour, even where there may be no compelling evidence to indicate that they 
even converted whilst in prison.
A number of studies that assert widespread radicalization to violence in prison rely upon 
very limited information, and therefore equally questionable analysis, about what the indi-
vidual did in prison, who they interacted with, the nature and development of their beliefs, 
spiritual or otherwise and do not consider the impact of post-release experience. It should 
also be remembered that it is not prisons (or prison conditions) in themselves that cause 
prisoners to be radicalized to violence: if that were true, radicalization to violence would be 
the rule rather than the exception. Rather, prison conditions can activate social and psycho-
logical mechanisms that may, under certain circumstances and for certain individuals, induce 
a shift toward violent extremist attitudes and behaviour that is then interpreted as radicaliza-
tion to violence.
The above notwithstanding, prison radicalization to violence is an issue of considerable 
importance and recruitment attempts, successful or otherwise, do occur. Whether violent 
extremist prisoners are separated, dispersed, or concentrated, there remains a risk that some 
violent extremist prisoners, particularly leaders, may seek to radicalize other prisoners to 
violence and to further radicalize those prisoners who are in prison for a violent extremist 
offence. Studies have suggested that violent extremist recruitment methods are not always 
expected to yield a high number of recruits. Violent extremist messages may be delivered to 
many prisoners with the understanding that most will resist radicalization to violence.154 
However, a single prisoner radicalized to violence can be a significant threat to public safety.
7.2 Radicalization to violence cycle
There are several theories regarding the process of radicalization to violence. One prominent 
theory suggests that the radicalization to violence cycle is composed of four steps: (a) pre-
radicalization to violence; (b) identification; (c) indoctrination; and (d) action.155 Each stage 
is distinct, and a violent extremist may never reach the final step. Radicalizing an individual 
to violence is a fluid process that does not have a timetable and does not necessarily lead 
to action. Individuals may enter, exit or even re-enter the radicalization to violence process 
at any stage. It is important to note that these stages are not chronological and individuals 
can skip stages, reaching violent actions more quickly. It also means that individuals may 
stop the process and may not be fully radicalized to violence; conversely, even if they are 
fully radicalized to violence they will not necessarily carry out a violent action.
154 Gerwehr, S. and Daly, S. (2006): “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment” in , McGraw-Hill Home-
land Security Handbook, p. 84.
155 The four step cycle is the dominant theory but other theories have been developed. For further details of 
the four-step cycle see: Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division. The radicalization process: From 
conversion to Jihad. See also: Silber M, Bhatt A. Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat. New York. New 
York City Police Department; 2009; Al-Lami M. (2009), Studies of radicalization: State of the field report. London, 
United Kingdom.
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(a) Pre-radicalization to violence: Imprisonment can be the environment that provides the 
motivation, stimulus and opportunity for embracing violent extremism. It can be driven 
by either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivation could be the result of a 
personal crisis/trauma, experiences of discrimination and/or alienation, or individuals may 
feel frustration and dissatisfaction with their current religious faith, leading them to change 
their belief system. On the other hand, extrinsic motivations could be any external factor 
(for example, economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious or social deprivation) that 
may negatively affect an individual's attitude and belief towards those implicated.
(b) Identification: Imprisonment can increase the isolation of an individual from his/her 
former life, encourage him/her to adopt and accept a new social identity, provide religious 
instruction that is based on violence, and open up opportunities for training in violent 
extremist activities.156 At this stage, an individual prisoner identifies him/herself with a 
particular violent extremist cause and essentially changes his/her religious beliefs or behav-
iours. These individuals may begin to construct a new character based on religion and 
support for violent extremist ideologies. Guidance from supervisors reinforces their new 
sense of identity and commitment. Overall, the individual prisoner’s needs and wants are 
increasingly removed and replaced by those of the collective.
(c) Indoctrination: Imprisonment enables the new recruit to be immersed in a “group-
think” environment, thereby strengthening social identity, allowing the individual to be 
vetted, monitored and tested by other violent extremists. The individual prisoner is so 
indoctrinated that he/she is convinced that action is required to support the violent extrem-
ist cause. Part of this stage is becoming an active participant. This involves small-group 
and individual participation that allows the recruit to know and recognize his/her potential 
as a violent extremist. What is critical in this stage is the knowledge, skills and leadership 
of senior prisoner figures. This is a highly volatile and emotional stage for recruits. Con-
fidence increases over time and the prisoner's mind becomes saturated with violent extrem-
ist ideologies. The only solution to their problems is to stand up for what they believe in 
through violent action.
(d) Action: The individual prisoner knowingly engages in violent extremist activity. While 
in prison, he or she may undertake a variety of operational activities, including: recruit-
ment of other prisoners; facilitation of violent extremist activity in the prison or outside; 
financing violent extremist activity; and preparing, planning and executing violent extremist 
activity.
7.3  Enablers and precursors of radicalization to violence in prison
A number of researchers have sought to identify factors in the prison context that may render 
prisoners more susceptible to being radicalized to violent extremism. These have included 
identification of several “push” and “pull” factors. The main factors that can drive, or create 
opportunities for radicalization to violence in prison, are described as follows:
• Ideology: Exposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, legitimize or require violence, 
often by providing a compelling but fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and 
recent history.
156 However, this is seen as positive/protective when the individual comes in with violent extremist ideologies 
—they are isolated from their influential group in the community.
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• Grievance: A range of perceived grievances, some real and some imagined, to which 
there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response. One of the fac-
tors that may increase a prisoner’s susceptibility to violent extremist ideologies is the 
experience of unfair or unjust treatment, actual or perceived. Violent extremist prison-
ers may seek to attribute their imprisonment or the way they are treated in prison to 
discriminatory policies and may interpret their situation as yet another signal that the 
government seeks to humiliate members of their group. Imprisonment and confine-
ment conditions have indeed been central in the narratives of some violent extremist 
movements.157 Embracing a violent extremist group may thus be a way for prisoners 
to deal with perceived unfair or unjust treatment that comes above and beyond the 
deprivations caused by imprisonment, and to pursue the satisfaction of social and 
epistemic needs in the face of adversity.
• Charismatic leaders: Exposure to people or groups who can directly and persuasively 
articulate that ideology and then relate it to aspects of a person’s own background 
and life history. The literature on prisoner radicalization to violence repeatedly empha-
sizes the importance of charismatic individuals in recruiting other prisoners for violent 
extremist purposes.158 Whether this happens is likely to depend on an array of situa-
tional factors such as characteristics of the violent extremist prisoner, the other prison-
ers, and the prison context. Charismatic leaders are able to exploit emotional triggers 
such as hatred, revenge and frustration. They can perform an essential function in 
channelling perceived or experienced humiliation into an ideological narrative and 
guiding the formation of a group identity that revolves around shared humiliation and 
ideological commitment.159
Charismatic leaders targeted the most vulnerable—inmates who had spent or will spend much of 
their lives incarcerated under maximum security and who no longer had contact with family. 
Angry and embittered by their circumstances, these inmates often adopted anti-authoritarian 
attitudes and were easily pressed into a gang, where they met an inmate leader who promised 
hope. Indeed, I discovered that charismatic leadership was more important than other commonly 
cited factors associated with prisoner radicalization.
Hamm, M.S. (2008). Prisoner radicalization: Assessing the threat in U.S. correctional institutions. NIJ Journal, 261: 17-18.
157 See for example: Gormally, B., McEvoy, K. & Wall, D. (1993): “Criminal justice in a divided society: North-
ern Ireland Prisons”. Crime and Justice, 17, pp. 51-135, and Kepel, G. (2002): Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
158 See for example: Brandon, J. (2009b). Unlocking al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons. London: 
Quilliam Foundation; Warnes, R. and Hannah, G. (2008): “Meeting the challenge of extremist and radicalised 
prisoners: The experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain”. Policing, 4, pp. 402–411; Hamm, M.S. (2012). 
“Prisoner radicalization in the United States”, Prison Service Journal, 203, 4-8; Hamm, M.S. (2013). The spectacular 
few: Prisoner radicalization and terrorism in the post-9/11 era. New York: New York University Press; Hofmann, D.C. 
& Dawson, L. (2014). “The neglected role of charismatic authority in the study of terrorist groups and radicalization”. 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37, pp. 348-368.
159 Emrich, C. G., Brower, H. H., Feldman, J. M., & Garland, H. (2001). “Images in words: Presidential rhetoric, 
charisma, and greatness”. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, pp. 527–557, Klein, K. & House, R.J. (1995). “On fire: 
Charismatic leadership and levels of analysis”. Leadership Quarterly, 6, pp. 183-198.
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“We had one [terrorist] prisoner who was a top-end proselytiser. He was brilliant at it. He’d get 
someone vulnerable, not an experienced prisoner, and offer him protection and support through 
religion. He’d build a rapport over a long period: it’s what he lived for. And then from that, 
influence his idea of what it means to be a Muslim … What he was actually doing was preaching, 
not on a weekly but a daily basis, recruiting in the yard. He had been urging people to join the 
fight in Afghanistan on the outside—and he just carried on doing it here.”
Prison staff quoted in: Rose, D. (2012) “Inside Britain's terror cells: A chilling insight into how gangs of convicted 
terrorists recruit prisoners for Al Qaeda–and the courageous men and women sent in to 'turn' them”. Available at: 
www.dailymail.co.uk.
• Need to satisfy basic physical and general needs: When life in prison is a struggle to 
survive, prisoners may be motivated (or forced) to join a violent extremist group to 
obtain food, somewhere to sleep, and protection, regardless of whether they identify 
with and intrinsically adhere to the group´s violent extremist ideology or not. Such 
prisoners may seemingly have radicalized and adopted violent extremist attitudes and 
beliefs, but such manifestations of extremism may reflect an underlying struggle to 
survive in prison rather than sincere ideological commitment. Poor living conditions 
and prison overcrowding can generate resentment and provide the ground for violent 
extremist narratives to take root.160
Furthermore, radicalization to violence in prison may also be seen as a by-product of 
attempts by prisoners to satisfy their general needs. Imprisonment itself can be a threat 
to individual needs, as prisoners are likely to experience deprivations in several domains 
of their lives. Early research described how the “pains of imprisonment”, such as dep-
rivation of liberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy and secu-
rity, can be a source of frustration and deviancy among prisoner populations.161 Such 
deprivations can cause threats to, or deficits in, a variety of fundamental individual 
needs and vulnerable prisoners may turn to violent extremist groups to fill the void.
• Religion: The experience of a criminal conviction and spending time in prison can lead 
some people to take a closer interest in religion than they had before. Religion can 
help them change their lives for the better. It is not uncommon, therefore, for 
160 See Global Center on Cooperative Security (2015): Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Com-
munity Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: an Action Agenda, Action 8; Useem, B. and Clayton, O., “Radi-
calization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3(August 2009), pp. 586-587.
161 Sykes, G.M. (1958) The society of captives, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
LEBANON: Risk of radicalization to violence in prison
Inadequate conditions of imprisonment, prison overcrowding and poor security measures 
represent the main challenges of the Lebanese prison system, which in itself enhance the risk of 
prison-based radicalization to violence.
Contribution submitted by the Prison Administration of Lebanon in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings 
on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
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prisoners to experience religious or spiritual conversion during imprisonment.162 How-
ever, as people who convert may initially be less well-informed about their faith, they 
may be vulnerable to overtures from radicalizers who seek to impress a distorted ver-
sion of theology upon them. For example, research has shown that prisoners (including 
recent converts) were ignorant and confused about the Islamic faith and those with 
violent extremist views could fill this gap with misinformation and misinterpretation.163 
Conversion, however, rarely leads to violent outcomes.164 Prison staff should be aware 
that there have been cases of violent extremist prisoners aggressively forcing or coerc-
ing other prisoners to convert to swell their ranks and strengthen their hold on crime 
rackets. Some prisoners have spoken of strict religious law being enforced in some 
prisons by violent extremist prisoners, with prisoners being banned from eating pork, 
pictures of women torn down and music systems destroyed.165
7.4 Vulnerability and models of recruitment in prison
Prisons provide a constantly regenerating pool of potential candidates for recruitment into 
violent extremist groups.166 This section considers how recruiters are able to spot, assess and 
encourage potential vulnerable recruits to join a violent extremist cause.
The majority of studies have focused on demographic variables (such as age, gender, ethnic-
ity, race) to look at the vulnerability of individuals to recruitment to violent extremist causes, 
mainly because they are much easier to access than other variables.167 However, many empiri-
cal studies show that psychographic variables, such as attitudes, emotions, preconceptions 
and motivations, seem to matter most regarding the success rate.168 In some cases, it is the 
162 Clear, T. and Sumter, M. (2002). “Prisoners, prison, and religion: religion and adjustment to prison”. Journal 
of Offender Rehabilitation, 35, 127-159. Clear, T.R., Hardyman, P.L., Stout, B., Lucken, K. & Dammer, H.R. (2000). 
“The value of religion in prison: an inmate perspective”. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 16, pp. 53-74.
163 Liebling, A., Arnold, H., & Straub, C. (2012). Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on. 
London: National Offender Management Service.
164 Hamm, M.S. (2009). “Prison Islam in the age of sacred terror”. British Journal of Criminology, 49, 667-685. 
Hamm, M.S. (2011b). Locking up terrorists: Three models for controlling prisoner radicalization: Hamm, M. (2013) 
The Spectacular Few, New York University Press. 
165 Porter, T. (2013) “Muslims 'Force UK Prison Inmates to Convert' With Bullying and Intimidation”, Inter-
national Business Times, October 20, 2013.
166 Mulcahy, E., Merrington, S. Bell, P. “The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion 
and Prisoner Vulnerability”, Journal of Human Security (2013), Volume 9, Issue 1, pp 4-14.
167 Gerwehr S. and Daley S., (2006): “Al-Qaida: Terrorist selection and recruitment” (chapter 5 in The Homeland 
Security Handbook, New York, United States; McGraw-Hill; p. 73-89).
168 Ash S. (1985): “Cult-induced psychopathology, part one: Clinical picture”, Cultic Studies Journal. Vol. 2(1), 
pp. 31-90.
Recent research has found that, while radicalisation is a live and important issue to both prisoners 
and staff, it is rarely witnessed. Radicalisers use a variety of means to persuade and influence, 
including coercion and intimidation. This is true in prisons as in other environments. In prisons, it is 
not always clear where observable behaviours are indicative of radicalisation or other prisoner 
behaviours, such as the formation of alliances as coping mechanisms, bullying or criminal 
association.
United Kingdom–Prevent Strategy (June 2011) para. 10.157.
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expertise of the potential recruit that the violent extremists are seeking, for example, engineers 
or information technology and communications specialists.
Recruitment plays a significant role in any violent extremist organization.169 Individuals can 
use their expertise to spot, assess and encourage potential recruits to follow the same path.170 
The process of recruitment can be viewed as one of “rational prospecting”, meaning that 
recruiters follow a strategy for seeking out individual prospects that demonstrate the greatest 
“participation potential”.171 In the first stage, the recruiter seeks information regarding the 
target individual (such as past activities the individual has been involved in). Also, the recruiter 
assesses whether the individual has characteristics, such as political interests or concerns 
about politics, that might predispose them to take part in their violent extremist activities. 
In the second stage, the recruiter needs to get a positive result (i.e. the individual recruit 
accepts and becomes an active member). In order to successfully achieve this, the recruiter 
may entice the recruit with various gratifications or incentives, such as food, clothing and 
protection.172
7.5  Preventing and detecting radicalization to violence in 
prisons
In some jurisdictions, prisons administrator are under a legal duty to prevent radicalization 
to violence. 173 Even if there is no explicit legal duty to prevent radicalization to violence in 
prison, professional prison directors will seek to prevent and detect radicalization to violence 
in their prison.
As highlighted in chapter 3, the importance of staff training should not be under estimated 
in this regard. Prison staff should: understand the nature of the threat; be aware of the use 
of various narratives; appreciate that there is no typical violent extremist or recruit; get to know 
their prisoners; and raise concerns if members of staff do have concerns about behavioural 
patterns. Prison managers must adopt a range of activities to prevent, detect and disrupt 
radicalization to violence in prison.
One area where radicalization to violence can occur is during religious gatherings. The impor-
tance of vetting religious leaders before permitting them to lead religious services in prison 
was highlighted in chapter 2. One national study found that only half of religious services 
were physically supervised by prison staff, and just over half used any sort of audio or video 
monitoring capabilities. The same study found that prisoners were allowed themselves to act 
169 Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). Violent extremists in federal institutions: Estimat-
ing radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population (Research Report R-313). 
Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada
170 Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division. The radicalization process: From conversion 
to Jihad. 
171 Brady H., Schlozman K., Verba S. “Prospecting for participants: Rational expectations and the recruitment 
of political activities”, American Political Science Review. 1999; 93, pp. 53-168.
172 Gerwehr S. and Daley S. (2006): “Al-Qaida: Terrorist selection and recruitment” (chapter 5 in The Homeland 
Security Handbook, New York, United States; McGraw-Hill; p. 73-89).
173 See for example: United Kingdom: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (article 26): “The governor 
of a prison… must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn 
into terrorism.”
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as spiritual leaders in half the institutions.174 Even when internal or external religious leaders 
are available, some may be intimidated by violent extremist prisoners who consequently 
assume the role of religious service providers for themselves. In the absence of qualified 
religious services providers, prisoners can become attracted to violent extremist views and 
the politico-religious messages coming from other prisoners who assume informal positions 
of religious leadership. Monitoring procedures should be put in place to ensure religious 
services are being conducted appropriately.
In prison radicalisation may be facilitated by the fact that prayer rooms are a popular place to 
convey messages, and that they are among the few areas in which inmate groups can meet, often 
without guard supervision. Even if supervision is provided, language barriers and a lack of cultural 
awareness might prevent prison staff from identifying suspicious behaviour.
Handbook on Violent Radicalisation: Recognition of and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups 
Concerned (2008) Austria–France – Germany.
Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, including with external 
law enforcement partners, to understand whether violent extremism is an issue in the prison 
and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern. At national prison administration 
level, there is a need to create an intelligence group to monitor, share, analyse and collate 
any information regarding prisoner radicalization to violence from all prisons within the 
jurisdiction. This group should also work closely with external law-enforcement agencies.
UNITED STATES: Correctional Intelligence Program (CIP)
The United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have 
jointly developed the Correctional Intelligence Program (CIP). CIP is a nationwide special project 
designed to facilitate coordination on terrorism matters between all Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTFs) and all correctional agencies nationwide. BOP assigned employees to the National Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to coordinate the exchange of intelligence related to corrections and 
manage CIP.
The project’s main focus is to prevent prison radicalization in particular, and to encourage the 
effective exchange of intelligence regarding terrorism matters in general. BOP plays a major 
leadership role, and all state/local correctional agencies are actively encouraged to partner. The 
Correctional Intelligence Program focuses on: improving intelligence collection; detecting, 
deterring, and disrupting efforts by terrorist, extremist or radical groups to radicalize or recruit in 
federal, state, local, territorial, tribal or privatized prisons; and providing training and support 
materials that can be used by field offices and JTTFs for training and outreach at state and local 
correctional institutions.
All of these elements have helped identify numerous factors responsible for the spread of 
radicalization and recruitment in prisons. A recent comprehensive assessment based on a survey 
of nearly 3,000 state and local correctional facilities identified “best practices” for correctional 
institutions to follow to combat the spread of radicalization and recruitment. Some of these are: 
establish system-wide vetting protocols for all contractor and volunteer applicants; the FBI 
provides assistance by conducting criminal history checks against all FBI indices for contract, 
174 A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers, Department 
of Justice, Office of The Inspector General April 2004, p. 17.
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volunteer, and staff personnel entering correctional facilities. Relevant information is passed on to 
correctional officials for appropriate action; create system-wide databases of contractors and 
volunteers providing direct inmate services; improve monitoring capabilities; coordinate inmate 
transfers; and share information among all levels of law enforcement and correctional personnel. 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces can facilitate this process.
Contribution submitted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States of America, in the course of the two UNODC Expert 
Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
Staff in everyday contact with prisoners should be empowered to take decisions in order to 
be able to react swiftly and adequately to signs of radicalization to violence and deal with 
interpersonal conflicts. In particular, staff should be given tools to report concerns regarding 
signs of radicalization to violence, and appropriate procedures should be applied to assess 
such risks promptly and professionally.175 Consideration should further be given to creating 
a dedicated core group of dependable, trained and motivated individuals to investigate sus-
pected cases of radicalization to violence in each prison and to provide advice to staff who 
have concerns about particular prisoners.
  For further detail on prison intelligence, see the UNODC Handbook on Dynamic Security and Prison 
Intelligence (2015)
Prison staff should also be aware that prisoners undertaking recruitment efforts or leading 
violent extremist groups in prison do not necessarily have a high profile and often conform, 
superficially at least, to the prison regime. Leaders are able to avoid detection by using sur-
rogates to conduct business so that their real identity remains unknown to the prison 
authorities.176
A number of indicators, as outlined below, may suggest vulnerability to violent extremism, 
and may therefore be useful in detecting attempts to radicalize a prisoner to violent extrem-
ism. It should not be assumed that the characteristics and experiences set out below neces-
sarily indicate that a person is committed to becoming a violent extremist:
• Expressed opinions: These may include support for violence and terrorism, the leader-
ship of terrorist organizations and uncompromising rejection of the principle of the 
rule of law and of the authority of any elected government of a country; clearly iden-
tifying another group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for 
all social or political ills; using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another 
group; speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the impor-
tance of action now; expressing attitudes that justify violence on behalf of the group, 
cause or ideology; condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others; or plot-
ting or conspiring with others.
175 Useem, B. and Clayton, O.,(2009): “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, 
no. 3 (August 2009), pp. 586-587.
176 Liebling, A., Arnold, H., & Straub, C. (2012). Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on. 
London: National Offender Management Service. Central Intelligence Agency (2002) Terrorists: Recruiting and 
Operating Behind Bars, p. 4, available at: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf
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• Material: Possession of violent extremist literature, symbols and imagery in hard copy 
or digital form; attempts to access, become a member of or contribute to violent 
extremist websites and associated password-protected chat rooms (where Internet 
access is permitted in prison); possession of material regarding weapons and/or explo-
sives; possession of literature regarding military training, skills and techniques.
• Behaviour and behavioural changes: Loss of interest in and withdrawal from contact 
with family, peers, friends; hostility towards former associates in prison; association 
with existing violent extremists in prison and individuals who hold extremist views 
that stop short of advocating violence; changing their style of dress or personal appear-
ance to accord with the group; their day-to-day behaviour becoming increasingly cen-
tred around a violent extremist ideology, group or cause; attempts to recruit others 
to the group/cause/ideology.
The examples above are not exhaustive and vulnerability may manifest itself in other ways. 
There is no single route to violent extremism nor is there a simple profile of those who 
become involved. For this reason, any attempt to derive a “profile” can be misleading. It 
must not be assumed that these characteristics and experiences will necessarily lead to indi-
viduals becoming violent extremists, or that these indicators are the only source of informa-
tion required to make an appropriate assessment about vulnerability.
Prison staff will need to take into consideration how reliable or significant signs are and 
whether there are other factors or issues that could indicate vulnerability. Prison staff should 
closely observe any changes in the behaviour of prisoners and, in particular in the event of 
changes in several areas, speak to the prisoner about them.
When developing indicators evidencing radicalization to violence, staff should be cautioned 
that such indicators should not be considered in isolation but in the context of personal 
features and specific circumstances of a given case in order to avoid erroneous conclusions.177 
For example, just because a prisoner adopts a particular faith, or follows its practices in a 
more devout manner, does not mean that the prisoner is on the path to violent extremism. 
Some countries have developed easily accessible documents for staff which remind them of 
key factors to look out for in spotting signs of potential radicalization to violence. In England 
and Wales, for example, staff are issued with a pocket size reminder card that they are able 
to carry at all times. 178
It must be emphasized to staff that these types of indicators are not in themselves evidence 
of violent extremism but are merely signs that may indicate that a prisoner is on the path 
to becoming radicalized to violence. Further probing and evidence will be required to estab-
lish the reality. A mechanistic ticking of the checklist will not, in itself, prove that a prisoner 
has become a violent extremist.
177 Council of Europe Guidelines for the Prison and Probation Services Facing Radicalisation and Violent 
Extremism, Principle 25.
178 National Offender Management Service (NOMS) – England and Wales, Extremism and Radicalisation–Guid-
ance for Staff. Available at: www.lemosandcrane.co.uk. A number of jurisdictions have more detailed and up-to-date 
lists of indicators for staff but these lists are not available in the public domain for security reasons.
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7.6 Disrupting radicalization to violence in prisons
Where there is evidence that a violent extremist prisoner has been attempting to radicalize 
other prisoners to violence, prompt and decisive action should be taken. In some cases, this 
may involve moving the individual to another prison or to a different accommodation area 
within the same prison. Consideration should also be given to preventing the prisoner from 
freely associating with vulnerable prisoners and to supervising all of his or her interactions. 
Management actions could also include a reduction in privilege level, disciplinary charges or 
segregation. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to provide theological, motivational and 
behavioural interventions.
Prison staff should try to challenge the violent extremist ideology and promote how diverse 
views can be heard, analysed and challenged in a way which values freedom of speech and 
freedom from harm. Their approach should allow grievances to be aired, explored and dem-
onstrate the role of conflict resolution and active citizenship. Where a violent extremist has 
particularly strong views or is highly educated, staff may not always have the necessary skills 
to challenge the prisoner’s views. In such circumstances, the assistance of more experienced, 
competent and knowledgeable personnel should be sought.
7.7  Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent 
extremists
If the prison administration considers that support to reduce vulnerability to violent extrem-
ism is required, they should devise an appropriate support package for the corresponding 
prisoner. This may take the form of an action plan or case management plan setting out 
who will lead on delivering such support. The action plan should highlight identified behav-
iours and risks that need to be addressed. This will assist in case reviews and evaluating the 
effectiveness of the support package.
The type of activities included in a support package will depend on risk, vulnerability and 
local resources. To illustrate, a diversionary activity may be sufficient for a prisoner who is 
in the early stages of radicalization to violence, whereas a more focused and structured 
one-on-one mentoring programme may be required for those prisoners who are already 
radicalized to violence. The following support programmes should be considered: counselling; 
faith guidance; civic engagement; working with support networks; involvement in the prison 
regime; life skills; mentoring support; cognitive/behavioural therapies; general work on atti-
tudes and behaviours; health awareness; and assessing and addressing any physical or mental 
health issues. The support package could also take the form of moving the vulnerable prisoner 
away from a negative influence or providing them with mentoring from the relevant faith-
leader or social worker.
Individual prisoners receiving support should be reassessed at least every three months to 
ensure that the progress being made in supporting them is having the intended impact and 
that the prisoner is not being further radicalized to violence.
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8. Preparing violent 
extremist prisoners for 
their reintegration into 
the community
8.1 Introduction
Violent extremist prisoners will, at some point, be released back into the community unless 
they die in prison or are serving a whole life sentence.179 The process for reintegrating violent 
extremist prisoners into the community should therefore be a key element in any strategy 
related to preventing and countering violent extremism.
The period of transition from prison to living in the community is difficult for any prisoner. 
Incarceration may itself have had several negative effects on a prisoner’s ability to lead a 
violence free, law-abiding and self-supporting live. Prisoners may have lost their livelihood, 
their personal belongings and their accommodation; they may have lost important personal 
relationships and imprisonment may have damaged their social and family networks; and 
they may have experienced mental health difficulties. This is no different for violent extremist 
prisoners who are being released back into the community. However effective the disengage-
ment interventions that take place in prison, the risk of the former violent extremist prisoner 
reoffending significantly increases if no reintegration preparation is put in place.
[R]eleased individuals are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment, the latter because many 
inmates leave prison with very little financial, emotional, or family support. To the extent that 
radical groups may draw upon funding from well-financed extremist backers, they can offer 
significantly more social and financial support to released prisoners than other legitimate 
community support programs … when inadequate formal support is provided for inmate 
transition, radical religious groups may fill the void by offering both financial and emotional 
support. By providing for prisoners in their time of greatest need, these organizations can build 
upon the loyalty developed during the individual’s time in prison. If connections are made with a 
radicalized community group, the recently released inmate may remain at risk for recruitment or 
continued involvement in terrorist networks. Released inmates have significant potential value for 
terrorist networks that have recruited them.
Cilluffo, F. and Saathoff, G. (2006). Out of the shadows: Getting ahead of prisoner radicalization. Report by George 
Washington university, Homeland Security policy Institute, and university of Virginia, critical Incident analysis Group, p. 7.
179 This is without prejudice to recommendations of international bodies to the effect that Member States should 
establish penal policies which would (i) ensure that life sentences are only imposed on offenders who have com-
mitted the most serious crimes, and only when strictly necessary for the protection of society; (ii) guarantee that 
any individual sentenced to life has the right to an appeal to a court of a higher jurisdiction, and to seek commuta-
tion of sentence; (iii) not result in the imposition of life sentences on children, i.e. under the age of 18 (see, for 
example, United Nations (1996), The Life Sentence, Report of the Criminal Justice Branch of UNOV, United 
Nations Publication Geneva). 
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8.2 Progress through the system
As described in chapter 4, the prison regime and conditions in which violent extremist pris-
oners are held should depend on the results of their risk and needs assessment. An important 
feature of the risk and needs assessment is that it should be used to identify the small number 
of violent extremist prisoners who are likely to pose a continued serious threat to security, 
safety or good order in the prison and to distinguish them from the majority of violent 
extremist prisoners who, although they may have committed serious crimes, will not neces-
sarily pose a threat within the prison setting and whose level of dangerousness may reduce 
over time, in response to various interventions in prison.
The aim should be to move violent extremist prisoners to progressively less restrictive set-
tings, based on periodic individual risk assessments. The final stage of a sentence should 
ideally be spent in the lowest security prison, which will provide prison management and 
the violent extremist prisoner with the best environment to prepare him or her for release. 
When a prisoner is moved to a lower security prison, the prison administration must ensure 
that the purpose of each move is specified and that new targets are set for the prisoner on 
arrival in the new prison.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) 
call for countries to develop and operate a wide range of post-sentencing alternatives in order 
to avoid institutionalization and to assist offenders in their early reintegration into society. 
Such measures may include furlough and halfway houses, work or educational release, vari-
ous forms of early or conditional release programmes (parole) and remission.180
Subject to applicable laws, it is desirable to facilitate progressive reintegration by permitting 
a prisoner to leave the institution—for a day or a few days—in order to prepare his or her 
eventual return to the community. In some jurisdictions, transition houses or pre-release 
centres offer supervised residential settings to help prisoners go through a planned transition 
from custody to community living. They allow prisoners substantial interactions with the 
outside world, as well as contacts with their families and (potential) employers.
UNITED STATES: Faith-based transition centre and re-entry unit, Indiana
That radicalization may be best avoided by strengthening the occupation prospects of inmates is a 
main motivation for the Indiana Department of corrections’ efforts to assist inmates in their 
transition from prison to community. Indiana’s efforts include a faith-based transition centre and a 
re-entry unit that provides inmates with free movement in an attempt to create a culture that 
mimics civilian society.
Useem, B. and Clayton, O., “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 2009), pp585-6. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf.
In the case of violent extremist prisoners who are eligible to be considered for early or con-
ditional release, arrangements must be made to conduct a risk assessment and a release plan 
to inform the decision of conditional release authorities (for example, a parole board). Violent 
extremist prisoners should be provided with information on the application and 
180 See the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules), Rule 9.
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decision-making process and their potential eligibility under existing law. They may need 
assistance in preparing their submission or application for conditional release and may need 
the assistance of legal advisors or paralegals to put their case forward. They may also need 
assistance in formulating a workable release plan.
Parole and other conditional release decisions are often based on whether violent extremist 
prisoners have participated in interventions designed to address their risk factors and other 
challenges. These decisions can also be based on whether the violent extremist prisoner’s risk 
is manageable in the community. In some jurisdictions, violent extremist prisoners are required 
to sign a document testifying to the renunciation of former beliefs. Family and tribal members 
may also have to vouch for them, such that they will be responsible for their future 
behaviour.181
Prior to the release of a violent extremist prisoner, a formal multi-agency meeting which 
includes the police and, where they exist, a probation violent extremism lead, should take 
place to assess risks and inform decisions after release—a mechanism which should also apply 
to periods of temporary release. This will ensure that partner agencies work together to share 
relevant information and put provision in place to manage the risk or any outstanding con-
cerns. Any cooperation and exchange of information with the police or other law enforcement 
agencies must be based on strict and clear procedures in terms of privacy and data 
protection.
Confidentiality and privacy issues can hinder multi-agency cooperation. Shared responsibility 
may lead to no-one feeling responsible in some cases. For example, after release, contact 
between the police and intelligence services (who have primary responsibility in terms of 
security) and the prison and probation service (who are responsible for an effective reintegra-
tion) is key to avoiding different behaviour and interventions towards the former violent 
extremist. This requires clear rules on ownership and information-sharing.182
8.3 Prison-based reintegration interventions
Prison-based interventions should be put in place to prepare prisoners for their release and 
re-entry into the community. This is particularly important for violent extremist prisoners 
who may have spent a considerable period in detention.
DENMARK: Back on Track (BOT) training programme
The Back on Track (BOT) programme was designed to help prisoners who have been charged or 
convicted of terrorism-related offences, or who have been assessed as vulnerable to radicalization. 
BOT uses a broad definition of extremism and is not just concerned with religiously motivated 
terrorism, but is also concerned with left- and right-wing violent extremism, and hate crime.
181 Boucek, C., Beg, S. and Horgan, J., (2009) “Opening up the jihadi debate: Yemen’s Committee for Dialogue”. 
In: T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan, ed. 2009. Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement. Abingdon: 
Routledge. Ch.11.
182 Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016): Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, 
RAN Prisons and Probation–practitioners working paper, p. 3.
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The programme is based on a mentor working closely with the prisoner to provide assistance with 
practical issues such as finding work and accommodation on release, to liaise and work with the 
prisoner’s family, and to help motivate the prisoners to change their lifestyle. The main focus of 
BOT is to train and coach the mentors, who can then work in a one-to-one capacity with their 
mentees. The mentors and mentor coaches come from variety of backgrounds including police 
officers, prison staff, social workers, lawyers, etc. The mentors are trained to develop their skills in 
areas around coaching, managing conflict and dialogue techniques.
Twelve days of training are provided to the mentors. These are comprised of five two-day sessions 
developing the different skills needed. Added to this is one two-day course on radicalization and 
extremism provided by the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and 
the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. Following the formal training, BOT also facilitates 
network days for the mentors which allows the mentors to meet and share experiences and 
insights.
This programme is a government project and was originally developed by the Danish Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Integration in cooperation with the Danish Prison and Probation Services. 
Development of the programme started in 2011, with the first launch taking place in 2012. Initially, 
the programme was mainly supported by funds from the European Union, but from 2014 onwards 
the programme has been adopted as a general Prison Service programme.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
A number of activities should be delivered as part of a pre-release interventions programme 
to help violent extremist prisoners prepare for reintegrating into the employment market. 
Employment keeps people occupied, provides ties to non-criminal (and non-violent extremist) 
peers and influences, and provides a source of income independent of the group.183 An income 
also increases the likelihood of enabling a released prisoners to play a meaningful role within 
their families. It is important that efforts to find suitable employment for violent extremist 
prisoners begin prior to their release. This should include an assessment of the prisoner’s 
skills and the identification of possible employment opportunities. Interventions may include 
services helping prisoners to develop job search and presentation and interview skills, joint 
discussions about expectations, addressing anxiety associated with the job search process, 
provision of information about the job market, preparation of a curriculum vitae and applica-
tions, information and contacts with public and private employment agencies, and contacts 
with individuals or previous employers who may be able to offer assistance in seeking 
employment.
In low-resource countries, there is often little prospect of former violent extremists finding 
employment without significant support from appropriate government ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Labour or Employment, and close links with other relevant bodies, such as the 
Chambers of Commerce. Providing vocational training in skills required in post-conflict situ-
ations, such as construction, building and welding, may also be particularly helpful in enabling 
former violent extremists to find employment.
183 Disley, E. et al (2011) Individual disengagement from Al Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evi-
dence Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, 
United Kingdom Home Office, pviii. 
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Self-employment can be another important post-release occupation for former violent extrem-
ist prisoners, given the challenges that they may face with obtaining paid employment. A 
number of jurisdictions have set up schemes to enable prisoners to set up their own small 
business and to be self-sufficient on release. Entrepreneurship programmes within prisons 
offer a realistic opportunity for reducing recidivism.184
The lack of suitable housing is one of the major challenges that all ex-prisoners face at the 
time of re-entry, and there is some evidence that it may be related to the risk of recidivism.185 
Living with a family member or a friend is not always a possibility and, when it is, it may 
come with its own problems. Pre-release interventions for violent extremist prisoners must 
therefore include a plan for securing appropriate housing. Ideally, every individual should be 
released directly to appropriate housing. Working with community-based organizations is often 
the best way to gain access to the full range of housing options available.
Another aspect of social reintegration is financial security in the sense that a former violent 
extremist prisoner will require, in most societies, a bank account and in all cases a basic 
knowledge of how to manage their finances and how to assume responsibility for their 
finances. Prison administrations should therefore offer interventions for violent extremist 
prisoners on how to manage their finances, and provide opportunities to earn money or save 
those earnings in prison. Some violent extremists will not require such support as they have 
may have been professionals or self-employed businessmen or women prior to imprisonment. 
In some circumstances, however, where a former violent extremist’s assets and bank accounts 
have been frozen, for example, they may need support to work with authorities to unfreeze 
their assets, as appropriate.
It is also important to ensure that violent extremist prisoners preparing for their release have 
adequate identification and other civil documents. The lack of such documents at the time 
of their release will impede the individual’s access to services, housing and employment. 
Prisoners should also be provided with information on how they may access various forms 
of service and support in the community. In some instances, planning for their release may 
involve applying for such services in advance of their release.
8.4 Involving community organizations
The progress made by violent extremist prisoners in prison must continue to be reinforced 
after their release. It is important, therefore, to plan the release of violent extremist prisoners 
to ensure that they will receive uninterrupted services and support upon their return to the 
community. Continuity of care can be achieved through close linkages and collaboration 
between prison staff and community-based service providers.
184 See, for example: Cooney, T. (2012) Reducing Recidivism Through Entrepreneurship Programmes in Prisons. 
Dublin Institute of Technology. 
185 Metraux and Culhane (2004): “Homeless shelter use and reincarceration following prison release”, Criminology 
and Public Policy, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 139-160.
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Services and agencies, governmental or otherwise, which assist released prisoners in 
re-establishing themselves in society shall ensure, so far as is possible and necessary, that released 
prisoners are provided with appropriate documents and identification papers, have suitable 
homes and work to go to, are suitably and adequately clothed having regard to the climate and 
season and have sufficient means to reach their destination and maintain themselves in the period 
immediately following their release.
The approved representatives of such agencies shall have all necessary access to the prison and to 
prisoners and shall be taken into consultation as to the future of a prisoner from the beginning of 
his or her sentence.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 108.1.
As violent extremist prisoners are approaching release, a range of service providers from the 
community that can play a role in their successful resettlement (e.g. probation services, social 
services, housing and health-care services) should be invited to case conferences to explore 
risks, needs and continuity of care in the community. There must be linkages between prison 
and community-based interventions to ensure continuity of support.186
8.5 Establishing strong contact with families
Relationships can be a primary vehicle for disengagement from violent extremism, and further, 
appear to be what most optimally enables subsequent engagement of a former extremist 
elsewhere in society.187 The impact of family and friends’ visits on the psychological health 
of prisoners, their motivation to desist from future offending, prospects of finding accom-
modation and employment after release should therefore not be underestimated. It is impor-
tant to help violent extremist prisoners maintain, or re-establish, contact with their family 
during their time in custody and particularly in the stages prior to release.
186 Griffiths, C., Dandurand, Y. and Murdoch, D. (2007) The Social Reintegration of Offenders and Crime 
Prevention, The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR), p. 6.
187 Barrellea, K. (2015): “Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism”, Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression, Volume 7, Issue 2, 2015, pages 129-142; Jacobson, M. (2008) “Why Terrorists 
Quit–Gaining From Al-Qa`ida’s Losses”, CTC Sentinel, July 15, 2008.
Interventions for the prevention of reoffending should be clearly linked to the ongoing risk 
assessment of the individual offender. It should be planned for both the custodial and community 
settings, ensuring continuity between the two contexts.
Such a plan should facilitate effective communication, coordinate the actions of various agencies 
and support multi-agency cooperation between prison administration, probation workers, social 
and medical services and law-enforcement authorities.
Recommendation Cm/Rec(2014)3 of The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States Concerning 
Dangerous Offenders, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 February 2014 at the 1192nd meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies, recommendations 34 and 36.
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As violent extremist prisoners move towards release, prison visits should be turned into 
structured opportunities to help them prepare for their return to the community. Family 
visits close to the time of release, can provide opportunities for helping the prisoner and the 
family make some realistic plans for the transition period.
Prison authorities should, however, be aware that reuniting a violent extremist prisoner with 
his or her family may also have a negative impact on the prisoner and increase the risk of 
reoffending. The pre-release risk assessment should take this into account. If the violent 
extremist prisoner’s family is associated with, or supports, violent extremist groups or ideolo-
gies, care should be taken to avoid re-establishing contact or make sure that such contact is 
closely monitored.188
In addition to facilitating contacts between violent extremist prisoners and their families, it 
is sometimes important to offer services and support to family members of prisoners. Family 
members may have experienced significant distress over the period of imprisonment. Some 
of them may have relocated or formed new relationships. Reuniting a prisoner with family 
members may therefore have a negative impact on the family. Family members should receive 
timely notification and information concerning the prisoner’s release. Social service agencies 
should be mobilized to offer assistance to family members and help them cope with the 
emotional, financial and interpersonal issues relating to the offender’s return to his or her 
family and community.
LEBANON: Reintegration challenges
The “image of heroes” that some close community (family, religious and political entities) maintain 
of the imprisoned violent extremists created particular challenges when it comes to the 
reintegration of violent extremist prisoners in Lebanon. Indeed, the social reintegration of these 
prisoners is made more difficult if the community provides all services and support needed during 
the detention and following release (legal counsel, transportation, costs for the visits in prison, 
financial support to the family, etc.).
Contribution submitted by the Prison Administration of Lebanon in the course of the two UNODC Expert Group Meetings 
on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 and 1-3 June 2016).
8.6 Preparing victims and the community
Fostering a welcoming and positive community environment for prisoners post-release, 
including former violent extremist prisoners, is critical to long-term success. Beyond a former 
violent extremist prisoner’s immediate family, the broader community is also important in 
setting them on a path towards successful reintegration. This is particularly true in countries 
where tribes and clans play a significant role in communities, and where working with tra-
ditional rulers and authorities is a critical element of any reintegration programme.
188 See, for example, Abuza, Z.: “The Rehabilitation of Jamaah Islamiya detainees in South East Asia”, in Bjørgo, 
T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, pp. 193-211. London: 
Routledge.
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With the participation and help of the community and social institution, and with due regard to 
the interests of victims, favourable conditions shall be created for the integration of the 
ex-prisoner into society under the best possible conditions.
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Principle 10.
Any former prisoner may be confronted with negative stigmas, which hinder the reintegration 
process and cause difficulties in finding housing or employment. Arguably, such stigmatiza-
tion effects are at least as strong, if not stronger, for ex‐inmates who have a violent extremist 
background. To maximize the chances of success, additional measures must be taken to 
address criminogenic needs in the former violent extremists’ immediate environment, and to 
establish a safe and trusting social network to return to. It is of profound importance to 
actively engender the receiving environment as a protective factor against recidivism and to 
encourage the community to support the re‐entry and reintegration process.189
Reconnecting with the victims and others who have been affected by the violent extremist 
prisoner’s behaviour is a difficult process.190 In many instances, relationships and trust have 
been seriously damaged and cannot be repaired easily or immediately. Restorative justice pro-
cesses, reconciliation and other mediated interventions, starting while violent extremist prisoners 
are still in prison, can help them find their place in the community. This is sometimes referred 
to as a “restorative reintegration process”. There is a growing movement to use restorative 
practices to facilitate the social reintegration of prisoners returning to the community.
Interventions can be planned to notify and prepare victims and relevant community members 
of the violent extremist prisoner’s return to the community and to provide them with protec-
tion, counselling services and support. A victim may choose not to participate in any decision 
concerning the violent extremist prisoner, but may nevertheless need to be kept informed of 
the violent extremist prisoner’s release and should be notified about the timing and circum-
stances of the violent extremist prisoner’s return to the community. Ideally, the prison releas-
ing the former violent extremist prisoner will have a record of the victim’s wish to be notified 
(or not). When possible, counselling and support must be made available to victims of violent 
crimes, as required, to prepare them for the return of the prisoner to the community.
In some jurisdictions, the role of local communities and community leaders are crucial in 
supporting reintegration. This is particularly the case where local neighbourhood chiefs, tribal 
leaders and citizens groups have a role in formal or informal community management.
8.7 Protective measures on release
A pre-release plan must also consider how the violent extremist prisoners can be expected 
to be received by members of their former violent extremist group and hostile members of 
the community.
189 Veldhuis,T. (2012): “Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: 
A Realist Approach, International Centre for Counter Terrorism Research Paper”; Rome Memorandum, Good 
Practice, No. 24.
190 See, for example: Miller, R. (2010): Terror, Religion, and Liberal Thought, Columbia University Press, on how 
religious violence may trigger feelings of repulsion and indignation from the community, especially in a society that 
encourages toleration and respect. Rejection, however, contradicts the principles of inclusion that define a democracy 
and its core moral values.
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Consideration should be given to providing protective measures when there is credible infor-
mation that a reformed violent extremist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of 
family members, during or upon release from custody.191 Some former violent extremists may 
be at risk of retaliation when transitioning back into society. To assess that risk and take it 
into account in planning the return of the former violent extremist prisoner to the commu-
nity, it is important to make the best use possible of all the information available about any 
history of conflict, violence or threats by or against the individual. Some jurisdictions use 
pre-release questionnaires to inquire whether there are threats to life issues facing the indi-
vidual or family members.
Where such risks exist, Member States should consider the possibility of relocating the former 
violent extremist prisoner and his/her family to safer areas. The individual and family mem-
bers could also be given advice on precautionary safety measures and security practices 
designed to reduce future risks. In some cases, this may involve providing the former violent 
extremist with a new identity.192 Consideration should also be given to providing emergency 
support, such as a 24-hour telephone hotline, that former violent extremist prisoners can 
access if they are under threat or at risk of re-engaging in violent extremist activity. In most 
jurisdictions, the implementation of protective measures is not the responsibility of the prison 
administration, but it should liaise closely with the police, probation, public safety and security 
services in order to ensure that safety issues are considered.
Whatever the potential threat against a violent extremist prisoner, keeping them in prison 
for their own safety after the expiry of their sentence, can never be legally justified.
Provision should also exist for former violent extremist prisoners to be able to challenge the 
actions of authorities on their release, if they believe that they are the subject of bullying, 
harassment or discrimination by the authorities due to their prior violent offending. In some 
jurisdictions, this can be achieved through an ombudsman.
8.8 Post-release interventions and support
The period immediately after release is most critical, and is likely to be the most difficult 
for the former violent extremist prisoner, his or her family and the community. Where pris-
oners are married, the family’s routine and dynamics will probably have changed while the 
prisoner was in prison, with their spouses and children taking on more responsibilities than 
they had in the past. There will be a considerable adjustment period upon release, as the 
former violent extremist prisoner works his or her way back into the family structure and 
community.
191 Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 21.
192 Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: 
Routledge, p. 253.
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The duty of society does not end with a prisoner’s release. There should, therefore, be 
governmental or private agencies capable of lending the released prisoner efficient aftercare 
directed towards the lessening of prejudice against him or her and towards his or her social 
rehabilitation.
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), Rule 90.
Developing a robust and effective reintegration process, working in close partnerships with 
civil society organizations and communities, will facilitate the former violent extremist pris-
oner’s transition back into society, demonstrating continuing good will and providing an 
important support structure for the former violent extremist prisoner at a potentially chal-
lenging time.193
Some jurisdictions provide assistance to former violent extremist prisoners in the form of a 
guaranteed job, housing, new social networks and, in rare cases, even help to get married, 
including financial support to do so.194 Post-release activity should include ongoing educa-
tional/vocational skills training and disengagement interventions, as deemed appropriate. In 
a number of countries, formal “contracts of reintegration” exist between the prison admin-
istration and other government agencies, which require those agencies to take responsibility 
for reintegration issue such as employment, training and housing. In the United Arab Emir-
ates, for example, a work placement scheme has been established between prisons and local 
technical colleges which ensure continuity of training and support in finding employment, 
including financial support for two to three years in order to set up a small business. In 
Malaysia, a partnership has been reached between the prison administration and the transport 
department through which prisoners are taught to drive and receive their driving licence, 
which enables them to find employment upon release.
TURKEY: Prisoner post-release support
The probation system was established in Turkey in 2005. Under this system, 137 protection boards 
were formed. The aim of these boards is to help prisoners who are released from prison to gain a 
profession, and business or job placement. These boards also help prisoners who have set up small 
businesses and want to engage in agricultural business by providing tools and credit. These boards 
are made up of local officials including: the Chief Public Prosecutor, representative of the judiciary, 
the Prison Governor, the Director of Probation, the Director of National Education, the Director of 
Social Services, the Agricultural Bank and Popular Bank, and other members. Since 2006, 7,520 
prisoners have benefited from support given by protection boards.
Contribution submitted by the Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses of Turkey in the course of the two 
UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015 
and 1-3 June 2016).
193 See Rome Memorandum, Good Practice, No. 20, Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation 
services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, Principle 37.
194 Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009): Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: 
Routledge, p. 253.
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The post-release period can be a testing time for former violent extremist prisoners as they 
put into practice the pro-social values of what it means to be a law abiding citizen. It is 
important that any risk factors that are likely to continue on release are addressed as soon 
as possible in the community so that they do not lead to early relapse.
SAUDI-ARABIA: Prisoner post-release support programme
Saudi Arabia has developed one of the most influential deradicalization programmes of recent 
decades. The Saudi approach has informed and inspired the design and implementation of similar 
programmes in a wide range of other countries. In terms of structure and focus, the Saudi 
programmes developed for terrorist prisons are multifaceted and attempt to take a holistic 
approach in the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoners. To date, in excess of 3,000 prisoners 
have gone through some elements of the available programmes.
Following release from detention facilities, the ex-prisoners continue to be monitored by the 
authorities and are also required to continue to engage with the deradicalization work. One aspect 
of the programme is to assist reintegration into Saudi society by providing financial support to the 
ex-prisoners. This usually involves a monthly payment which the individual receives for up to one 
year or until they are financially independent. Added to this, the programme also provides 
assistance in securing employment.
Ex-prisoners are also encouraged to continue their education, the fees for which are paid for by 
the authorities. In a few cases, financial assistance has also been provided to facilitate marriages 
for ex-prisoners. The rationale for this support has been to encourage the men to focus more on 
family life and commitments, and to divert attention away from radical causes. In most cases, the 
strong practical and financial support provided after release, combined with continued 
monitoring, has been associated with a permanent move away from violent extremism.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
Appropriate arrangements should be put in place for continuing help in the form of mentor-
ing and support structures so that risks of relapse can be prevented.195 Care should further 
be taken to ensure the safety of the mentor or practitioners, as there are a multitude of 
potential difficulties and risks.
Some jurisdictions provide financial incentives to support released violent extremist prisoners 
and to encourage them to abstain from further violent activity. The provision of financial 
incentives and support may include supporting prisoners’ families (either through stipends, 
education assistance or employment) and providing a direct income source other than that 
from their illicit connections. The “appropriate” size of financial incentives, whether they 
should be in the form of cash or benefits in kind such as housing, should be considered 
carefully. There could be a risk that providing financial incentives may lead to unsustainable 
results: for example, because an individual may return to violent extremism once those benefits 
are withdrawn. Moreover, the provision of financial incentives might be controversial—seen 
as “rewards” for violent extremism by local communities. Care should be taken with such 
an approach to ensure that the financial assistance is not seen as rewarding violent 
extremism.
195 Sydney Memorandum, Suggested Strategy 8.
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INDONESIA: Disengagement from violence
The third and perhaps the most important factor in facilitating successful disengagement was the 
establishment of an alternative social network of friends, family members, business associates and 
mentors. New relationships and friendships can offer new narratives for perceiving the enemy, 
highlight instances where the rhetoric of seniors was at odds with their actions, challenge prior-
held views, and refocus priorities from jihad and/or revenge killing toward family.
Pressure from parents or a spouse can be a key supporting factor facilitating the disengagement. 
This was especially true among the Tanah Runtuh jihadists in Poso. However, the converse was also 
true. In those cases where parents professed support for terrorism, individuals remained hard line 
and unrepentant.
Finally, shifts in priorities from jihad and clandestine activities toward marriage, family, and gainful 
employment also facilitated disengagement. Priority shifts followed. In the cases of Tanah Runtuh 
members who had been released from prison, the need to earn a living, to “cari makanan” for 
one’s family, led to prioritising finding and keeping a job over their prior jihad activities. Likewise, 
among members of JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK, and the Subur cell, the most successful instances of 
disengagement and reintegration were those young men who had the opportunity to go for 
either further education or professional development training and had become teachers or 
businessmen in their own right.
Chernov Hwang (2016) Jihadist Disengagement from Violence: Understanding Contributing Factors, RSIS Commentary No. 
139 – 9 June 2016.
Learning and skills gained during custody should be rewarded and reinforced after release, 
leading to the individual’s acceptance as a law-abiding member of the community with a 
place to live and gainful employment. This calls for multi-agency cooperation between the 
prison, the police and statutory organizations offering post-release support, as well as other 
non-statutory groups and non-governmental organizations.
SINGAPORE: Prisoner post-release support programme
Following release from detention facilities, the ex-prisoners continue to be monitored by the 
authorities and are also required to continue to engage with deradicalization work. RRG counsellors 
who worked with the prisoner while she or he was in detention, continue to work with her/him 
after his release. This has provided the programme with valuable continuity.
The prisoners are initially released on a Restriction Orders (ROs) scheme, which sets a variety of 
conditions for the individual. They face curfews and must be at their residence at specific times. 
The ex-prisoners must report to the Singapore Internal Security Department (ISD) at specified 
times and dates, and must make themselves available to take part in counselling and interviews. 
Before moving address or changing employment, the released prisoner needs to obtain approval 
from the ISD. Also, the ex-prisoner is not allowed to make public statements, media appearances, 
or join any organization without prior approval from the ISD.
A further element to the post-release programme is the Interagency-After Care Group (ACG). This 
was established particularly to work with the families of prisoners, as it was recognized that the 
family would play an important role in helping to keep released prisoners away from extremist 
activities. Thus, facilitating family stability played an important role in the programme. The ACG 
aimed to provide support to families including providing female counsellors to work with the 
wives of ex-prisoners, by providing direct financial assistance, by helping wives to find 
employment, and also by supporting the education of the family’s children and assisting with 
school fees and other expenses.
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In terms of the post-release programme, particularly strong elements are the strong support for 
the ex-prisoner’s family. Also significant is the role that staff and counsellors who worked with the 
prisoner while in detention continue to play after release. This provides a strong continuity of care 
for the ex-prisoners and increases the likelihood that any return to violent offending will be 
recognized by staff.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
Religious professionals based in prisons can also play a significant role outside of the prison 
setting, in helping facilitate the former violent extremist’s reintegration into the community.196 
Religious professionals should strive to develop relationships with the prisoners’ families. 
Religious faith leaders working in the communities, while not formally associated with the 
reintegration activities, can also play a particularly useful role. They may already enjoy the 
trust of the community and a network of contacts who can be of great assistance to the 
prisoner and their family. Ideally, religious faith leaders who work in prisons settings should 
have developed relationships with the faith leaders who are based in the communities. Work-
ing together, they can help facilitate a smoother transfer and transition back to the com-
munities of the former violent extremist prisoners and make full use of the social network, 
particularly the family.
  For further detail on aftercare and re-entry assistance, see the UNODC Handbook on the Prevention of 
Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders (2012), including on job market re-entry assistance, 
accommodation and financial assistance, access to health care and social security; and family support
8.9 Monitoring and supervision after release
It is possible to distinguish between different models of supervising former violent extremist 
prisoners, in particular between the risk-based and the needs-based models. Risk-based strate-
gies operate on the premise that former violent extremist prisoner are potentially dangerous 
and need to be controlled and closely monitored. Needs-based supervision strategies focus 
more on former violent extremist prisoners’ needs and support their involvement in appro-
priate continuing interventions.
Monitoring also can provide invaluable information and data that can be used to determine 
the effectiveness of disengagement interventions.
In some jurisdictions, conditions are applied to the release of violent extremist prisoners prior 
to the expiration of their sentence, regardless of whether they will actually be supervised 
following his or her release—this is often referred to as “conditional release”. Sometimes 
those conditions are minimal. However, most conditional release systems impose both man-
datory/standard and special conditions on the former violent extremist prisoner. Mandatory 
conditions are usually those stipulated by law and imposed on all prisoners released before 
196 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (2013): Additional Guidance on the Role 
of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes.
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the end of their sentence. Special conditions are added, usually on a case-by-case basis. In 
some cases, the authorities have considerable discretion in determining such special 
conditions.
MALAYSIA: Violent extremist release arrangements
Every six months, the prisoners were evaluated to assess progress by a three-person committee of 
senior officials. The committee would prepare a report on each prisoner and this would be 
reviewed by a panel from the prison and also by the Home Ministry. The committee could 
recommend release if they were convinced that the prisoner had deradicalized and was no longer 
a threat. On average, the prisoners would spend three years in detention before being released.
Prisoners were normally released under a Supervision Order which placed restrictions on their 
activities, including curfews and limits on their travel and personal contacts. Continued 
counselling and religious instruction was also provided. Practical assistance was also given to 
reintegrate into society and, in some cases, the authorities helped the prisoner to gain 
employment or provided financial support.
Compilation of management practices related to violent extremist prisoners prepared by Andrew Silke, Professor of 
Criminology, University of East London, for the first UNODC Expert Group Meetings on the Management of Violent 
Extremist Prisoners (Vienna, Austria; 16-18 December 2015).
Standard conditions of release are most frequently defined in the legislation or regulations 
governing conditional release and typically include the following: initial contact with a super-
visor; ongoing contact with a supervisor; notification to the supervisor of any change in living 
or employment circumstances; limitations on travel; wearing an “electronic tag”; and being 
“of good behaviour” and/or behaving lawfully at all times.
Special or additional conditions can also be imposed in case decision-makers consider them 
necessary to manage the risk or meet the needs of the former violent extremist prisoner in 
the community. Those conditions are meant to offer a more specific response to the unique 
risk presented by the former violent extremist prisoner or a more detailed response to his 
or her reintegration needs. The use of special conditions should be related to the degree of 
risk that is presented by the former violent extremist prisoner. For example, the conditions 
may include a requirement: to avoid certain buildings, geographical areas or regions; not to 
approach or communicate with named people or organizations; to reside at a particular loca-
tion; to participate in a particular intervention; to obey a curfew; not to use the Internet; or 
not to travel out of the country.
In some cases, former violent extremist prisoners may require intensive supervision, at least 
in the first months or years following release. Intensive supervision may mean that they 
should be supervised very closely, with requirements for frequent face-to-face meetings with 
their supervisor, a set curfew, monitoring of contacts with police, and in some cases electronic 
monitoring. The exact nature of the intensive supervision may vary from person to person. 
In some jurisdictions, the role of local communities and community leaders is crucial in 
monitoring the former violent extremist prisoner.
Where a former violent extremist prisoner breaches the terms of their conditional release, 
appropriate measures should be put in place to deal with the non-compliance. In the most 
severe cases of non-compliance, the conditional release should be revoked and the individual 
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returned to prison. In the case of lower levels of non-compliance, a more strategic approach 
should be adopted, based on systematic attempts to enhance the likelihood of successful 
completion of supervision, with violations being used as opportunities to intervene with the 
violent extremist prisoner offenders and redirect their behaviour.197 In order to do so, it is 
often necessary to implement intermediate sanctions for non-compliance that do not involve 
a return to prison, such as participation in a community-based intervention.
Post-release supervision is a critical component in determining the success of a prisoner’s 
re-entry and community reintegration. However, supervision is more than simply monitoring 
the former violent extremist’s compliance with the conditions attached to their release. It 
involves managing the risk presented by the individual, acquiring and/or arranging resources 
to meet the needs of the individual and developing and maintaining a relationship with the 
former violent extremist that engenders trust with appropriate boundaries. It includes acts 
of surveillance, role-modelling, guidance and support, reinforcing positive behaviour and 
enforcing consequences for negative behaviour. Carried out professionally, it includes at its 
core supporting the social reintegration of the former violent extremist while actively manag-
ing the risk that he or she may reoffend.
While care must be taken not to give a “special status” to former violent extremist prisoners, 
the type of offence they committed and the impact of any future offence means that they 
require special attention. The key element, therefore, in considering post-release arrangements 
for former violent extremist prisoners must be public safety and protection. Risk assessments 
are indicative and can only point to a lower risk of further violent extremist offending, rather 
than predicting with certainty that the individual will never commit or support violent extrem-
ist activity in the future.
197 Burke, P. Gelb, A. and Horowitz, J., (2007): “When offenders break the rules: smart responses to parole 
and probation violations”, Public Safety Policy Brief, No. 3, November, (Washington, D.C., Pew Center on the States).
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9. Summary of key principles 
and recommendations
Chapter 2.  Managing violent extremist prisoners:  
fundamental issues
• Prisoner radicalization is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society 
if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent 
extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists.
• Prison administrations should ensure the secure and safe custody of violent extremist 
prisoners; prevent radicalization to violence within prisons; seek to ensure that prison-
ers disengage from future violence; and prepare those being released for their reinte-
gration into the community.
• Good prison management and necessary reforms constitute a fundamental basis for 
the effective management of all prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners. Stand-
alone interventions for violent extremist prisoners which are implemented in isolation 
of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results.
• The challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners must be addressed in full compli-
ance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(the Nelson Mandela Rules) and other relevant international standards and norms, 
including from a gender perspective.
• Any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining 
fundamental human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, 
are entitled, including the freedom of thought, religion or belief, and the absolute 
prohibition of torture.
• Appropriate security measures must be implemented that maintain a proper balance 
between physical, procedural and dynamic security elements. All prisons holding vio-
lent extremist prisoners should have in place a structured prison intelligence system 
consistent with national legislation and international standards.
• Prison administration should cooperate with other law enforcement and criminal jus-
tice agencies concerning the violent extremist prisoners held in their custody. Intelli-
gence and other relevant information should be shared across agencies.
• Prison authorities have an obligation to ensure that prisons are safe places, where 
prisoners, staff, service providers and visitors can go about their daily business without 
fear for their physical well-being. Maintaining control in prison through situational 
and social control methods is fundamental to ensuring safety and order.
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Chapter 3.  Managing prison staff and other resource persons 
who work with violent extremist prisoners
• Prison staff have an obligation to protect, maintain and uphold the human dignity of 
all offenders, including violent extremist prisoners. Prison staff who are to work with 
this challenging category of prisoners should be carefully selected for their integrity, 
humanity, professional capacity, personal suitability and ability.
• Prison administrations should have a clear policy to encourage suitable individuals to 
apply to work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners. The conditions of service 
for those staff should reflect the challenges and importance of their role.
• All staff should receive specialist training for working with violent extremist prisoners. 
Furthermore, prison administrations should take appropriate steps to ensure the personal 
safety of staff who work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, both while on 
duty and while outside of the prison, including their family members.
• Prison staff should maintain high levels of professional standards and ethics at all 
times when working with violent extremist prisoners. Appropriate support mechanisms 
should be put in place to enable staff to cope with the stress of working in prisons 
holding violent extremist prisoners.
• The staffing level for each prison should be set at the level required to ensure the 
security, safety and stability of the institution. It is essential that sufficient staff are 
appointed to ensure security and safety, as well as to ensure the implementation of 
constructive regime activities, including disengagement interventions.
• Sufficient specialist staff, such as psychologists, social workers and faith leaders, should 
be appointed to lead disengagement interventions. Other resources, such as victims 
and victims’ advocates, former violent extremists, family members and significant others, 
members of the community, and non-governmental organizations may play a significant 
part in the successful delivery of disengagement interventions.
Chapter 4.  Assessing and managing the risks posed by violent 
extremist prisoners
• Upon admission of a violent extremist prisoner, a thorough, evidence-based risk and 
needs assessment should be undertaken by specially trained staff. As opposed to doing 
so only upon entry, the assessment of risks and needs of violent extremist prisoners 
should be carried out on an ongoing and regular basis.
• The assessment and management of pretrial detainees should take into account their 
specific vulnerability, which may also include a particular susceptibility to the efforts 
of violent extremist recruiters. However, prison administrations must also be aware 
that any intervention including pretrial violent extremist prisoners may have an impact 
on their respective court cases, which may discourage participation.
• Structured professional judgement should be used in making the assessments of violent 
extremist prisoners. Assessment tools specifically tailored to identify individual risks 
and current levels of radicalization to violence, as well as the risk of undertaking future 
violent extremism-related activity, including post-release, should be developed and used 
according to the national context and capacities. Such tools should also consider the 
risk of others being radicalized to violence.
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• Each violent extremist prisoner’s assessment should identify the personal and contex-
tual circumstances which contributed to his or her (alleged) offence, and are likely to 
contribute to such offending in the future. The findings of this risk assessment should 
be used to identify the prisoner’s needs and interventions that will assist the prisoner 
in disengaging from violence and to enable the prisoner’s social reintegration.
• All violent extremist prisoners should be (a) separated according to gender, legal 
status, and age; (b) classified according to the information gained through the risk 
and needs assessment; and (c) categorized according to the appropriate level of security 
they will need to be held in. Violent extremist prisoners should be held in the least 
restrictive setting necessary for their safe and secure custody.
• Consideration should be given as to how best to house violent extremist prisoners 
within each prison system. The suitability of separation, concentration, dispersal or 
integration approaches (or a mix thereof) will depend on specific factors within the 
country, including the size of the violent extremist prison population, the prison infra-
structure and the capacity, the size and skills level of staff, as well as the resources 
and capacity to deliver disengagement programmes.
Chapter 5. Prison-based disengagement interventions
• Underpinning the approach of disengagement interventions should be the concept that 
if an individual can adopt radical beliefs and attitudes that lead to violent extremism, 
that individual can also abandon the use of violence through changing those beliefs 
and attitudes that justify its use.
• No single model of disengagement is universally applicable. To be effective, efforts 
must be highly tailored to the country and culture involved, the individual prisoners 
participating and the environment into which the former violent extremist prisoners 
is ultimately released.
• Disengagement-related interventions may consist of a variety of activities including: 
psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work 
interventions; faith-based debate and dialogue; education; vocational training; creative 
therapies; physical therapies (e.g. yoga, sport, exercise); family activity; and social, 
cultural and recreational activities.
• To be effective, disengagement and social reintegration interventions should further 
be gender-sensitive and address the varying experiences, as well as the specific obstacles 
and challenges which women may face.
• Taking due account of the availability of resources, the delivery of disengagement and 
social reintegration interventions for violent extremist prisoners should not have a 
negative impact on, but be accompanied by, the delivery of rehabilitation programmes 
for the “regular” prison population in order not to provide any “special group” status, 
which may result in hostility or other prisoners aspiring to be violent extremists.
• The goal of all of all above prison-based interventions related to violent extremist 
prisoners should be to change their behaviour so that they renounce the use of violence 
to achieve their objectives. This reflects the fact that having a radical belief system 
alone is not necessarily a threat to prison (or community) safety and security.
• Reporting on disengagement activity is an important feature to ensure accountability, 
to facilitate the adaptation of interventions, and as a foundation for evaluation. 
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Monitoring and evaluating an intervention should equally occur to determine whether 
the goals were appropriate, the activities were efficiently implemented and the objec-
tives were met.
• A key element for ensuring the continuous development of interventions, learning and 
advocacy related to the disengagement of violent extremist prisoners is independent 
research of the highest quality.
Chapter 6.  Managing the implementation of disengagement 
interventions
• An integrated case management system approach should be adopted for violent 
extremist prisoners, which uses a common framework, tools and language to assess, 
identify needs and monitor progress, and which updates the outcomes during violent 
extremist prisoners’ imprisonment, transition to release and community supervision.
• All practitioners, including security, custodial, ancillary, supervisory and administrative 
staff members who do not have a direct role to play in delivering structured interven-
tions, should contribute to maintaining conditions conducive to intervention delivery 
and to supporting progress in disengagement.
• Where available, an intervention team should include a multidisciplinary group of 
specialists who implement disengagement interventions, including: psychologists, psy-
chiatrists, faith leaders, sports instructors, art therapists, social workers, vocational 
guidance officers, teachers and health-care professionals.
• For interventions team members to engage effectively with violent extremist prisoners, 
it is important that each intervention team has one or more members who speak the 
language of the violent extremist prisoners held in the prison in which they work.
• The specific duties of the interventions team should include: undertaking an initial 
assessment of violent extremist prisoners to identify risks, needs and appropriate inter-
ventions; completing and update case file records; delivering interventions; participating 
in case conferences; completing reassessments at regular intervals; and using the 
materials, tools and equipment provided for disengagement interventions.
• The interventions team should work closely with the director of the prison in which 
they operate to ensure that the director is fully aware of intervention requirements 
and activities, and that those requirements and activities are appropriate to the security 
arrangements within that prison.
• At headquarters level, there should be a supervisory or management team that holds 
overall responsibility for establishing, overseeing the development, implementation and 
evaluation of interventions, as well as providing mentoring and support for the prison-
based interventions teams.
• A single dynamic case file should be developed soon after a violent extremist prisoner’s 
admission to the prison, which should be updated and modified as he/she progresses 
through the institution. Intervention team members should attend regular team meet-
ings, participate in case reviews, and contribute to case conferences.
• Any institution implementing interventions will require a range of facilities including: 
meeting rooms (for one-to-one interviews and counselling); classrooms (for group 
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work, presentations and lectures); worship facilities; vocational training and other work-
shops; sports and exercise facilities; and facilities for creative and arts therapy.
• Violent extremist prisoners should be informed about the purpose of the interventions 
and the way they operate. Staff members should explain to violent extremist prisoners 
that participation in the programme is voluntary. Appropriate incentives should be put 
in place to encourage violent extremist prisoners to participate in interventions.
• Institutions should consider various ways to show recognition for participation in, and 
completion of, interventions including graduation ceremonies, awarding certificates 
and medals and inviting family and senior representatives of the community and/or 
community agencies to attend.
• In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media 
should take place to explain the positive disengagement activity taking place in prison, 
the types and purpose of interventions being delivered and the positive impact that 
they can have on violent extremist prisoners.
Chapter 7.  Preventing radicalization to violent extremism in prison
• While there is limited empirical evidence which would suggest a significant level of 
radicalization to violence in prisons, a number of factors and grievances (actual or 
perceived) unique to the prison context may, under certain circumstances, render 
prisoners more susceptible to being radicalized to violence.
• Prison administrators should implement measures to prevent prisons becoming loca-
tions in which violent extremism can thrive and where prisoners can be radicalized 
to violence. Addressing prison conditions and overcrowding are an essential part of 
efforts to avoid that prisoners join a violent extremist group for protection or for the 
satisfaction of basic physical needs.
• Recruiters are able to spot, assess and encourage potential vulnerable recruits to join 
a violent extremist cause and use a variety of approaches to recruitment. Prison admin-
istrations should be aware that they do not necessarily have a high profile, and often 
seem to conform to the prison regime. Charismatic leaders, on the other hand, are 
able to exploit emotional triggers such as hatred, revenge and frustration, and to guide 
the formation of a group identity around shared ideological commitment to using 
violence in order to achieve goals.
• Where there is evidence that a prisoner has been attempting to radicalize other pris-
oners to violence, prompt and decisive action should be taken (e.g. restrictions on his 
or her association with vulnerable prisoners, supervision of interactions, or transfers 
to another prison wing or prison).
• A number of indicators in the categories of (a) expressed opinions; (b) possession of 
relevant material; and (c) behaviour/behavioural changes may suggest vulnerability to 
radicalization to violence. Prison staff will need to take into consideration how reliable 
or significant signs are and whether there are other factors or issues that could indicate 
vulnerability.
• If prison administrations consider that support to reduce vulnerability to radicalization 
to violence is required, they should devise an appropriate support package for the 
prisoner being recruited.
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Chapter 8.  Preparing violent extremist prisoners for reintegration 
into the community
• In the vast majority of cases, violent extremist prisoners will at some point be released 
back into the community. Supporting the reintegrating of violent extremist prisoners 
into the community should therefore be a key element in any strategy for preventing 
and countering violent extremism.
• An individual release plan should be developed that identifies the violent extremist 
prisoner’s reintegration needs and circumstances, and determines the type of interven-
tions that the prisoner should access in order to maximize his or her chances for 
successful reintegration.
• Prison-based interventions should be put in place to prepare violent extremist prison-
ers for their release and re-entry into the community. The aim should be to move 
violent extremist prisoners to progressively less restrictive settings, based on periodic 
individual risk assessments.
• The social reintegration of violent extremist prisoners requires a holistic and multi-
disciplinary approach, with strong coordination among the different stakeholders 
involved, including civil society organizations, public institutions, the private sector, 
NGOs, families and communities. If relevant, psychological and religious counselling, 
employment assistance and/or support to the family should continue.
• Families can be vital partners in the reintegration process, and should be involved 
before the release of the violent extremist prisoner. Families can also play important 
monitoring functions after release. However, care should be taken to account for the 
fact that in some cases, the family can be part of the problem and hinder the disen-
gagement process.
• In order to create a welcoming and enabling environment and with a view to reduce 
stigmatization, educating society and public opinion is necessary to create social 
awareness and try to break barriers and prejudices around former violent extremist 
prisoners.
• Consideration should be given to providing protective measures when there is credible 
information that a reformed violent extremist may face threats to his or her life, or 
the lives of family members, during or upon release from custody.
• Formal or informal monitoring and supervision post-release can be an effective method 
to deter or interrupt recidivism. Close supervision and guidance can support and 
reinforce any pre-release agreements or contracts the former violent extremist prisoner 
has agreed to upon release.
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Glossary of key terms
The definitions contained in this glossary are for the purposes of this handbook only.
Accommodation  The (prison) housing in which violent extremist prisoners are 
located. This varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
includes: separation from the general prison population; isola-
tion from each other; concentration in one place; dispersal 
across a small number of prisons; and integration with the 
general prisoner population.
Assessment   The process of identifying who is a violent extremist prisoner 
and estimating the risks and needs of that prisoner before catego-
rizing him/her and planning an intervention to reduce risk of 
future violence and/or providing advice to judicial or other com-
petent authorities. Assessments should also identify those at risk 
of being radicalized to violence. Assessments should take place 
on arrival at the prison and at regular intervals thereafter.
Deradicalization  The process of changing the belief system, rejecting the extremist 
ideology, and embracing mainstream values. Deradicalization 
refers primarily to a cognitive rejection of certain values, atti-
tudes and views—in other words, a change of mind. It implies 
a cognitive shift, i.e. a fundamental change in understanding 
resulting from activities intended to help individuals to renounce 
radical or extreme ideas, beliefs and groups.
Disengagement  Social and psychological process whereby an individual’s com-
mitment to, and involvement in, violent extremism is reduced 
to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and 
engagement in violent activity. Disengagement from using, or 
supporting the use of, violence does not necessarily mean a change 
in an individual’s commitment to a radical or extremist cause. 
Disengagement involves a change in behaviour (renouncing the 
use of violence) rather than a change in fundamental beliefs.
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Extremists  Can be characterized as people who tend to reject equality and 
pluralism in society. Extremists strive to create a homogeneous 
society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek 
to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and 
subjugating minorities.
Intervention   Any action taken to assist or guide violent extremist prisoners 
in order to divert them from committing further violent 
offences, to help them lead law-abiding lives and to assist with 
social reintegration in the community. Some interventions may 
take place in the prison and others post-release. It is a purpose-
ful, planned activity, which aims to change the characteristics 
of the prisoner (attitudes, cognitive skills and processes, per-
sonality or mental health, and social, educational or vocational 
skills) that are believed to be the cause of the individual’s vio-
lent behaviour, with the intention to reduce the chance that 
the individual will commit future violent extremist offences.
Prison/Prisoner  Prison refers to any place of detention where a person is 
deprived of their liberty against his or her will. Prisoners refer 
to individuals held in detention who are: sentenced; convicted 
but pre-sentence; pretrial; or pre-charged.
Radicalization   A dynamic process whereby an individual may adopt ever more 
extreme ideas and goals. The reasons behind the process can 
be ideological, political, religious, social, economic and/or per-
sonal. A radical may seek to bring about a system-transforming 
radical solution for government and society through violent or 
non-violent means (for example, democratic means using per-
suasion and reform).
Radicalization to violence  The process by which people acquire radical or extremist beliefs 
and attitudes that involves the use of violent measures to 
achieve objectives.
Reintegration  Reintegration occurs at the end of incarceration, sometimes 
under formal supervision, sometimes without any assistance. 
Reintegration also refers to a process through which violent 
extremist prisoners move from custody to living in the 
community.
Religious conversion  A noticeable change in one’s religious or belief identity; a self-
conscious transformation that may take the form of a change 
from: one formal religion to another; an atheistic belief to a 
theistic belief; a recommitment to an existing religion.
Supervision   Refers both to assistance activities conducted by or on behalf 
of an implementing authority or agency and to actions taken 
to ensure that the violent extremist prisoner fulfils any condi-
tions or obligations imposed, including control where necessary. 
Violent extremist prisoners may be supervised very closely after 
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release, with requirements for frequent face-to-face meetings 
with a supervisor, a set curfew, monitoring of contacts with 
police, and in some cases electronic monitoring.
Violent extremist   Someone who promotes, supports, facilitates or commits acts 
of violence to achieve ideological, religious, political goals or 
social change. In some cases, a violent extremist prisoner may 
not be in prison for an offence (or alleged offence) related to 
violent extremism, but nonetheless has been assessed as being 
a violent extremist according to the definition set out above.
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Annex. Relevant international 
instruments, standards 
and principles
The following list of international instruments, standards and principles only 
refers to those cited in the Handbook: 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Banjul Charter) (Adopted 27 June 1981, entry 
into force on 21 October 1986)
American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica) (Adopted on 22 Novem-
ber 1969, entry into force on 18 July 1978)
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Adopted by the 
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers, 27 August to 7 September 1990)
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 45/111 of 14 December 1990)
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 
(Adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988)
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry 
into force on 26 June 1987)
Council of Europe
 − Resolution (76)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the treat-
ment of long-term prisoners (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 
February 1976)
 − Recommendation No. R (82)17 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
concerning custody and treatment of dangerous prisoners (Adopted by the Com-
mittee of Ministers on 24 September 1982)
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 − Recommendations CM/Rec(2003)23 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on the management by prison administrations of life-sentence and other 
long-term prisoners (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 October 2003)
 − Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the European Prison Rules (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 
January 2006)
 − Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on the European Code of Ethics for Prison Staff (Adopted by the Com-
mittee of Ministers on 12 April 2012)
 − Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states  concerning dangerous offenders (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 19 February 2014)
 − Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent 
extremism (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2016, at the 
1249th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies
Global Counterterrorism Forum
 − Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Coun-
tering Violent Extremism (2013)
 − Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice 
in the Criminal Justice Sector (2012)
 − Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012).
 − Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Vio-
lent Extremist Detainees (2012).
Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (the Luanda 
Guidelines) (Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 
55th Ordinary Session, 28 April to 12 May 2014)
Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas 
(Adopted by resolution 1/08 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 13 March 
2008)
Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa 
(Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 56th  Ordinary 
Session in Banjul, Gambia (21 April to 7 May 2015).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted by United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force on 23 March 
1976)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Adopted by United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force on 3 
January 1976)
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Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa (United Nations Economic and Social 
Council resolution 1997/36 of 21 July 1997, annex)
Recommendations on Life Imprisonment (United Nations Office at Vienna Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch, Life Imprisonment (UN Document ST/CSDHA/24), 1994)
United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for 
Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) (Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tion 65/229 of 16 March 2011)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) 
(Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/175 of 17 December 2015)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (Adopted by United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 45/110 of 14 December 1990)
United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism–
Report of the Secretary-General (2015) Seventieth session, A/70/674
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly reso-
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